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Introduction: 
Merleau-Ponty and Social 
Thought 
This is a study of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's social thought, its often 
troubled relations with Edmund Husserl's phenomenological philo-
sophy, and its equally ambivalent stance toward those approaches 
in the human sciences which take Ferdinand de Saussure's struc-
tural linguistics as their point of departure. It seeks to do justice to 
one of the more complex and elusive figures in contemporary 
philosophy and social theory. By the time of his death, Merlcau-
Ponty was regarded as 'the greatest of French phenomenologists'; 
yet his last writings questioned the very coherence of Husserl's 
project.' He built a case for Marx's philosophy of history which is 
among the most subtle in the Marxian tradition; and he produced 
one of the most powerful and merciless critiques Marxism has ever 
received.2 He was the first French philosopher to appreciate the 
importance of Saussure's linguistics; but even his admirers admit 
that the things he purported to find in Saussure are simply not there 
to be found.3 He was the author of a corpus of works whose 
relevance for contemporary social theory has been matched only by 
the striking indifference which they all too often have received.4 He 
was and remains an enigmatic and compelling thinker. As one of his 
most able readers once confessed, 'Thinking about him produces a 
kind of verbal vertigo.' 5 
The life and the reputation 
He was born in 1908 and, despite the loss of his father in the First 
World War, enjoyed what he later described to Jean-Paul Sartre as 
'an incomparable childhood' .6 He attended the Parisian lycees 
Janson-dc-Sailly and Louis-lc-Grande and in 1930 graduated from 
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the Ecole Normale Supcrieure. It was there that he first met Sartre, 
whose work would both inspire and annoy him for the rest of his life. 
While teaching philosophy at various lycees in the 1930s he made 
the acquaintance of Claude Levi-Strauss and Simone de Beauvoir, 
entered into a brief association with the group around the Catholic left 
journal Esprit, and attended- along with Raymond A ron, Georges 
Bataille~ Raymond Queneau, Jacques Lacan, Eric Weill, and 
(occasionally) Andre Breton- Alexandre Kojeve's historic lectures 
on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit at the Ecole Practique des 
Hautes Etudes. By the end of the decade he had become interested 
in the phenomenology of Edmund Husser!, whose efforts to provide 
'an inventory of consciousness as milieu of the universe' would 
remain a lifelong point of reference for his own work.7 His these 
complementaire, The Structure of Behaviour, was completed in 
1938 and published four years later. 
He served in the infantry between 1939 and 1940. During the 
Occupation he resumed contact with Sartre through the Resistance 
group 'Socialism and Liberty', the two discovering that by different 
paths they had come to a common interest in Husser! and 
Heidegger. He completed his major work, Phenomenology of 
Perception ( 1945), shortly before the end of the war, drawing in 
part on a collection of Husserl's unpublished manuscripts which had 
been transported from Louvain to Paris in 1944." After the 
Liberation, he collaborated with Sartre in the publication of the 
review Les Temps Moderncs, serving as political editor and 
publishing essays on philosophy, politics, and the arts which were 
subsequently reprinted as Sense and Non-Seme ( 1948). A series of 
articles on Arthur Koestler's novel Darkness at Noon became the 
basis for his controversial study of the Moscow trials, Humanism 
and Terror ( 194 7). 
Having received his doctorate on the strength of his first two 
books, Merleau-Ponty taught at the University of Lyon and the 
Ecole Normale, offering courses on the philosophy of language, 
psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychology and the social theory of Dur-
kheim, Mill, and Weber. In 1949 he was named to a position at the 
Sorbonne in 'Child Psychology and Pedagogy'. There he taught a 
sequence of courses on the linguistic and cognitive development of 
the child, the relations of the child with adults, and -on a more 
theoretical plane - the relationship between phenomenology and 
the human sciences.9 
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As a consequence of longstanding political differences exacer-
bated by the Korean War, Merleau-Ponty broke with Sartre and 
resigned from the editorial board of Les Temps Modernes in 1952.10 
In the same year he was appointed to the chair of philosophy at the 
College de France, a position which had been held a generation 
earlier by Henri Bergson. His inaugural lecture, In Praise of 
Philosophy ( 1953), was dedicated to the memory of his mother, 
with whom he had remained very close. She had died in the same 
year as his appointment and his dispute with Sartre. 
His courses at the College de France and his writings throughout 
the 1950s spoke to his desire to complete the analysis begun in 
Phenomenology of Perception with an account of expression and a 
philosophy of history. Adventures of the Dialectic (1955), over half 
of which was consumed by a detailed and bitter critique of Sartre's 
philosophy and politics, explored the promise and the shortcomings 
of the Marxian philosophy of history. A series of masterful essays, 
subsequently republished as Signs (1960)- a work whose elegiac 
introduction recorded the healing of the breach with Sartre -
probed the nature of expression in philosophy, art, and politics. In 
the latter half of the 1950s he became increasingly critical of 
Husserl's standpoint and increasingly receptive to certain aspects of 
Martin Heidegger's work. He now felt it was necessary to elaborate 
a 'new ontology' which would be presented 'without any compro-
mise with humanism, nor moreover with naturalism, nor finally with 
theology' .11 
He died suddenly on 3 May 1961. At the time he was working on 
a manuscript posthumously published as The Visible and the 
Invisible ( 1964). Another unfinished manuscript, begun before his 
appointment to the College de France and abandoned sometime 
around 1952, was eventually published under the title The Prose of 
he World (1969). 
·His career as a writer thus began in the wake of Sartre's 
existentialism and ended on the eve of the counter-offensive 
Levi-Strauss would launch, in The Savage Mind (a book dedicated 
to Merleau-Ponty's memory), against Sartre, phenomenology, and 
the cogito. 12 Throughout the 1950s Merleau-Ponty had sought to 
distance his understanding of phenomenology from that of Sartre 
by marshalling the very authorities which, as Vincent Descomhes 
has noted, 'would be invoked against all forms of phenomenology 
after 1960': 
----------- _j 
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During the fifties, Saussurian linguistics and the structural 
anthropology of Levi-Strauss were his allies. It is as if these allies 
in the resistance to Sartrian activism transformed themselves, 
after Merleau-Ponty's death in 1961, into opponents of 
phenomenology in general, forming the heteroclite camp which 
was christened 'structuralism' .13 
Once those lines had been drawn, it was clear to the structuralists 
where Merleau-Ponty belonged: on the other side of the divide 
which separated them from phenomenology. His critique of Sartre, 
however bitter, appeared in retrospect to have been but a family 
squabble. Gilles De leuze, reviewing Michel Foucault, expressed as 
succinctly as anyone the concerns that had come to the fore with the 
new decade: 
A cold and concerted destruction of the subject, a lively distaste 
for the notion of origin, of lost origin, of recovered origin, a 
dismantling of the unifying pseudo-synthesis of consciousness, a 
denunciation of all the mystifications of history performed in the 
name of progress, of consciousness, and of the future of reason. 14 
Michel Foucault, reviewing Gilles Deleuze, pressed home how 
different all of this was from Merleau-Ponty: 
Logique du sense [Deleuze's book of 1969] can be read as the 
most alien book imaginable from Tile Phenomenology of Percep-
tion. In this latter text, the body-organism is linked to the world 
through a network of primal significations, which arise from the 
perception of things, while, according to Deleuze, phantasms 
form the impenetrable and incorporeal surface of bodies; and 
from this process, simultaneously topological and cruel, some-
thing is shaped that falsely presents itself as a centred organism 
and that distributes at its periphery the increasing remoteness of 
things.u 
Where Merleau-Ponty remained faithful to Husserl's call for a 
return to the 'things themselves' and sought access, in the world of 
perception, to the 'origin of truth', the most influential thinkers of 
the 1960s were suspicious of the entire vocabulary which spoke of 
origins, of returns, and even of truth. Where Merlcau-Ponty sought 
Introduction: Merleau-Ponty and Social Thought 5 
'foundations' and 'grounds', they found only 'ruptures' and 'dis-
placements'. And thus he came to suffer the cruellest of fates which 
can befall a French thinker: he became unfashionable!6 
Such a reading of his work, however, is a bit too neat. His 
structuralist critics were as blind to the ambivalences which wracked 
his writings as his phenomenological disciples. Both defined his 
achievement almost exclusively in terms of the Phenomenology of 
Perception - structuralists to criticise it, phenomenologists to 
embrace it. But while the Phenomenology of Perception may be his 
most impressive work, his philosophical development did not end in 
1945. He saw the need to address problems which it had barely 
mentioned. And in addressing these problems he came to see that it 
was necessary to rethink the grounds on which the Phenomenology 
of Perception rested. 
The works and the lacunae 
The itinerary Merleau-Ponty intended to pursue is sketched clearly 
enough in a prospectus he drew up at the time of his candidacy to the 
College de France. In it, Merleau-Ponty saw his work as falling into 
two distinct phases: (i) an attempt 'to restore the world of 
perception' and (ii) an attempt 'to show how communication with 
others, and thought, take up and go beyond the realms of 
perception which initiated us to the truth'. 17 The first stage, 
consisting of The Structure of Behaviour and Phenomenology of 
Perception, had been completed by 1945. The second phase, which 
would trace the 'sublimation' of the perceptual world, had been 
anticipated in a few of his post-war essays - Merleau-Ponty 
specifically pointed to Humanism and Terror and to essays on 
CCzanne and Simone de Bcauvoir's novel L 'Invitee, both of which 
had been collected in Sense and Non-Sense. But, he noted, 'the 
philosophical foundations of these essays arc still to be rigorously 
elaborated' .18 This was the task reserved for a work tentatively 
titled The Origin of Truth. As a prologue to this book, Merleau-
Ponty planned to write a study of literary expression, to be called 
The Prose of the World. It would approach 'less directly' the process 
by which the world of perception was sublimated into a world of 
symbols which were, in turn, shaped in history, and would focus on 
how writers such as Montaigne, Stendhal, Proust, Breton, Arbaud, 
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and Valery took up existing conventions of speech and employed 
them in new ways. 19 
While Merleau-Ponty seems initially to have conceived The Prose 
of the World as 'a sort of What is Literature?'20 - here, as elsewhere, 
Sartre would serve as a spur for his own studies- the implications of 
the book reach beyond the fields of aesthetics or poetics. In his 
prospectus, Merleau-Ponty expressed the desire to 'elaborate the 
category of prose beyond the confines of literature and give it a 
sociological meaning'.21 He seems to have wanted to employ the 
analyses developed in The Prose oftlte World as prototypes for his 
inquiries into the domain of social theory proper: 
The linguistic relations among men should help us understand the 
more general order of symbolic relations and of institutions, 
which assure the exchange not only of thoughts but of all types of 
values, the co-existence of men within a culture and, beyond it, 
within a single history .22 
Such an approach to history, he argued in his inaugural lecture at 
the College de France, could overcome the shortcomings of 
Hegelian and Marxist philosophies of history by showing a way 
beyond the fruitless opposition of 'things versus consciousness' .23 ·, 
His hopes, however, never bore fruit. The Prose of the World was 
abandoned sometime around 1952 and while certain of the 
implications of the inaugural lecture were pursued in courses on 
language, literature, and history conducted at the College de France 
between 1952 and 1955;• the next work he published was not the 
promised elaboration of a sociologically relevant account of prose. 
Instead, drawing on discussions of Weber and Lukacs from his 
1953-4 course 'Materials for a Theory of History' and coupling 
them with a blistering critique of Sartre's 1952 articles 'The 
Communists and Peace', he produced Adl'enlllres of the Dialectic, a 
work which he described in its preface as a set of 'samplings, 
probings, philosophical anecdotes, the beginnings of analyses'.25 
The reader who searches for a sequel to the Phenomenology of 
Perception which would show how the 'had ambiguity' of perceptual 
life gives birth to the 'good ambiguity' of expression is thus brought 
up short. Had Merleau-Ponty died in 1953, leaving The Prose of the 
World unfinished, one could try to flesh out the argument by turning 
to the essays which immediately preceded it and, when necessary, 
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making recourse to Phenomenology of Perception in hopes of 
ferreting out the more general presuppositions on which the entire 
enterprise rested. But Merleau-Ponty died in 1961, not 1953, and 
The Prose of the World was not interrupted; it was abandoned. It 
may very well be not simply an unfinished book; it is quite possibly a 
book which Merleau-Ponty found to be unfinishable. 
The difficulties facing a reader who desires to complete what 
Claude Lefort once termed Merleau-Panty's 'unfinished thought' 26 
do not, however, end here. With his attempt to show how 
expression took up and transcended the world of perception now 
abandoned, Merleau-Ponty went on to call into question the 
conclusions he had reached in the first phase of his career. It is not 
simply The Prose of the World which became problematic for him; 
he also came to regard The Structure of Behaviour and the 
Phenomenology of Perception with ever-greater suspicion. 
Throughout the 1950s Merleau-Ponty was working on a manus-
cript which was tentatively titled, at one time or another, Being and 
Meaning, Genealogy of the True, The Origin of Truth, and finally 
The Visible and the Invisible. 27 In the 'working notes' Lefort 
appended to the unfinished text of The Visible and the Invisible, 
Merleau-Ponty stressed the need for a study which 'takes up again, 
deepens and refines my first two books' and which would thus bring 
the results of the Phenomenology of Perception to 'ontological 
specification'.28 He felt that it was necessary 'to show that what one 
might consider "psychology" (Phenomenology of Perception) is in 
fact ontology' and considered one of the central tasks of this 
ontology to be 'the elaboration of the notions that have to replace 
that of transcendental subjectivity, those of subject, object, mean-
ing' .29 The purpose of The Visible and the Invisible, at first glance, 
would thus appear to be that of showing that the discussions of 
incarnate subjectivity in the Phenomenology of Perception were not 
to be taken simply as a contribution to the understanding of the 
subject; they were, more importantly, an entree to an account of the 
structure of being.30 
But it is apparent from some of the working notes that more was 
afoot here than a simple clarification of what the Phenomenology of 
Perception had presumed; Merleau-Ponty also stressed that certain 
of the accounts offered in the earlier book were in crucial ways 
deficient 'due to the fact that in part I retained the philosophy of 
"consciousness" '.31 The problems posed in the Phenomenology of 
8 Maurice Mer/eau-Ponty 
Perception, he wrote, 'are insoluble because I start there from the 
"consciousness"-"object" distinction' .32 It was not enough, then, 
simply to clarify the argument of the Phenomenology of Perception. 
Increasingly, Merleau-Ponty seems to have felt that it was necessary 
to reformulate the arguments attempted there from a standpoint 
other than that of the reflecting subject. A note written a little over a 
year before his death indicates the magnitude of the revisions he 
had in mind: 
Replace the notions of concept, idea, representation with the 
notions of dimensions, articulation, level, hinges, pivots, config-
uration - - The point of departure = the critique of the usual 
conception of the thing and its properties-+ critique of the logical 
notion of the subject, and of logical inherence --.. critique of the 
positil'e signification (differences·between significations), signifi-
cation as a separation [ecart], theory of predication- founded on 
this diacritical conception.33 
A set of terms deriving from the 'philosophy of consciousness' 
(concept, idea, mind, representations) is to be replaced with a new 
set of terms (dimensions, articulations, levels, hinges, pivots, 
configurations) which neither give primacy to the standpoint of 
consciousness nor rest on a distinction between subject and object. 
Even before this explicit recognition that the vocabulary of the 
'philosophy of consciousness' had to be rejected, a peculiar new 
argot begins to make its way into Merleau-Ponty's published 
writings. 'Vision' replaces 'perception', 'carnal existence' is used 
instead of 'corporeal existence', 'Earth' is used in place of 
Merlcau-Ponty's more usual 'world', 'being' begins to be written 
with a capital letter, and 'flesh', perhaps the most important of these 
new categories, gradually comes into promincnce.34 At roughly the 
same time a curious shift of agency begins to occur at decisive 
moments in some of Mcrlcau-Ponty's writings. In his last essay, 
'The Eye and the Mind', we arc told that painters sometimes find 
the relationship between themselves and the things they paint 
reversed and sense 'that things arc looking at them', while the notes 
to The Visible and the /m·isihlr stress the necessity of saying 'that 
things have us, it is not we who have things ... language has us ... it 
is not we who have language ... it is being that speaks within us and 
not we who speak of being' ,35 
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It is by no means clear what the ultimate goal of these changes in 
terminology, expression, and voicing might have been. Commen-
tators on The Visible and the Invisible have found in it a shift 'from 
phenomenology to metaphysics' / 6 a replacement of 'time' by 
'Being' as the central analytic category,37 an abandonment of 
Husserl's notion of intentionality as a point of departure,38 a 
recognition of the degree to which 'philosophies of consciousness' 
must draw on the illusion of non-linguistic signification to support 
the cogito ,39 a 'displacement of the place of thought' ,4° a 'defenest-
ration' of the philosophy of the cog ito : 1 and a 'ritual killing of the 
father' - Husser! - that was both 'pious and pitiless' .42 Indeed, as 
Marjorie Grene has observed, perhaps the only thing that is 'wholly 
clear' in this 'enigmatic document' is that Merleau-Ponty saw the 
need to develop 'a new, or renewed, ontology' .43 
This is a study of Merleau-Ponty's social thought and not an 
account of his ontology. But while I shall make no attempt to 
decode all the riddles of Merleau-Ponty's last writings, the fact that 
Merleau-Ponty was engaged, in the last years of his life, on a project 
which called into question certain aspects of his earlier work cannot 
be ignored. Merleau-Ponty attempted to elaborate an account of 
expression and history which presumed the validity of certain 
arguments he had articulated in the Phenomenology of Perception. 
He could not do it and, after abandoning The Prose of the World, he 
began to outline an argument which culminated in a work which 
differs markedly from the Phenomenology of Perception. While it is 
unreasonable to argue that the failure of his philosophy of 
expression and history was the sole cause of his decision to take up 
again the questions which the Phenomenology of Perception 
presumably settled, it is equally unreasonable to assume that his 
failed attempt at an account of expression and history and his 
critique of his earlier work have nothing to do with one another. 
What they might have to do with one another is one of the questions 
I have sought to investigate in this book. 
An m·erview and some canals 
My concern, then, will be with the way Merleau-Ponty's efforts at 
articulating the social dimension of his phenomenological account 
of perception led him to adopt a stance towards his initial standpoint 
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which, while paralleling in certain respects the cnt1que of 
phenomenology which developed in France in the decade after his 
death, nevertheless remained in a productive tension with central 
clements of Husserl's project. The argument will be elaborated by 
examining the evolution of Merleau-Ponty's thinking on three 
issues: (i) the relationship of philosophy and the human sciences 
(Chapter 2); (ii) the nature of intersubjectivity and the problem of 
our knowledge of others (Chapter 3); and (iii) the character of 
expression and of historical meaning (Chapter 4). These three 
problems not only illuminate different aspects of Merleau-Ponty's 
social theory, they also show how his thought developed as a 
consequence of a dialogue with a few key thinkers. Thus, Chapter 2 
examines Merleau-Ponty's stance towards Husser! and Levi-
Strauss, Chapter 3 is concerned with his stormy relationship with 
Sartre and, to a lesser extent, his debts to the work of Jacques 
Lacan, and Chapter 4 explores his use of Saussure and its 
significance in his interpretation of Marx, Weber, and Georg 
Lukacs. In a concluding chapter I have attempted, in a somewhat 
more cursory fashion, to locate Merleau-Ponty's final position with 
regard to Husserlian phenomenology and structuralist analyses. 
The perspective I have sought to open on Merleau-Ponty's work 
differs from that of other studies. I have been concerned with 
keeping his most general notions about the nature of society and his 
understanding of the proper concerns and character of the human 
sciences at the centre of this account. Such a focus necessarily 
implies certain choices about what is to be highlighted and what is to 
be neglected. I have ventured into his more strictly philosophical 
works - The Strucwre of Behaviour, the Phenomenolot:y of 
Perception, and The Visihle and the bn•isible- only in so far as they 
cast light on the way in which he conceived the relationship between 
philosophy and the human sciences, on his account of the 'Other', or 
on his account of expression and history!4 Likewise, I have 
discussed his more exclusively political works- I am thinking here 
primarily of some of the essays in Sense and Non-Seme and Sigm as 
well as llumcmism and Terror- only in so far as they illuminate the 
motives behind his turn from Marx to Saussure!5 I have forgone an 
examination of his critique of contemporary psychology in order to 
devote more attention to his discussion of developments within 
ethnology, sociology, and linguistics!8 Perhaps most important, the 
account I have given of the development of his critique of 
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Husserlian phenomenology has focused on the impetus given by his 
failed attempt at elaborating a philosophy of expression and history 
and thus has not been able to consider other possible motivations for 
his critique of Husserl. This is, of course, not to deny that there were 
other influences at work. Certainly his renewed interest in Heideg-
ger in the last years of his life goes a long way towards explaining at 
least some of the motivations behind the argument of The Visible 
and the Invisible; but I will have less to say about Heidegger here 
than about Levi-Strauss, Lacan, Marcel Mauss, and Max Weber. 
This is a study of Merleau-Ponty's views on society and the social 
sciences, and whatever Heidegger (or Bergson, or Scheler) might 
have contributed to the development of his ontology, he had little to 
say to Merleau-Ponty's social thought.47 
I should also note that I have tried to be more forthright than has 
sometimes been the case in the secondary literature about 
the peculiarities of Merleau-Ponty's interpretations of other think-
ers. Much in them seems to involve either serious misunderstand-
ings or wanton misrepresentations. His reading of Husser!, for 
example, is quite suspect; his discussion of Saussure, more often 
than not, is simply wrong. There seems little reason to ignore his 
somewhat wayward exegeses of other thinkers' works, especially 
when an understanding of the degree to which he misread other 
thinkers may be one of the best guides we have to understanding his 
own peculiar concerns and emphases. I need to stress as well that it 
is not at all clear that Merleau-Ponty was able to bring many of the 
problems discussed here to anything even remotely resembling a 
convincing or even an unequivocal conclusion. But it must also be 
stressed that in almost every case I would rather have Merleau-
Ponty's misreadings and equivocations than the scrupulous but 
tedious exegeses of more responsible, but less provocative, com-
mentators or the clear but implausible or inconsequential conclu-
sions of more single-minded, but less gifted, theorists. Merleau-
Ponty may have been a staggeringly inaccurate reader of Saussure, 
but what he forced Saussure to say is as important as anything 
Saussure actually said. Merleau-Ponty may have been maddeningly 
obscure as to what his final conclusions were with regard to the 
problems with which he wrestled; but the problems he faced were 
real problems, and if he did not manage to solve them, at least he 
noticed them. 
That, in the end, is what matters about Merleau-Ponty. He did 
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not answer all of the questions he asked, but the questions he posed 
more often then not still lie at the heart of contemporary social 
theory. Nearly a quarter of a century after his death he remains 
current. His problems are ours, and if a reading of his work does not 
make them vanish, it at least allows us to understand a bit more 
clearly what is at stake. 
------------ ~ ~------
2 
Phenomenology, 
Structuralism, and the 
Human Sciences 
Descartes's ghost 
Explaining phenomenology at the Sorbonne in February, 1929, 
Edmund Husser! began: 
No philosopher of the past has affected the sense of phenomenol-
ogy as decisively as Rene Descartes ... Phenomenology must 
honor him as its genuine patriarch ... The study of Descartes' 
Meditations has influenced directly the formation of the develop-
ing phenomenology ... to such an extent that phenomenology 
might almost be called a new, twentieth century, Cartesianism.' 
Descartes had shown phenomenology the path it must follow: 
'Anyone who seriously considers becoming a philosopher must 
once in his life withdraw into himself and then, from within, attempt 
to destroy and rebuild all previous learning.' 2 
Three decades later, in Geneva, Claude Levi-Strauss called on 
the city's native son for aid in exorcising the spell the patriarch of 
phenomenology had cast over the human sciences: 
To attain acceptance of oneself in others (the goal assigned to 
human knowledge by the ethnologist), one must first deny the self 
in oneself. To Rousseau we owe the discovery of this principle, 
the only one on which to base the sciences of man. Yet it was to 
remain inaccessible and incomprehensible as long as there 
reigned a philosophy which, taking the cogito as its point of 
departure, was imprisoned by the hypothetical evidences of the 
self.3 
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Descartes believed that one could proceed directly 'from a man's 
interiority to the exteriority of the world'; he forgot that 'societies, 
civilizations - in other words, worlds of men - place themselves 
between these two extremes' .4 
For Husser), Descartes was the model that philosophy must 
emulate; for Levi-Strauss, he was a symbol of everything the human 
sciences must reject. And for Merleau-Ponty, he was the last to 
know that 'secret of equilibrium' between philosophy and science 
which subsequent generations could neither completely recover nor 
totally forget. Science, philosophy, and theology could mutually 
support one another in his system only because 'the mental universe 
was not torn apart' and 'men remained at the entrance to the three 
paths' .5 The equilibrium had been 'lost for good', but its memory 
continued to haunt philosophy and the human sciences: 'Our 
science and our philosophy are two faithful and unfaithful conse-
quences of Cartesianism, two monsters horn from its dismember-
ment.'8 
Virtually all of Merleau-Ponty's works can be read as attempts 
to reunite parties which, since Descartes, had increasingly come to 
face one another as antagonists. His first two books displayed a 
mastery of the relevant empirical research in behavioural and 
Gestalt psychology. His courses at the Sorbonne surveyed a broad 
spectrum of work in developmental psychology and linguistics. He 
studied the works of Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss and was an 
enthusiastic commentator on the writings of Claude Levi-Strauss. 
Even as he moved closer to the work of Martin Heidegger in the last 
years of his life, he chided Heidegger for condemning philosophy to 
silence too quickly hy ignoring the light which developments in the 
natural sciences cast on fundamental issues in ontology.7 
Merleau-Ponty found in phenomenology a philosophy which 
seemed uniquely open to the contributions of the empirical 
sciences. Yet Levi-Strauss, one of the 'non-philosophers' on whom 
he drew for philosophical insights," argued that the development of 
his discipline had been thwarted for too long by that 'philosophy of 
the cogito' which Husser) had sought to perpetuate. Our examina-
tion of Merleau-Ponty's social thought can take its start from these 
diverging evaluations of the relevance of Husserlian phenomenol-
ogy for the human sciences. 
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In the Turkish bath 
Merleau-Ponty and Levi-Strauss were exact contemporaries, born 
in 1908 - a fact that occasioned a set of arcane references to the 
number eight at the start of Levi-Strauss's inaugural lecture at the 
College de France.9 They first met in 1930 when, along with Simone 
de Beauvoir, they were brought together at the Lycee Janson-de-
Sailly to complete the training which led to the 'agregation', the 
examination which certifies would-be teachers as competent to 
teach in lycees. 10 
Like Simone de Beauvoir's slightly older friend, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty and Levi-Strauss were repelled by the academic 
philosophy in which they were trained. Sartre found the lectures in 
the 'cours magistral' to be 'idiotic' and 'abstained from ever going to 
the Sorbonne'.11 The questions which had driven him to philosophy 
-'Why do we lead a life which is disqualified by its absences? And 
what docs it mean to live?' - found no answers in the lecture hall: 
Futile and serious, our teachers were ignorant of History. They 
replied that these were questions which shouldn't be asked, or 
that were badly expressed, or (and this was a tic of every teacher 
at the time) that 'the answers were to be found in the questions'. 
To think is to weigh, said one of them, who did neither.12 
Levi-Strauss was no kinder toward his reputedly 'advanced' 
teacher, Gustave Rodrigues: 
He was, it is true, a militant member of the S.F.I.O. [the French 
Socialist Party]: but on the philosophical level all he had to offer 
was a mixture of Bergsonism and Neo-Kantianism . . . He 
expounded his dry dogmatic views with great fervour and 
gesticulated passionately throughout his lessons. I have never 
known so much naive conviction allied to greater intellectual 
povcrty.13 
Mcrlcau-Ponty's reaction was much the same. He characterised the 
curriculum in which he was trained as 'a march to the Kant of the 
Three Critiques'. It ignored such concerns as art, the problem of the 
other, and history; it reduced speech to an 'exterior accompani-
ment' of the thoughts of a 'pure consciousness'. u All these issues, 
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typically consigned to the disciplines of empirical psychology and 
sociology, demanded a philosophy far more willing to confront the 
ambiguities of existence than that rationalism which, with the 
eruption of the Second World War, was 'collapsing before our 
eyes' .15 
The tradition that Sartre, Levi-Strauss, and Merleau-Ponty were 
rejecting was epitomised by Leon Brunschvicg, the dominant 
influence in philosophy at the Sorbonne from 1909 until the 
German occupation in 1940. Paul Nizan, Sartre's friend and 
classmate, sketched a nasty portrait of the man in his 1931 novel, 
Aden, Arabie: 
This little retailer of sophisms had the physical appearance of an 
old maitre d'hotel who late in life had been permitted to grow 
stout and wear a beard ... Winking, letting fly his witicisms as 
though they were decrees of reason, suggesting in every speech: 
leave it to me, everything is going to be all right, I can fix 
everything, both in souls and in the sciences.16 
Brunschvicg's thought, as Merleau-Ponty characterised it in a more 
temperate recollection from 1959, 'consisted primarily of an effort 
of reflection, of a return to the self' which took Kant and Descartes 
as its models.17 He viewed the existence of objects of knowledge as 
relative to the act of judgement which creates them; the copula 'is' 
had no force of existence for him - an argument which greatly 
annoyed Gabriel Marcel, an early influence on Merleau-Ponty- it 
merely expressed the synthesis which consciousness had effected 
through its own activity.1 ~ Consciousness, however, was not a static 
category for Brunschvicg. The history of western thought could he 
viewed as a progress, at times interrupted, from the individual 
cogito to that universal cogitn which found its purest expression in 
science, mathematics, and philosophical reflection. This was what 
Nizan, Sartrc, Levi-Strauss, and Mcrlcau-Ponty could not accept. 
Empirical history bore scant resemblance to Brunschvicg's 'progrcs 
de Ia comcicncc' and his focus on the activities of scientific 
consciousness said nothing about the life of concrete individuals. 19 
What did? Levi-Strauss found his answer when he chanced upon 
Robert H. Lowie's Primitil"c Society and at last made his escape 
from 'the claustrophobic, Turkish bath atmosphere' of philosophy 
by turning in 1934 to the field of ethnology.20 Nizan reached his 
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conclusion even earlier. By the mid-1920s he was associated with 
the 'Philosophies' group, a circle of young radical intellectuals 
(including Georges Politzer, Henri Lefebvre, and Norbert Guter-
mann) who on occasion formed alliances with Andre Breton's 
surrealists in a common front against contemporary French philo-
sophy.21 Merleau-Ponty found an approach to philosophy that was 
'a good deal more concrete, a good deal less reflexive' than that of 
Brunschvicg in the writings of Henri Bergson.22 Jean Wahl's 1932 
study of William James, Alfred North Whitehead, and Gabriel 
Marcel, V ers le concret, struck a common chord in both Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty.23 And Alexandre Kojeve's lectures on Hegel's 
Pheno,;,enology of Spirit, with their radically secular and anthro-
pological interpretation of Hegel's work, had a decisive impact 
on Merleau-Ponty.24 But the thinker who would prove to be most 
crucial for both Merleau-Ponty and Sartre was Edmund Husserl. 
Waiting for phenomenology 
Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty wrote in 1945, 'existed as a 
movement' before it came to full consciousness of itself as a 
philosophy: 
It has been long on the way, and its adherents have discovered it 
in every quarter, certainly in Hegel and Kierkegaard, but equally 
in Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. 
Readers who encountered Husscrl or Heideggcr for the first time 
had the impression 'not so much of encountering a new philosophy 
as of recognizing what they had been waiting for' .25 
So it seems in the case of Sartrc, who first encountered what he 
had been waiting for at that fateful meeting with Raymond Aron 
and an apricot cocktail which Simone de Beauvoir preserved for 
posterity: 
We spent an evening together at the Bee de Gaz in the Rue 
Montparnassc. We ordered the speciality of the house, apricot 
cocktails; Aron said, pointing to his glass: 'You sec, my dear 
fellow, if you are a phenomenologist, you can talk about this 
cocktail and make philosophy out of it!' Sartrc turned pale with 
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emotion at this. Here was just the thing he had been longing to 
achieve for years- to describe objects just as he saw and touched 
them, and extract philosophy from the process.26 
Husser! provided Sartre with the escape route Levi-Strauss had 
found in ethnology. 'We have all read Brunschvicg, Lalande, 
Meyerson,' he wrote in 1939, 'we have all believed that the spidery 
mind trapped things in its web, covered them with a white spit and 
slowly swallowed them, reducing them to its own substance.' 27 
Phenomenology was the emetic he needed to counter this 'digestive 
philosophy': 
To know is to 'burst toward', to tear oneself out of the moist 
gastric intimacy, veering out there beyond oneself, out there near 
the tree and yet beyond it, for the tree escapes me and repulses 
me, and I can no more lose myself in the tree than it can dissolve 
itself in me.28 
Heady stuff, this phenomenology. It allowed Sartre to maintain the 
standpoint of the cogito without dissolving all reality into con-
sciousness. 
Merleau-Ponty's first encounter with Husserl's work was a good 
deal less colourful, and its impact was considerably weaker. He 
attended Husserl's lectures at the Sorbonne, although he under-
stood little of what was being said; Husser! lectured in German, and 
at this point Merleau-Ponty did not know the Janguage.29 By 1933 
he had drawn up a proposal for a thesis, 'On the Nature of 
Perception', which sought to demonstrate- against Brunschvicg-
that the 'sensible and the concrete' are 'ireducible to intellectual 
relations' and that the 'universe of perception is not assimilable to 
the universe of science' .30 But to demonstrate this, he turned not to 
Husser! (who is never mentioned in the initial proposal) but to 
Gestalt psychology and' Anglo-American realist philosophies' .31 He 
first became acquainted with Husserl's work in 1934, when Sartre 
returned from Berlin with a copy of Bussert's Ideas Towards a Pure 
Phenommology and Pllenomenological Plli/osoplly. After studying 
the book, he read- with less interest- Husserl's Logical Investiga-
tions and then took up the Cartesian Meditations and the Formal 
and Tramcendental Logic. 32 But he did not seem to find what he 
'had been waiting for' in phenomenology until he turned to 
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Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology (the first two parts of which appeared in the 
journal Philosophia in 1936), the essay 'The Origin of Geometry' 
(which appeared posthumously in the 1939 memorial issue of the 
Revue international de philosophic), and the unpublished second 
book of the Ideas (which Merleau-Ponty read, along with the 
unpublished third part of the Crisis, the virtually unobtainable 
posthumously published Experience and Judgement, and a 1934 
manuscript entitled 'Overthrow of the Copernican Doctrine' during 
a 1939 visit to the newly established Husser! archives in Louvain).33 
In these works he found a Husser! who, in his eyes, had rejected the 
standpoint of the 'estranged spectator' of the Cartesian rationalism 
and instead had taken up a study of concrete, individual existence 
that coincided perfectly with the position Merleau-Ponty himself 
had reached- in part under the influence of Gabriel Marcel, Max 
Scheler, Emmanuel Mounier, and Kojeve's Hegel-in The Structure 
of Behaviour }4 
Exits 
Four escapes from the Turkish bath of French philosophy: Levi-
Strauss to Brazil and Anglo-American ethnology, Nizan to Aden 
and Marx, and Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to Husser) -the former 
spending a year at the French institute in Berlin ( 1933-4 ), the latter 
staying in Paris, except for his brief trip to the Husser! archives. On 
the face of it, the route chosen by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty kept 
them closer- theoretically as well as geographically- to everything 
from which Levi-Strauss and Nizan were fleeing. Had not Husser! 
himself, in his lectures at the Sorbonne, stressed the continuity of his 
work with the project of Descartes? Could not the audience at the 
Sorbonne, whether more sympathetic to Brunschvicg or to Berg-
son, find resonances in Husserl's thought? Husser!, after all, shared 
Brunschvicg's conviction that philosophy had to be a rigorously 
scientific examination of the categories through which we give 
meaning to the world and, like Bergson, had a passion for the 
detailed description of the immediate data of consciousness and a 
conviction that 'intuition' was central to the practice of philo-
sophy.35 How could Merleau-Ponty escape from the prison of the 
cog ito by turning to a thinker who closed his Sorbonne lectures with 
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Augustine's 'Noli foras ire, in te redi, in interiore homine habitat 
veritas '?38 
The answer must be sought in the ambivalent relationship 
between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl. Merleau-Ponty's reading of 
Husserl was not Levi-Strauss's. For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenol-
ogy was not simply another 'philosophy of the cogito'; it was a 
philosophy which recognised the claims of the empirical sciences 
and put the cogito back in the world. He read Husser) in a 
notoriously 'creative' way, appropriating what he needed, rewriting 
what he could, overlooking what was irrelevant or antithetical to the 
project he had sketched for himself. He read Husser) this way at 
least in part because he had learned the tricks from Husser) himself, 
who had read Descartes in much the same way. So before we 
examine Merleau-Ponty's reading of Husser), we must acquaint 
ourselves with his paradigm: Husserl's reading of Descartes. 
llusserl's Descartes 
At the Sorbonne, Husser) had termed phenomenology a 'new, 
twentieth century Cartesianism'. When he expanded these lectures 
into his Cartesian Meditations ( 1931) he again called phenomenol-
ogy a 'neo-Cartesianism' but immediately added that 'precisely by 
its radical development of Cartesian motifs', phenomenology had 
been forced 'to reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of 
the Cartesian philosophy' .37 For Husser), the Cartesian project was 
thus a complex of vital but muddled intentions which had uncovered 
a set of suggestive but misunderstood themes.38 He shared with 
Descartes a conviction that philosophy alone could give the various 
empirical sciences the foundation which they now lacked. He was 
likewise convinced that the type of reflection which Descartes had 
introduced was the privileged path to this foundation. But he 
nevertheless felt that Descartes had misunderstood what it meant 
for philosophy to be rigorous and scientific, had employed his 
radical doubt in a fashion that was fundamentally misguided, and 
had an understanding of the cogito which was fatally flawed. 
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The ideal of science 
Like Descartes, Husser) saw the goal of philosophy to be that 
'conceptual distinctness and clarity' which is the hallmark of 
science, rather than that 'profoundity' which is 'an affair of 
wisdom' .39 He felt, however, that Descartes had been misled by a 
'fatal prejudice' which took the goal of one class of sciences- 'the 
ideal approximated by geometry and mathematical natural sci-
ences'- as the proper goal of any scientific philosophy .40 What was 
'fatal' here was the belief that a scientific account must terminate in 
a reference to 'a universal and absolutely pure world of physical 
bodies', a belief which ultimately rests on the assumption that 
sensory experience will not deceive us if we carefully purge our 
perceptions of all subjective distortions. In assuming that the 
essence of science consists of such a reference to a world of things 
which exist independently of the subject, Descartes had equated 
scientificity in general with one particular example: Galilean 
science.•• 
In Husserl's view, 'science' is by no means exhausted by what he 
terms the 'objective sciences'.42 The 'genuine concept of science' 
cannot be grasped 'by a process of abstraction based on comparing 
of the de facto sciences' .43 Rather, one must analyse the intentions 
which sustain any conceivable scientific endeavour. If this is done, 
science will be seen to be a search for 'truths which are valid, and so, 
once for all and for everyone' ! 4 Science is thus ultimately under-
stood as 'an order of cognition, proceeding from intrinsically earlier 
to intrinsically later cognitions' which at each point rests on the 
determination to derive each judgement from evidence which is 
certain!5 Understood in this way, the practice of science is agnostic 
towards ontology. It does not need to commit itself to any notion of 
what or how reality 'is'. It defines itself solely by its use of evidence, 
not by the alleged characteristics of this evidence. 
What is afoot here, as Eugen Fink noted in the Husserl-endorsed 
defence of phenomenology he wrote for Kant-Studien in 1933 (an 
essay which exercised a considerable influence on Merleau-Ponty's 
reading of Husser!), is a 'transformation of the idea of science' 
which, starting from the traditional conception of science as 
'world-immanent' knowledge,' "extends" the concept of science by 
developing a knowing which is "world-transcendent" '!8 Under the 
aegis of phenomenology, philosophy can no longer be viewed as one 
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science among others. Rather, it is 'in a definite sense prior to all 
worldly knowledge' .47 
The use of doubt 
To appreciate the peculiar notion of science to which Fink was 
alluding, we must turn to the second of Husserl's differences with 
Descartes: his reformulation of Descartes's method of radical 
doubt. Descartes had employed doubt in hopes of finding, like 
Archimedes, 'one point, fixed and immovable, to serve in lever-
age' .48 Husser!, in contrast, stressed that the goal of the suspension 
of the thesis of the natural standpoint- the constantly present but 
never explicitly articulated conviction that a self-subsisting world of 
facts exists 'out there beyond the subject'- was not to try to rescue 
'a little tag-end of the world' from which the project of restoring the 
once-doubted world might proceed.49 The phenomenological 
epoche or phenomenological reduction was for Husser! a 
methodological device which allowed him to illuminate a range of 
phenomena which might otherwise escape attention.50 It is not an 
attempt to replace the thesis of the natural standpoint with an 
antithesis; it is, rather, an attempt to 'shut off, 'disconnect' or 
'bracket' the thesis so that its functioning may be more carefully 
cxamincd.51 
This difference is worth underlining, for Mcrlcau-Ponty made 
much of it. Recall how Descartes began the third of his Meditations: 
I shall now close my eyes, stop my cars, withdraw all my sense, I 
shall even efface from my thinking all images of corporeal things; 
or since that can hardly be done. I shall at least view them as 
empty and false. 52 
Doubt appears here as a substitute for an operation which 'can 
hardly be done': the annihilation of the world. For Husser! it is 
precisely the persistance of the world- the inability of doubt alone 
to close our eyes, stop our cars, withdraw our sense, and purge our 
minds of images - which is crucial. The phenomenological epoche 
docs not annihilate the world; nor is that its intent. When we 
abandon the natural standpoint the world docs not vanish; we arc 
not left with nothing. Rather we are presented with a domain which 
' 'j
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we must now investigate on terms other than those which are 
suggested by the thesis of the natural standpoint. 53 
The status of the cog ito 
The most explicit and in many ways most basic of Husserl's 
differences with Descartes follows directly from his reformulation 
of the method of radical doubt. Since the world does not vanish, 
leaving the solitary thinking ego alone to contemplate its own 
existence, the cogito itself stands in need of reformulation: 
The transcendental heading, ego cogito, must ... be broadened 
by adding one more member. Eachcogito, each conscious process 
... "means" something or other and bears in itself, in this manner 
peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum .54 
The ego does not simply think, it must think about something. 
Consciousness is not simply conscious; it is consciousness of 
something. The world which Descartes had tried to shut out returns 
at the heart of the cogito as cogitatum .55 
This reformulation brings us to one of the better-known themes 
of Husserl's phenomenology: the so-called 'intentionality of con-
sciousness'. Husser) owed the term itself to Franz Brentano who, in 
turn, had taken up the Scholastic notion of 'intentional inexistence' 
in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint ( 1874) as a way of 
denoting that 'reference to content', 'direction upon an object' and 
'immanent objectivity' which characterises mental, as opposed to 
physical, phenomena.56 Husser!, however, had doubts about the 
soundness of 'the use of the word "psychical" as the equivalent of 
intentionality' .57 In the Cartesian Meditations he gave the term a 
carefully delimited meaning: 
The word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal 
fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of 
something; as a co giro, to bear within itself its cogitatum. 5" 
Defined in this way, the term says nothing about the ontological 
status of consciousness and does not provide, as it did for Brentano, 
an index by which the 'being of consciousness' could be set off 
against the 'being of objects' .59 
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Intentionality, as Husser) understood it, made no contribution to 
our understanding of human psychology. Still less did it force us to 
sec ourselves, in Sartre's words, 'on the road, in the town, in the 
midst of the crowd, a thing among things, a man among men' .60 The 
ego to which Husser) made reference was not the object of empirical 
psychology. Brcntano and Sartrc were, in effect, making what, for 
Husser), had been Descartes's fatal error: 
For Descartes, the Meditations work themselves out in the 
portentous form of a substitution of one's own psychic ego for the 
absolute ego, of psychological immanence for egological imma-
nence, of the evidence of psychic, "inner", or "self-perception" 
for egological self-perception; and this is also their continuing 
historical effect up to the present day.61 
To make these substitutions was to comprise one's analysis with a 
language which imported all of the prejudices of the natural 
standpoint into the description of the field which had been opened 
by its alleged suspension. To speak as if one were analysing 'an' ego 
(among other egos), to talk about a world 'outside' this ego, or to 
make usc of the 'dangerous first person singular' in describing the 
activities of this ego, would be to take for granted a set of 
distinctions- ego and alter ego, ego and world, 1 and you- which 
must be systematically constructed rather than simply invoked.62 
Husser\ argued that the entire Cartesian project had shipwrecked 
here, with 
the apparently insignificant but actually fateful change whereby 
the ego becomes a suh.Hantia cogitans, a separate human 'mens 
sive animm', and a point of departure for inference according to 
the principle of causality .63 
Descartes. certain that he exists as long as he thinks, but uncertain 
as to what it is that he is when he is thinking, surveyed a number of 
possible descriptions and concluded: 
I am therefore only a thinking thing, that is to say, a mind, an 
understanding or reason - terms the significance of which has 
hitherto been unknown to me. I am, then. a real thing, and really 
existent. What thing? I have said it, a thinking thing.64 
I , 
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This, for Husserl, was the fatal slip. With it, Descartes fathered not a 
'pure' phenomenology but rather a bastard mixture of philosophy 
and psychology: 
There begins with Descartes a completely new manner of 
philosophizing which seeks its ultimate foundations in the 
subjective. That Descartes, however, persists in pure objectivism 
in spite of its subjective grounding was possible only through the 
fact that the mens, which at first stood by itself in the epoche and 
functioned as the absolute ground of knowledge, grounding the 
objective science ... appeared at the same time to be grounded 
along with everything else as a legitimate subject matter within 
the sciences, i.e., in psychology.65 
There is, then, at the heart of the Cartesian project, a fundamental 
confusion. On the one hand, the ego is the ultimate basis on which 
all knowledge must rest, the foundation which gives rise to all 
concepts, the source from which all distinctions must be derived. 
But, at the same time, the ego is also an object in the world, defined 
by the same categories that apply to physical objects, and capable of 
being studied in the same way as all other physical objects: through 
causal analysis. A presupposition less account of the functioning of 
the ego - that 'first philosophy' which has the responsibility of 
grounding all other forms of inquiry - is thus transformed into an 
empirical psychology which battles onward with a host of 
unclarified presuppositions. 
Phenomenology and psychology 
The sins of the father, however, had once been the practices of the 
son. The same mingling of the transcendental and empirical 
subjects which Husser! bemoaned in Descartes lay at the basis of his 
own attempt, in the first (and only) volume of his Philosophy of 
Arithmetic (1891), at a psychological analysis of such concepts as 
plurality, unity, and number. The relationship between 
phenomenology and psychology thus merits closer scrutiny. It 
implies nothing less, as one commentator has suggested, than 'the 
whole progress of Husserl's philosophy'.68 
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Against 'psyclwlogism' 
The psychological inquiries begun in the first volume of the 
Philosophy of Arithmetic were to be extended, in the projected 
second volume, to the general logic of symbolic methods (in 
Husscrl's terminology, 'semiotics'). But this proved far more 
difficult than Husser! had initially conceived and the severe 
criticism Frcge directed against the first volume gave Husser! an 
addition impetus to rethink his approach.67 In lectures dating from 
as early as 1895, Husser! began the critique of psychological 
analyses of logical categories that would become the 'Prolegomen_a 
to Pure Logic', the first volume ofhisLogicallm•estigations (1900). 
The book won him an early reputation, in France and elsewhere, 
as a thinker squarely within the tradition of Frege, Bertrand 
Russell, and Anton Cournot.68 But, in the six investigations which 
made up the second volume (1901), Husserl appeared to many 
critics to have lapsed back into his old ways.69 While Husser! denied 
that psychology could clarify the origins of logical categories, he still 
maintained that epistemological criticism had to consist of a 
'descriptive examination of ... knowledge-experiences'. As he 
explained in the introduction to the second volume of the Logical 
lm·estigations: 
It is not the full science of psyclwlogy that serres as a foundation 
for pure logic, but certain classes of descriptions which arc the 
step preparatory to the theoretical researches of psychology. 
These, in so far as they describe empirical objects whose genetic 
connections the science wishes to pursue, also form the substrate 
for those fundamental abstractions in which logic seizes the 
essence of its ideal objects and connections with inward cvi-
dcnce.10 
Descriptive psychology could thus serrc two masters. It could be a 
preparatory stage for an account of the genesis of psychological 
categories, and as such was a prolegomena to empirical psychology, 
or- in so far as it remained purely descriptive- it could also serve as 
the foundation of logic. It is this latter usc of psychological 
description which Hus.,crl <;ailed 'phenomenology'. 
This satisfied no one- least of all Husser! himself. In a review 
essay of recent writings on logic published in 1903 and incorporated 
f 
! 
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into the part of the revised introduction to the second volume of the 
Logical Investigations which, from the second edition (1913) 
onward, replaced his initial equating of phenomenology with 
descriptive psychology, Husser) argued that the descriptions 
offered by phenomenology were completely removed from the 
orbit of psychology since they dealt with neither 'lived experiences' 
nor 'empirical persons' .71 Phenomenology does not speak of the 
perceptions, judgements, for feelings of any specific person, but 
rather is concerned with 'perceptions, judgements, feelings, as 
such' .72 It moved, not within the world off acts, but rather within the 
domain of essences. 
Toward a 'phenomenological psychology' 
The question of the relationship between phenomenology and 
psychology was not, however, put to rest with this apparently 
decisive segregation of the two disciplines. Husser) returned to the 
problem again and again throughout his career, making- at one 
time or another- at least three distinguishable claims: 
( 1) an insistence, which spans all his writings, that transcendental 
phenomenology is in no way reducible to psychology; 
(2) an argument, emerging most forcefully in his work in the 1920s 
that phenomenology nevertheless carries in its wake a new sort 
of psychology: an 'eidetic' or 'phenomenological' psychology. 
(3) a claim, which likewise became of increasing importance in his 
last writings, that because the concerns of phenomenological 
psychology and pure phenomenology parallel one another, 
phenomenological psychology can serve as a particularly 
important path to pure, transcendental phenomenology. 
Let us examine each of these points briefly. 
(1) From 1903 onward, Husser) insisted that phenomenology 
could in no way be equated with psychology, even if psychology was 
understood as a purely descriptive study of consciousness.'3 This 
was what had eluded Descartes, the recognition that with a correct 
understanding of the cogito, 'We abandon finally the standpoint of 
psychology, even descriptive psychology.'u Husser) would never 
retreat from the conviction that Descartes's project had ship-
wrecked on a confusion of transcendental philosophy and psychol-
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ogy.75 The distinction between psychology and phenomenology can 
be made on three levels: 
(i) Psychology is a science of facts which seeks either to frame 
general laws or to provide rigorous descriptions. Phenomenol-
ogy is an eidetic science which is concerned with obtaining an 
insight into those essential characteristics which define a 
certain class of phenomena.76 Thus, while psychology might 
investigate the factors which cause perceptual disturbances or 
describe what it was like to experience such disturbances, 
phenomenology would be concerned with the question of what 
is essential to a perception's being an act of perception rather 
than an act of remembering, imagining, or hallucinating.77 
(ii) Psychology is a study of empirical consciousness, of conscious-
ness as it appears as a part of nature, as an attribute of an 
embodied subject. Phenomenology places to the side all 
questions of material genesis, corporeal embodiment, or 
empirical situation, and studies 'purified' or 'transcendental' 
consciousness.7 " 
(iii) Following from this last point, psychology is a 'worldly' or 
'mundane' science which never questions the 'natural stand-
point' and, at all times, presupposes the existence of the world. 
Phenomenology, in contrast, is an 'unworldly' science which 
brackets the natural standpoint in order to pose the more 
fundamental question of how this taken-for-granted world 
comes to be constituted.79 
(2) While Husser! never retracted this contrast between 
psychology (empirical or descriptive) and transcendental 
phenomenology, he did eventually pose a more ambiguous rela-
tionship between phenomenology and something he called 
'phenomenological psychology'. In the 1927 article on 
phenomenology written for the Encyclopedia Britannica, Husserl 
went so far as to suggest that the confusion of phenomenology with 
descriptive psychology in the first edition of the Logical Investiga-
tions was almost inevitable: 
TI1e term 'phenomenology' designates two things: a new kind of 
descriptive method which made a breakthrough in philosophy at 
the turn of the century, and an a priori science derived from it; a 
science which is intended to supply the basic instrument (Orga-
I 
J. 
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11011) and, in its consequent application, to make possible a 
methodological reform of all the sciences. Together with this 
philosophical phenomenology, but not yet separated from it, 
however, there also came into being a new psychological 
discipline parallel to it in method and content: thea priori pure or 
'phenomenological' psychology, which raises the reformational 
claim to being the basic methodological foundation on which alone 
a scientifically rigorous empirical psychology can be estab-
lished.80 
Transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychol-
ogy were like twins born together, frequently taken for one another, 
distinguishable in fact but certainly related. 
In Husserl's most sustained discussions of these disciplines, the 
following division of labour emerges. Phenomenological psychol-
ogy is an a priori science of the psyche and as such stands in the same 
relation to empirical psychology as geometry docs to physics. Just as 
geometry, in Husserl's view, is an a priori analysis of idealised forms 
of space which lays the foundations for an exact and rigorous 
empirical study of nature, so too phenomenological psychology 
provides empirical psychology with that exactness which 'lies in its 
being founded on an a priori form system'."1 Phenomenological 
psychology, however, must not be equated with transcendental 
phenomenology since, like geometry, 'rational mechanics' and all 
the other a priori sciences, it is incapable of providing 'a theory of 
knowledge, a clarification and subjective grounding from the point 
of view of the critique of reason' ."2 This critical task is reserved for 
phenomenology proper, a transcendental discipline which stands 
outside the class of all 'objective sciences' - be they empirical, 
descriptive, or eidetic.83 
Phenomenological psychology thus makes usc of the 
'phenomenological reduction' - it turns its attention away from 
objects in the world and focuses instead on the subject whose 
activities reveal this world. It also employs the 'eidetic reduction'-
it concerns itself with essential structures rather than individual 
facts. But it docs not carry out the 'transcendental reduction'- the 
subject which it studies is still a psychological subject, a person 
engaged in activities which address a world whose existence remains 
unproblematic and unqucstioncd.84 
(3) Had Husser! simply treated phenomenological psychology as 
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one a priori science among others, it would have occupied a clearly 
circumscribed place within his philosophy. It would have clarified 
the concepts employed in empirical psychology, but it would have 
been dependent in turn on transcendental phenomenology for its 
own grounding. The hierarchy of disciplines would be clear and 
irreversible. 
Matters, unfortunately, are not that simple. Phenomenological 
psychology does not remain merely one a priori discipline among 
others. It comes to play a more important role in Husserl's late 
philosophy, at least in part because Husser! came to feel that his 
own development could serve as a paradigm for the path to 
transcendental phenomenology. In a passage added to the second 
(and unpublished) book of his Ideas, sometime between 1924 and 
1928 he wrote: 
Descriptive psychology serves as a proper and natural point of 
departure for the development of the idea of phenomenology. In 
fact it was this path that led me to phenomenology .85 
The Britannica article amplified the point, explaining that, because 
it stood closer to 'our natural thinking', phenomenological psychol-
ogy 'is well suited to serve as a preliminary step that will lead up to 
an understanding of philosophical phenomenology' .88 
Phenomenological psychology could play the double role of both 
an a priori science dependent on transcendental phenomenology 
for its ultimate justification and a privileged point of departure for 
transcendental phenomenology, because both disciplines studied 
forms of consciousness. However hesitant Husser! might have been 
about importing terminology from the sphere of empirical con-
sciousness into the analysis of transcendental consciousness, he was 
convinced that the psychological subject and the transcendental 
subject shared one crucial attribute: intentionality. He came to feel 
that his polemic against psychologism had gone too far. In the 
unpublished third book of his Ideas (1912), he stressed the need to 
abandon 'the old mistrust (still controlling even the author of the 
Logical bn-estigations) of psychic and ego logical reality'. This done, 
one could examine 
the remarkable relationship between phenomenological and 
psychological ontology which permits the former to find its place 
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in the latter and again, in a certain manner also permits the latter, 
like all ontological disciplines, to find a place in the former. 87 
Phenomenology and psychology are thus bound into what 
Merleau-Ponty, drawing on a term from classical rhetoric, would 
call a 'chiasmus'.88 Phenomenology finds its place in psychology, 
just as psychology can find a place in phenomenology. Thus, as early 
as the first book of the Ideas, Husser! argued that 
Every phenomenological position concerning absolute con-
sciousness can be reinterpreted in terms of eidetic psychology 
(which, strictly considered, is itself in no sense phenomenologi-
cal).ss 
Nearly two decades later, in a preface written for the English 
translation of the book, he noted once again the 
thoroughgoing parallelism between a (properly elaborated) 
phenomenological psychology and a transcendental 
phenomenology. To each eidetic or empirical determinate on the 
one side there must correspond a parallel feature in the other.90 
But what divides these two 'sides'? What separates these two 
parallel lines of inquiry? Everything appears to hinge on a 'mere 
change of attitude'. Phenomenological psychology 'still has the 
accessibility which is possessed by all positive sciences', but 
transcendental phenomenology requires 'an alteration of focus 
from one's entire form of life-style, one which goes so completely 
beyond all previous experiencing of life, that it must, in virtue of its 
absolute strangeness, needs be difficult to understand' .91 It is on this 
strange and unprecedented shift in attitude - which the Cartesian 
Meditations described as a 'Copernican conversion' and which the 
Crisis likened to 'a religious conversion' 92 - that the separation of 
phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology 
ultimately rests. 
Straying from the 'Cartesian way' 
In November of 1935, Husser! delivered a series of lectures in 
32 Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
Prague on 'Psychology and the Crisis of the Sciences'. These talks, 
which outlined the history of philosophy from Descartes to Kant 
before turning to a critique of modern psychology from Hobbes to 
Brentano, were the basis for The Crisis of the European Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology, that last 'introduction' to 
phenomenology which Husserl wrestled with between 1934 and the 
onset of his terminal illness in the summer of 1937.93 In reworking 
the Prague lectures, Husser! made two substantial additions. A long 
discussion of Galileo, who in the lectures had been treated only in 
passing as a precursor of Descartes, was added to the discussion, in 
Part I, of the 'Origins of the Modern Opposition Between 
Physicalistic Objectivism and Transcendental Subjectivism' .94 An 
entirely new subsection, 'The Way into Phenomenological Trans-
cendental Philosophy by Inquiry back from the Prcgiven 
Lifcworld', was added to Part III, preceding the discussion, taken 
over from the lectures, of 'The Way into Phenomenological 
Transcendental Philosophy from Psychology'.95 With these two 
modifications, a new theme- the 'life-world' (Lebenswelt)- forced 
its way to the centre of Husserl's analysis, and with the coupling of 
this theme to the peculiar mode of historical presentation adopted 
in the lectures, Husscrl's Cartesian meditations were disrupted by 
ruminations of a rather different sort. 
Galileo, Descartes, and the history of philosophy 
At the Sorbonnc, Husscrl regarded Descartes's Meditations as the 
'necessary prototype for the meditations of any beginning 
philosopher whatsocver'.96 In the Crisis, the Meditations were no 
less central, but his approach to them differs markedly. Descartes's 
procedure was no longer a prototype to be followed. Rather, if the 
implications of Descartes's project arc to be understood -and, even 
more crucial, brought to fruition - Descartes must be situated 
within what Husserl terms 'a teleological-historical reflection upon 
the origins of our critical scientific situation' .97 Descartes can no 
longer be Husserl's sole concern. Before him stands Galileo, that 
'discovering and concealing genius' whose oversights and presup-
positions were uncritically taken up by Descartes.9 " After him stand 
Kant and Hume, the culmination of the two traditions, rationalism 
and empiricism, which took their start from Descartes's failure to 
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overcome the prejudice of 'objectivism'- that neglect of the active 
subject which was the legacy of Galileo's mathematisation of 
nature.99 And beyond all of these thinkers stands Husserl himself. 
The burden of the Crisis is 'to establish the unavoidable necessity of 
a transcendental-phenomenological reorientation of philo-
sophy' ! 00 Through its account of the history of philosophy, the 
Crisis was to demonstrate how phenomenology redeems 
Descarte's missed opportunity of reasserting the role of the subject 
in the face of Galileo's objectivism. Phenomenology learns what it 
must do as a result of this 'teleological-historical reflection' and at 
long last consummates the critique of'physicalistic objectivism' that 
Descartes and the later heirs of the tradition of 'transcendental 
subjectivism' had never carried through successfully. 
In this reading of history there is a hubris worthy of Hegel- or, to 
stay with an example more obviously objectionable to Merleau-
Ponty, Brunschvicg. It constantly runs the risk of reducing earlier 
philosophies to the final Philosophy, or- in that distinction of Paul 
Ricoeur's which played a major role in Merleau-Ponty's own 
reflections on the history of philosophy - of constantly reducing 
individual, specific events to the continuing advent of an un-
equivocal meaning.101 For example, in the analysis of Descartes 
undertaken in the Crisis, Husserl is not concerned with Descartes's 
own understanding of his work. Rather, what matters is that 'hidden 
unity of intentional inwardness', which eludes the self-
interpretation of individual thinkers, but which nevertheless 'con-
stitutes the unity of history' .102 The principal motif in this history, 
the perpetual struggle between 'objectivistic and transcendental 
philosophy', is never clearly articulated by any of the individual 
philosophers discussed. Nor, of course, could any of them under-
stand where this all was leading. It is the unique achievement of the 
Crisis to articulate- and thus bring to completion- the movement 
which Hus:;erl detects in this history 'toward a final form of 
transcendental philosophy ... phenomenology', a form of trans-
cendental philosophy which 'contains, as a suspended moment, the 
final form of psychology' .103 
The life-world and the 'new way' to the transcendemal reduction 
Phenomenology can view the history of philosopohy from this 
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privileged standpoint because it docs not, like all philosophy since 
Galileo, take his mathcmatised nature as the end-point for its 
reflcctions. 104 Rather, it subjects the hitherto unquestioned equa-
tion of mathematised nature with 'the world' to rigorous scrutiny 
and discovers, behind this idealised nature, that pre-theoretical 
'realm of original self-evidence' which Husser! terms the 'life-
world' .105 On first glance, there would appear to be little new in the 
argument of the Crisis. The novelty of phenomenology as a science 
which poses the problem of how we have a world had, since at least 
the first book of the Ideas, been a persisting theme in Husserl's 
work!06 But the new meaning which Husser! gave to the term 
'life-world' - in its few previous usages it was roughly synonymous 
to 'cultural world' 107 - brought with it a major transformation in the 
way in which the path that led to the transcendental reduction is 
conceived. We must now proceed, he wrote, 'in an order opposite 
that suggested by the Cartesian approach' .108 
This new path to transcendental philosophy was schematised in 
Experience and Judgement ( 1937) as consisting of two stages: 
l. In the retrogression from the pregiven world with all of its 
sedimentations of sense, with its science and scientific disciplines, 
to the original life-world. 
2. In the regressive inquiry which goes from the life-world to the 
suhjectire operations from which it itself arises. 109 
While Descartes had turned away from the world in hopes of 
finding, in himself, that Archimcdcan point from which this 
now-doubted world could be restored, Husser! argued that we must 
turn away from the 'garb of ideas' in which post-Cartesian science 
and philosophy had clothed the world in order to recover the world 
as it is lived prior to theory and prior to scicncc. 110 An account of the 
structure of this world, Husser! now argued, could lay the ground-
work and provide the orienting themes for an analysis of transcen-
dental subjectivity .111 
We sec here a 'new way to the reduction, as contrasted with the 
"Cartesian way"'. The 'shorter way' which h:~d been employed in 
the Ideas 
has a great shortcoming: while it leads to the transcendental ego 
in one leap, as it were, it hrings this ego into view as apparently 
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empty of content, since there can be no preparatory explication; 
so one is at a loss, at first, to know what has been gained by it, 
much less how, starting with this, a completely new sort of 
science, decisive for philosophy, has been attained.112 
The 'Cartesian way' had demanded too much and provided too little 
in return. The analysis of the life-world, by beginning with the 
mundane sphere of everyday life, was less demanding. And, by 
virtue of the richness and diversity of the themes it found in the 
life-world awaiting elaboration, it was far more promising as a topic 
of investigation than that apparently empty ego that lay at the end of 
the Cartesian way. 
Merleau-Ponty's Husser! 
Husser) was, for Merleau-Ponty, above all else this non-Cartesian 
Husser!. In the Crisis, the second book of the Ideas, and in the other 
unpublished writings he studied - first in Louvain and then, after 
1944, in Paris113 - Merleau-Ponty encountered a Husser! whose 
focus had shifted from the questions of meaning and signification 
which had been the point of departure for the Logical Investiga-
tions, to those problems of perception, embodiment, and life-world 
which would become the central themes of what has come to be 
called 'existential phenomenology'. 114 In these works, Merleau-
Ponty discovered a radically different phenomenology from the one 
he found in Husserl's published works. The tension that the 
juxtaposition of these two visions of phenomenology must have 
produced in him was echoed in the famous preface to the 
Phenomenology of Perception: 
Phenomenology is the study of essences ... But phenomenology 
is also a philosophy which puts essences back into existence ... It 
is a transcendental philosophy which places in abeyance the 
assertions arising out of the natural attitude ... but it is also a 
philosophy for which the world is always 'already there' before 
reflection begins- as an inalienable presence ... It is the search 
for a philosophy which shall be a 'rigorous science', but it also 
offers an account of space, time, and the world as we 'live' them. 
It tries to give a direct description of our experience as it is, 
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without taking account of its psychological origin and the causal 
explanations which the scientist, the historian or the sociologist 
may be able to provide. Yet Husser! in his last works mentions a 
'genetic phenomenology', and even a 'constructive phenomenol-
ogy'. One may try to do away with these contradictions by making 
a distinction between Husserl's and Heidegger's 
phenomenologies; yet the whole of Sein und Zeit ... amounts to 
no more than an explicit account of the 'natiirliche Weltbegriff' or 
the 'Lebenswelt' which Husser!, towards the end of his life, 
identified as the central theme of phenomenology.115 
It was with this other phenomenology, the phenomenology towards 
which Husser! moved as he advanced from 'the eidetic method or 
logicism of his earlier stage to the existentialism of the last 
period' ,118 that Merleau-Pont:.; cast his lot. 
Pushing Husser/ 
This 'existentialist' Husser! was a curious creature, as much a 
consequence of Merleau-Ponty's way of reading as of anything 
Husser! actually wrote. Husser! had not abandoned the goal of 
transcendental phenomenology in the Crisis; he had only ques-
tioned the path outlined in the Cartesian Meditations. Likewise, 
Husser! did not regard Being and Time as merely an 'explicit 
account' of the natural concept of the world; for him, it was a 
wrong-headed presentation of phenomenological reflection that 
remained stuck in the natural attitude and rested on a questionable 
anthropologism.117 Whatever the virtues of Merleau-Ponty's 
account of phenomenology, it has long heen apparent that fidelity 
to the letter of Husserl's argument is not one of them.118 
But then he never claimed it was. He said that at times he was 
'pushing Husser! further than he wished to go' .119 His intent was 'to 
resume, instead of his theses, the very movement of his thought' .120 
Like Husserl's own approach to the history of philosophy in the 
Crisis, his concern was with the drawing-out of implicit intentions, 
not with the documenting of explicit utterances. For that reason, 
what Husser! did not say mattered as much as what he actually did 
say. Following Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty argued that every 
thinker's work included 'an unthought-of clement which is wholly 
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his own and yet opens out on something else' .121 And phenomenol-
ogy, for Merleau-Ponty, opened out onto the world. 
As understood and practised by Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology 
consisted almost entirely of the first of the two steps in the 
'non-Cartesian way' Husser! outlined in Experience and Judgement: 
the 'retrogression from the pregiven world ... to the original 
life-world'. 122 It was thus primarily 'a matter of describing, not of 
explaining or analysing'.123 Far from feeling that phenomenology 
should work to transform philosophy into a 'rigorous science', 
Merleau-Ponty felt that Husserl's initial directives involved 'a 
rejection of science'. Science was but a 'second order expression' of 
a 'basic experience of the world' which phenomenology had the 
unique responsibility of reawakening with a 'return to that world 
which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and 
in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract 
and derivative sign-language' .124 This world- that 'life-world' which 
we come to know through practical endeavours before we reflect on 
it with more theoretical interests - was, for Merleau-Ponty, the 
'homeland of our thought', the 'horizon of all horizons, the style of 
all possible styles', and 'the only pre-existent Logos' on which 
philosophy could draw.us 
Phenomenology thus moved in the shadow of science, attempting 
to give voice to what had been denied expression in its more precise, 
but also more restrictive, formulations. 126 At a colloquium held 
shortly after the publication of the Phenomenology of Perception, 
Emile Brchier commented that Merleau-Ponty's goal might be 
'better expressed in literature and painting than in philosophy' .127 In 
a somewhat backhanded way, Brchier indicated the company which 
Merleau-Ponty himself came to feel that philosophy must keep if it 
was to remain faithful to Husserl's insights. In the introduction to 
Si~ns, he wrote: 
Philosophy does not hold the world supine at its feet. It is not a 
'higher point of view' from which ooe embraces all local 
perspectives. It seeks contact with brute being, and in any case 
informs itself in the company of those who have never lost that 
contact. It is just that whereas literature, art, and the practice of 
life ... can (except at their extreme limits) have and create the 
illusion of dwelling in the habitual and the already constituted, 
philosophy- which paints without colors and in black and white 
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like copperplate engravings - does not allow us to ignore the 
strangeness of the world, which men confront as well as or better 
than it does, but as if in half-silence. 128 
In this concern to make manifest the strangeness of the world- or, 
as he put it in Phenomenology of Perception, 'the mystery of the 
world and of reason'- phenomenology was 'a movement before 
becoming a doctrine'. With Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, 
and Freud as its forerunners, and Balzac, Proust, Valery, and 
Cezanne as its fellow travellers, phenomenology 'merges into the 
general effort of modern thought' ! 29 
But what of Husser! survived the merger? And what, in Husser!, 
resisted Merleau-Ponty's nudgings? Let us look briefly at the fate of 
a few of Husserl's central concepts. 
The phenomenological reduction 
At first glance, it would appear that the various techniques by which 
Husser! sought to bracket the general thesis of the natural attitude 
and open the transcendental sphere for analysis would have little 
relevance for a conception of phenomenology as resolutely worldly 
as that of Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty's position, however, was 
as straightforward as it was peculiar. Far from leading to a 
transcendental consciousness, the phenomenological reduction- as 
an attempted disengagement from the world which could never be 
carried through to completion - restored our 'wonder' at the 
'strange and paradoxical' hold which the world has on us. 130 With 
this interpretation of the goal of the phenomenological reduction, 
all the distinctions Husser! had so laboriously drawn between the 
natural and transcendental attitudes crumbled. Merleau-Ponty 
argued that psychological reflection, when consistently carried out, 
'outruns itself, and that starting from the question of the relation-
ship between mental phenomena and the objective world, it is 
ultimately forced to account for the way in which this world is given. 
At that point. 'the phenomenal field becomes a transcendental 
field'. 131 Likewise. he claimed that the attack launched by Gestalt 
psychologists on the 'constancy hypothesis'- the belief that stimuli 
elicit responses which vary only with respect to variations in those 
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stimuli - 'assumes the value of a genuine "phenomenological 
reduction" '. 132 
The ultimate implications of these arguments were drawn out in 
his 1959 essay 'The Philosopher and His Shadow' - one of the 
places where he pushed Husser! the hardest. Within the natural 
attitude, he argued, one can find a 'preparation for phenomenol-
ogy': 
It is the natural attitude which, by reiterating its own procedures, 
topples into phenomenology.lt is the natural attitude which goes 
beyond itself in phenomenology- and so it does not go beyond 
itself. Reciprocally, the transcendental attitude is still and in spite 
of everything 'natural' .133 
Out of the intertwining of psychological and transcendental stand-
points which he found in Husserl's Crisis, he wove a chiasmus where 
the transcendental attitude was as natural as the natural was 
transcendental. 
The intllition of essences 
Husserl's distinction between sciences of fact and sciences of 
essence suffered much the same fate. Mcrlcau-Ponty argued that 
Husser! could maintain such a strict demarcation only so long as he 
held 'a dogmatic conception of Wesenschau [intuition of essence)' .134 
In the first book of the Ideas, Husser! was at pains to stress that 
knowledge of essence was, like knowledge of fact, a matter of 
seeing: 'Essential insight is still inlllition, just as the eidetic object is 
still an object.' 135 What set insight into essences apart from insight 
into facts was that reference could be made to essential objects 
without advancing the claim that such objects actually exist (for 
example, we can recite the essential features of a unicorn without 
claiming that there really are unicorns). 136 Through a variation of 
the attributes of an object - real or imagined -one comes to 'sec' 
what is essential to it (for example, bearded and beardless unicorns 
arc possible, but not hornless ones). 
What Mcrlcau-Ponty saw as 'dogmatic' in this was Husserl's 
insistence that 'the meaning of eidetic science excludes in principle 
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every assimilation of the theoretical results of empirical sciences' 
while nevertheless maintaining that 'no fully developed science of 
fact could subsist unmixed with eidetic knowledge' .137 Merleau-
Ponty argued that this strict hierarchy of eidetic over empirical 
sciences was eventually called into question by Husser! himself in 
his exchange of letters with the French anthropologist Lucien 
LCvy-Bruhl. 138 Having studied Uvy-Bruhl's analysis of primitive 
mentality, Husser! was willing to grant that the findings of empirical 
sciences could have a decisive impact on eidetic analyses within the 
human sciences. Husser! now saw that philosophy must 'accept all 
the acquisitions of science' and only then try to work towards an 
understanding of the world which transcends, but does not ignore, 
empirical contingency. 139 
Thus phenomenology, in Mcrlcau-Ponty's reading, completely 
transforms the relationship between the de facto and thea priori .140 
From the moment that experience ... is recognized as the 
beginning of knowledge, there is no longer any way of distinguish-
ing ... what the world must necessarily be and what it actually is. 
The unity of the sense, which was regarded as an a priori truth, is 
no longer anything but the formal expression of a fundamental 
contingency: the fact that we are in the world - the diversity of 
sense, which was regarded as given a posteriori, including the 
concrete form that it assumes in a human subject, appears as 
necessary to this world, to the only world which we can think of 
consequentially; it therefore becomes an a priori truth.141 
The notion of essence is borrowed from the world of perception.142 
Eidetic analysis is an a posteriori clarification of concrete, factual 
expcrience. 143 Hence it too is properly understood as a technique of 
existential rather than transcendental phenomenology. It is a way of 
enabling reflection to grasp the pre-reflective life of an incarnate 
consciousness; it is the means by which 'our effective involvement in 
the world' is brought to conceptualisation.144 
llltentio11ality 
While Husserl's notion of intentionality would eventually cause 
Merleau-Ponty considerable difficulties, as presented in the 
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Phenomenology of Perception it was neither a central category in 
Husserl's phenomenology- 'too often cited as the main discovery of 
phenomenology ... it is understandable only through the reduc-
tion'- nor a particularly original one- Kant had already recognised 
that 'all consciousness is consciousness of something'. 145 Husserl's 
real insight, Merleau-Ponty argued, lay 'in the discovery, beneath 
the intentionality of representations, of a deeper intentionality, 
which others have called existence' .146 
In the 'classic conception' of intentionality- embraced by both 
neo-Kantians and by the Husserl of the Ideas - consciousness is 
defined as 'absolute non-being' and the experience of the world is 
treated 'as a pure act of constituting consciousness' .147 In this 
understanding of intentionality, consciousness builds up a meaning-
ful world through a series of judgements, definitions, and other 
conscious acts which impose significance on the raw stuff of sense 
data (Husserl's 'hyle'). 14" Against this notion, Merleau-Ponty 
argued that Husserl came to elaborate a conception of 'operative 
[fimgierende] intentionality' which - prior to all acts of positing, 
intending, judging, reflecting, or signifying- reveals a world which, 
far from being a blank state awaiting the bestowal of significance, 
already had a distinctive physiognomy.149 
Husserl's mature approach, then, should not be confused with 
that of Descartes or Kant. Their retreat to transcendental subjectiv-
ity 'ceases to remain part of our experience and offers, in place of an 
account, a reconstruction' .150 Husser! turned away from 'a noetic 
analysis which bases the world on the synthesizing activity of the 
subject' and instead embraced a '"noematic reflection" which 
remains within the object and, instead of begetting it, brings to light 
it fundamental unity'.JSI Intentionality, like the phenomenological 
reduction and eidetic analysis, was pressed into the service of an 
existential phenomenology which argued that the relationship of 
subject and world 'is not a thing which can be further clarified by 
analysis: philosophy can only place it once more before our eyes and 
present it for our ratification'. 152 
The transcendemal ego 
Merleau-Ponty's presentation of phenomenology in the 
Phenomenology of Perception delayed the break with Husser! until 
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the last possible moment. He insisted on the centrality of the 
phenomenological reductions, he argued for the continued utility of 
eidetic analyses, and he sought to purge intentionality of its idealist 
overtones. But he was forced to reject the one thing in Husserl's 
work which gave sense to all of these other notions: the transcen-
dental ego. For Merleau-Ponty, the fatal error of the 'intellectualist' 
philosophies of Brunschvicg, Alain, and Lagneau was their attempt 
to found all mental activity in the epistemological subject, their 
attendant inability to recognise that subjectivity is always situated in 
and engaged with a world, and their ultimate failure to see that 
finitude, temporality, and carnality were not blemishes detracting 
from absolute subjectivity, but were, rather, the only terms on 
which truth was possible. Although he tried to recruit Husser! to his 
side here as well, he could not hide the fact that Husserl's attempted 
reform oft he Cartesian cogito was plagued by a fatal intellectualism 
as well. 
The 'true cogito', he argued in Phenomenology of Perception, 
neither defined 'the subject's existence in terms of the thought he 
has of existi~g' nor sought to convert 'the indubitability of the world 
into the indubitability of thought about the world' ! 53 Instead, it 
'must reveal me in a situation', as 'being-in-the-world', as 'through 
and through compounded of relationships with the world'.154 
Properly understood, it thus exemplified what Merleau-Ponty saw 
as the basic experience of reflection: it revealed a level of 
experience which was present before reflection and which served as 
the ground on which reflection was possible, but which was 
nevertheless governed by a set of rules different from those 'clear 
and distinct ideas' which, since Descartes, had been the ultimate 
criterion for knowledge. 'There is absolute certainty of the world in 
general,' Merleau-Ponty wrote, 'but not of any one thing in 
particular.' 155 
The cogito is misrepresented if it is presented as leading to a 
'psychological immanence' which reduces all phenomena to 'pri-
vate states of consciousness', or even if- following Husser! - it 
terminates in a 'transcendental immanence' which sees all 
phenomena as the result of the operations of a constitutive 
consciousness. Rather, Merleau-Ponty argued, it testifies to 'the 
deep-seated momentum of transcendence which is my very 
being' .156 The 'ultimate consciousness is not an eternal subject 
perceiving itself in absolute transparency'; it is, rather, 'a com-
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prehensive project, or a view of time and the world which ... needs 
to unfold itself into multiplicity' .157 It is not 'a transcendental Ego 
freely positing before itself a multiplicity in itself; it is, rather, 'an I 
which dominates diversity only with the help of time' .158 The 
transcendental ego 'posits a world'; the incarnate subject must first 
of all 'have a world or be in the world' and thus has around it 'a 
system of meanings whose reciprocities, relationships and involve-
ments do not require to be made explicit in order to be exploited' .159 
The cogito, in short, testifies to the ability of an incarnate subject 
to pull itself away from involvement in the world and reflect on that 
world: 
there are acts in which I collect myself together in order to surpass 
myself. The cogito is the recognition of this fundamental fact. In 
the proposition: 'I think, I am', the two assertions are to be 
equated with each other, otherwise there would be no cogito. 
Nevertheless we must be clear about the meaning of the 
equivalence: it is not the 'I am' which is pre-eminently contained 
in the 'I think', not my existence which is brought down to the 
consciousness I have of it, but conversely the 'I think', which is 
re-integrated into the transcending process of the 'I am', and 
consciousness into existence!60 
Cartesian analysis falsified the experience of the cogito, in 
Merleau-Ponty's view, not- as Husser) would have it- because of a 
confusion of transcendental and psychological subjectivity, but 
rather because it failed to see that the body was the vehicle through 
which we have a world and the means by which we sustain 
communications with it.161 Descartes gave only a secondary expres-
sion of this more fundamental experience and elaborated, within 
discourse and on the level of reflection, an analysis which made 
sense only because of its implied reference to a 'tacit cogito' which 
had 'upon itself and upon the world only a precarious hold' ! 62 This 
'presence to oneself, being no less than existence, is anterior to any 
philosophy' .163 It is a subject whose unity, like the unity of the world, 
is 'invoked rather than experienced'; it is the 'background' against 
which all acts of positing, reflecting, thinking, and perceiving stand 
out!64 
Phenomenology had the unenviable task of catching this elusive 
presence. Merleau-Ponty's reinterpretations of the phenomenolog-
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ical reduction, of eidetic analysis, and of intentionality were all 
attempts to retool phenomenology so that it could do justice to this 
subtle intertwining of subject and world: 
The world is not an object such that I have in my possession the 
law of its making; it is the natural setting of, and field for, all my 
thought and all my explicit perceptions. Truth does not 'inhabit' 
only the 'inner man', or more accurately, there is no inner man, 
man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself. 
When I return to myself from an excursion into the realm of 
dogmatic common sense or of science, I find, not a source of 
intrinsic truth, but a subject destined to be in the world!65 
Descartes and Augustine, Husserl's mentors, had led him nowhere. 
Against the phantom of the 'inner man', Merleau-Ponty appealed, 
in one of his finest essays, to Montaigne!66 Montaigne knew that 
We are equally incapable of dwelling in ourselves and in things, 
and are thrown back from them to ourselves and from ourselves 
to them.187 
Tossed into this cross-fire, Montaigne saw that 'To be conscious is, 
among other things, to be somewhere else.' 168 Husser! had joined 
Descartes in the attempt 'once for all' to cast off received opinions 
and start anew, 'building from the foundations up'.169 Montaigne 
taught Merleau-Ponty a different lesson. The study of man was 
destined to be 'an inquiry without discovery, a hunt without a 
kill' yo 
Phenomenology and the human sciences 
On the basis of this peculiar reading of Husser!, Merleau-Ponty 
went on to relate phenomenology and the human sciences in a way 
which diverged markedly from Husserl. Husserl's concern was to 
'purify' phenomenology, to set it apart from 'worldly' sciences 
which might compromise its radicalism. Merleau-Ponty sought 
instead to intertwine phenomenology and the human sciences. 
That Merleau-Ponty's position was different from Husserl's is, 
however, by no means immediately obvious. In his course at the 
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Sorbonne on 'The Human Sciences and Phenomenology' (1950-1; 
1951-2) as well as in the closely related essay 'The Philosopher and 
Sociology' (1951) Merleau-Ponty made one of those excursions 
into 'intentional history' which tend to blur the line between what a 
thinker actually wrote and what a reader would like to find. 171 
Discussing Husserl's treatment of the relationship between 
phenomenology and the empirical sciences in the 1951 article, 
Merleau-Ponty observed: 
We know that he began by affirming- and always maintained- a 
rigorous distinction between them. It seems to us, however, that 
his idea of a psycho-phenomenological parallelism - speaking 
more generally: his thesis of a parallel between positive know-
ledge and philosophy, in which each affirmation of the one 
corresponds to an affirmation of the other - leads in fact to a 
reciprocal envelopment.172 
To see what of this 'reciprocal envelopment' was Husserl's doing 
and what Merleau-Ponty's, we must begin by once again insisting on 
the differences between them. 
From 'rigorous distinction' to 'reciprocal envelopment' 
Merleau-Ponty saw this trajectory from 'rigorous distinction' to 
'reciprocal envelopment' traced in Husserl's discussion of the 
relationship of phenomenology to psychology, to linguistics, and to 
history. In each case, an early attempt to subordinate empirical 
inquiries to an eidetic science was replaced by a 'movement back 
and forth from facts to ideas and from ideas to facts' .173 The early 
Husserl argued that empirical psychology must defer to an eidetic 
psychology for the clarification of its basic concepts; he maintained 
that the unclerstanding of any individual language was impossible 
without a comprehension of the 'essence of language in general'; 
and he held that since history was 'unable to judge an idea', 
historians must rely on 'an a priori science which would determine 
the real meaning' of the concepts which they use 'blindly and 
without careful examination' .174 The later Husserl, in contrast, saw 
that there could be no 'basic discord' between phenomenology and 
psychology since they study 'the same subject, man'; he abandoned 
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·=n , P??ssrmr 
46 Maurice Mer/eau-Ponty 
his project of constructing an ideal language by turning to the study 
of the experience of the 'speaking subject'; and he recognised that 
'the eidetic of history cannot dispense with factual investigation' .175 
In spite of his early attempts to separate the 'empirical' from the 
'essential' and the 'natural' from the 'transcendental', he came to 
see that they in fact encroached upon and interpenetrated one 
another. Or, at least, this is how Merleau-Ponty claimed that 
Husser! came to see it. 
Husser! in fact came closest to the ultimate position Merleau-
Ponty attributed to him in the discussion of the relationship 
between psychological and phenomenological standpoints which 
concludes the Crisis. As we have seen, he argued there that 'a 
concretely executed psychology could lead to a transcendental 
philosophy', while conversely, 'the transcendental accomplishment 
in and through which I "have" the world' could be found once more 
'in a psychological internal analysis' .176 Phenomenology and 
psychology were not, however, equal members of this chiasmus. 
The psychology which leads to transcendental philosophy is no 
longer a science like other 'positive sciences': 
A psychology which would investigate universally the human 
beings living in the world as real facts in the world, similarly to 
other positive sciences ... does not exist. There is only transcen-
dental psychology, which is identical with transcendental philo-
sophy.177 
Hence, the envelopment of psychology by phenomenology is not 
reciprocated. Empirical psychology contributes nothing to 
phenomenology. Indeed, it can exist only once it has been recast 
along the lines of a phenomenological psychology. 
In his discussion of the relationship between phenomenology and 
the human sciences, Merleau-Ponty consistently downplayed the 
pre-eminence Husser! accorded eidetic inquiries over empirical 
disciplines and, at the same time, argued that the reforms which 
Husser! felt phenomenology could introduce into the human 
sciences were already in the process of being carried out by these 
sciences themselves. As a consequence of this reading of Husser!, 
Merleau-Ponty directed the bulk of his criticism of attempts to set 
phenomenological inquiries off from positive sciences, not at 
Husser! himself, but rather at those of Husserl's 'followers' who, 
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oblivious to the allegedly altered position of the later Husser!, 
continued to enforce Husserl's initial distinctions. Thus Heidegger, 
by distinguishing his 'analytic of Dasein' from those 'on tical' 
inquiries such as anthropology, ethnology, psychology, and biology 
- inquiries which presuppose 'ontological' accounts of 'Dasein' 
without actually carrying them out178 - remained, in Merleau-
Ponty's opinion, 'fixed' in a 'pure and simple opposition between 
philosophy and the sciences of man' which, for Husser!, 'was only a 
point of departure' .179 Sartre's studies of the imagination and the 
emotions likewise 'illustrate very well Husserl's conception as it was 
presented in the middle period of his career' .180 But they also 
demonstrate the shortcomings attendant on a view which argues 
that 'phenomenological, or eidetic, psychology ought to come first 
and ought to rule over all fundamental questions' .181 By presenting 
phenomenology as if it were an exercise in conceptual clarification, 
totally removed from empirical questions - as Sartre did, for 
example, when he proposed that 'I can try to grasp the essence of 
the "proletariat" through the word "proletariat" ' 182 - one runs the 
risk of 'seeing an essence when, in fact, it is not an essence at all but 
merely a concept rooted in language'. 183 The only way to avoid this 
danger would be to abandon the attempt to set eidetic psychology 
apart from empirical inquiries and to admit a 'very close relation 
between induction ... and Wesenschau and consequently a final 
homogeneity among the different psychologies, whether they be 
inductive or phenomenological' .184 
Merleau-Ponty was willing to allow for this homogeneity because 
he sensed a growing recognition within the human sciences of the 
inadequacy of the inherited frameworks of 'naturalism', 'empiric-
ism', and 'positivism'. The human sciences, like phenomenology, 
were unveiling 'a dimension of being and a type of knowledge which 
man forgets in his natural attitude' .185 The development of Gestalt 
psychology, he argued on a number of occasions, illustrated the way 
in which empiricist prejudices could, to a limited degree, be 
undermined through rigorous empirical research.186 Likewise, 
Saussure's revolution in linguistics rested on the replacement of a 
positivist approach -the treatment of language 'as a thing' - by a 
study of language which took up 'the perspective of the speaking 
subject'. 187 But the most important of Merleau-Ponty's examples 
for our immediate purposes is his discussion of developments in 
sociology, ethnology, and anthropology since Durkheim. For it is 
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here, in his confrontation with the work of Claude Levi-Strauss, that 
he encountered a rejection of positivism which could only with 
the greatest of difficulty be understood as a movement toward 
phenomenology. 
Durkheim, Mauss, Levi-Strauss: a rapprochement with 
phenomenology? 
Emile Durkheim's Elementary Forms of Religious Life demon-
strated, to Merleau-Ponty, the utter bankruptcy of the famous 
command of the Rules of Sociological Method to 'consider social 
facts as things'. The attempt to explain religion as a consequence of 
social cohesion, he argued, either 'begs the whole question' or 
'hides the problem' .188 That religious practices always take place 
within a community is as certain as 'that literature, art, science, and 
language are social facts in the sense of facts of communication' .189 
But to go on and argue that the fact of social cohesion somehow 
explains the existence of religious practices only results in our 
finding 'the same obscurity or the same problem hiding under 
another name' .190 
Merleau-Ponty saw two basic problems in Durkheim's account. 
First, Durkheim merely asserted that Australian totemism - the 
case he studied -was in fact an 'elementary form' of religious life; he 
never gave a rigorous demonstration that Australian totemism 
indeed exemplified all that was essential to religious experience.191 
To do this, a preliminary eidetic analysis, similar to the conceptual 
clarification which phenomenological psychology was to bring to 
empirical psychology, would be needed. 192 Second, Durkheim's 
conception of society itself was confused and misleading: 
Recourse to social ties cannot be considered an explanation of 
religion or of the sacred unless one makes an immutable 
substance of the social, an all-round cause, a vague force defined 
only by its power of coercion; that is, if one makes oneself blind to 
the ever-original operation of a society in the process of 
establishing the system of collective meanings through which its 
members communicatc. 193 
Durkheim's attribution of the characteristics of 'externality' and 
'constraint' to 'social facts' resulted in a relationship between the 
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'conscience collective' and the individual which, 'like that between 
two things, remained external'. 194 Against this way of looking at 
society, Merleau-Ponty argued 
the social is not collective consciousness but intersubjectivity, a 
living relationship and tension among individuals. Sociology 
should not seek an explanation of the religious in the social ... 
but must consider them two aspects of the real and fantastic 
human bond as it has been worked out by the civilization under 
consideration and try to objectify the solution which that 
civilization invents, in its religion as in its economy or in its 
politics to the problem of man's relation with nature and with 
other men}95 
To do this was to realise that while 'objective indices' could serve as 
a guide for the sociologist, sociological knowledge required that 'we 
recover the human attitude which makes up the spirit of a 
society' }96 
Had subsequent sociologists overcome Durkheim's failings? Was 
sociology, like linguistics and psychology, contributing to the 
'reciprocal envelopment' of phenomenology and the human sci-
ences? Merleau-Ponty felt it was and found in the work of Marcel 
Mauss a contribution which in effect paralleled that of Gestalt 
psychology. He understood Mauss's concept of the 'total social fact' 
as a tacit break with Durkheim's tendency to see social facts as 
connected only by the external linkage of cause and effect. For 
Merleau-Ponty, Mauss's most important insight was that society 
was 'a totality where phenomena give mutual expression to each 
other and reveal the same theme'; social facts thus constitute 'an 
efficacious system of symbols ... inserted into the depths of the 
individual'.t97 'We are concerned with "wholes", with systems in 
their entirety', Mauss wrote in his classic Essai sur /e don: 
It is only by considering them as wholes that we have been able to 
see their essence, their operation, and their living aspect, and to 
catch the fleeting moment when society and its members take 
emotional stock of themselves and their situation as regards 
others ... We see social facts themselves, in the concrete, as they 
are. In society there are not merely ideas and rules, but also men 
and groups and their behaviours}98 
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Mauss's concern to see society as an expressive totality broke with 
the atomistic positivism which still plagued Durkheim, just as his 
commitment to capture the way in which social facts were experi-
enced by the members of a society was a rejection of objectivism 
and a recognition of the importance of subjective interpretation. 
With these reforms, Merleau-Ponty suggested, Mauss had moved 
sociology closer to phenomenology. 
Merleau-Ponty came to feel, however, that Mauss's elaboration 
of his position had fallen short of these original insights. In an 
important 1959 essay, 'From Mauss to Claude Levi-Strauss', he 
advanced a series of criticisms which repeated those Levi-Strauss 
himself had mounted a decade earlier ! 99 Mauss had been unable to 
provide a theory of exchange or magic, the argument ran, because 
he fell back on explanations used by members of the societies he 
studied. To explain exchange, he turned to a Maori account of'hau'; 
to explain magic, he examined the Melanesian concept of 'mana' .200 
Such notions, Merleau-Ponty wrote, 'do not so much provide a 
theory about the facts as reproduce the society's own theory' .201 Or, 
as Levi-Strauss put it: 
The 'hau' is not the ultimate reason for exchange; it is the 
conscious form under which men of a particular society, where 
the problems have a particular significance, have apprehended an 
unconscious necessity whose reason is elsewhere.202 
The reason for exchange, Merleau-Ponty argued, must be sought in 
the 'demands of an invisible totality' of which the giver and the 
recipient of gifts were but a part. Exchange was not 'an effect of 
society'; it was 'society itself in action' .203 Terms like mana and hau 
could be likened to the 'zero phoneme' or the 'floating signifier' in 
linguistics. Levi-Strauss- whose reformulation Merleau-Ponty was 
following to the letter- explained their function this way: 
In that system of symbols which constitutes every cosmology, 
there will ordinarily be a symbolic value zero, that is to say a sign 
marking the necessity of a symbolic content supplementary to 
that with which the signified is already loaded, but able to be any 
value on the condition that it still forms part of the available 
reserve and is not already, as the phonologists say, a term of the 
group.2o4 
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Terms like hau and mana thus 'draw attention to the fact that in 
certain circumstances ... a relation of inadequacy exists between 
the signified and the signifier' .205 Because of the surplus of signifiers 
that members of a society have at their disposal, it is possible for 
them to deploy signifiers of an indeterminate and shifting meaning 
which, thanks to their very indeterminacy, are able to oppose 
potential absences of signification without imparting any positive 
meaning. Such terms cannot explain a society's practices; they 
instead play a crucial role in the continuing enactment of these 
practices. 
'Lived experience' and the unconscious: the problem of sociological 
meaning 
This agreement between Merleau-Ponty and Levi-Strauss, like the 
more general rapprochement between phenomenology and ethnol-
ogy which Merleau-Ponty sought to illustrate, is at best a tenuous 
one. Merleau-Ponty agreed with much 'of Levi-Strauss's critique of 
Mauss. Levi-Strauss, in turn, accepted at least some of Merleau-
Ponty's formulations of the relationship between ethnology and 
philosophy .206 But, on the rather basic level of what Mauss's work 
suggested about what it meant for a sociological explanation to be at 
all meaningful, they diverged sharply. 
Mauss, as Merleau-Ponty read him, required that the sociologist's 
explanations both grasp society as a coherent totality and show how 
this totality is experienced by the members of the society. 'Struc-
ture,' Merleau-Ponty insisted, 'like Janus, has two faces.' On the 
one side it organises 'its constituent parts according to an internal 
principle'.207 Such an organising principle may be extremely com-
plex, might be capable of being formalised mathematically, and 
perhaps could even be comprehended within a 'universal code of 
structures' whose transformation rules would 'allow us to deduce 
them from one another' .208 But however far anthropology might 
advance in this direction, its 'most proper task' consists in tracing 
'the connecting links of a thought network which lead us back from 
itself to the other face of structure and to its own incarnation': 
The surprising logical operations attested to by the formal 
structure of societies must certainly be effected in some way by 
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the populations which live these kinship systems. Thus there 
ought to be a sort of lived equivalent of that structure.209 
Anthropology's unique position within the human sciences lay in its 
insistence that its models must at some level 'have an immediately 
human significance' .210 
This insistence that the theorist's structures find a 'lived equival-
ent' in the experience of social actors brought sociology into 
agreement with phenomenology. 'Philosophy,' Merleau-Ponty 
argued, 'is indeed, and always, a break with objectivism and a return 
fromconstructa to lived experience, from the world to ourselves.' 211 
It is essential never to cut sociological inquiry off from our 
experience of social subjects ... For the sociologist's equations 
begin to represent something social only at that moment when the 
correlations they express are connected to one another and 
enveloped in a certain unique view of the social and of nature 
which is characteristic of the society under consideration ... If 
objectivism or scientism were ever to succeed in depriving 
sociology of all recourse to significations, it would save it from 
'philosophy' only by shutting it off from knowledge of its object. 
Then we might do mathematics in the social, but we would not 
have the mathematics of the society being considered. The 
sociologist engages in philosophy to the extent that he is charged 
not only to record the facts but to comprehend them. At that 
moment, he is himself already a philosopher.212 
In turning from abstract constructs to the experience of the 
members of the society under scrutiny, the sociologist traces the 
same path which, for Merleau-Ponty, defined phenomenology: the 
retrogression from the 'second order expressions' of science to the 
'basic experience of the world' which is the ultimate ground of every 
abstraction. 
Levi-Strauss, in contrast, demanded not a return to 'lived 
experience' but rather a search 'beneath the rationalized interpreta-
tions of the native' for those 'unconscious categories' which Mauss 
had argued were 'the determinants of magic, religion, and lan-
guage' .213 Where Merleau-Ponty argued, against Durkheim, that 
society be conceived not as a 'conscience coll£ctive' but rather as 
'intersubjectivity', Levi-Strauss maintained that what Durkheim 
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had sought to grasp as the 'conscience collective' could be more 
adequately comprehended by developing Mauss's comments on the 
function of the 'unconscious'.214 While Mauss, in Merleau-Ponty's 
reading, was groping - however tentatively - towards Husser!, 
Levi-Strauss saw him as bringing to consummation that 'end of the 
cogito' which Rousseau - in Levi-Strauss's rather idiosyncratic 
reading- had announced. 215 
Structuralism, as Levi-Strauss conceived it, could engineer an 
escape from the prison of the cogito only if it developed Mauss's 
insights and thus played the role of Rousseau against Husserl's 
Descartes. Like Rousseau, it would turn away from the conscious 
subject - 'that unbearably spoilt child who has occupied the 
philosophical scene for too long now' 2 ' 6 - and seek instead to 
comprehend the anonymous 'he' who ' "thinks" through me' and 
thus 'causes me to doubt whether it is I who am thinking'.217 It 
sought, again like Rousseau, to refuse all immediate and forced 
identities in order to find a solidarity 'beyond man with all that is 
alive' and thus form 'an identification also before the function or the 
character, with a being not yet shaped but given'.218 The sciences of 
man must thus dispense with man and instead 'seek the society of 
nature to meditate there on the nature of society' .219 
This approach to Mauss disregarded that 'face' of structure which 
Merleau-Ponty saw as leading back to 'lived experience'. In 
abandoning the requirement that structure find a 'lived equivalent' 
in the experiences of members of the society, Levi-Strauss saw 
himself as following the path taken by structural linguistics. 
Language is the most social of all'social facts'. Yet, much linguistic 
behaviour 'lies on the level of unconscious thought'. Speakers are 
unaware of the syntactic and morphological laws of their language 
and even the linguist's knowledge of these laws 'always remains 
dissociated from his experience as a speaking agent'.220 Language 
thus presents a paradigm of an 'unreflecting totalization', beyond or 
beneath both consciousness and will. It shows us a 'human reason 
which has it~ reasons and of which man knows nothing' .221 
The analogy to language- an analogy which Levi-Strauss pursued 
most persistently after the completion of Elementary Structllres of 
Kinship ( 1949), a work whose reliance on certain formulae taken 
from Gestalt psychology left it far more open to the sort of reading 
Merleau-Ponty was attempting than the works which followed222 -
provided Levi-Strauss with the tools he needed to give primacy to 
,.rrywrrnu·nnm;z mssr . 
54 Maurice Mer/eau-Ponty 
the unconscious in the achievement of intersubjective understand-
ing: 
As the organ of a specific function, the unconscious merely 
imposes structural laws upon the inarticulated elements which 
originate elsewhere - impulses, emotions, representations, and 
memories. We might say, therefore, that the preconscious is the 
individual lexicon where each of us accumulates the vocabulary 
of his personal history, but that this vocabulary becomes signifi-
cant, for us and for others, only to the extent that the unconscious 
structures it according to its laws and thus transforms it into 
language.223 
Taking up Paul Ricoeur's critical comments and affirming them as 
his own intentions, Levi-Strauss described this unconscious as 'a 
combinative, categorizing, unconscious', 'a categorizing system 
unconnected with a thinking subject', a 'Kantianism without a 
transcendental subject' .224 
From the flux of' Er/ebnisse' to the field of Being 
In drawing out the implications of Mauss's work, Levi-Strauss and 
Merleau-Ponty were thus led to radically different conceptions of 
the goal of sociological explanation. According to Levi-Strauss, the 
theorist must uncover, beneath the concepts employed by the 
members of a society, the combinatory operations of the uncon-
scious. According to Merleau-Ponty, no explanation is meaningful 
unless it recovers the 'lived equivalent' of the relations it formalises 
and thus returns 'from co11structa to lived experience'. 
Merleau-Ponty's apparent agreement with Levi-Strauss's criti-
que of Mauss thus conceals a fundamental disagreement over the 
nature of sociological explanation. At the basis of this dispute lay a 
still more fundamental disagreement over the relationship between 
philosophy and the human sciences. Levi-Strauss rejected 
phenomenology because it 'postulated a kind of continuity between 
experience and reality' which his study of geology, psychoanalysis 
and Marxism had taught him to suspect. Existentialism struck him 
as an even more dubious enterprise. A 'sort of shop-girl metaphys-
ics', it allowed people 'to play fast-and-loose with the mission 
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incumbent on philosophy until science becomes strong enough to 
replace it: that is, to understand being in relationship to itself and 
not in relation to myself.225 The human sciences, accordingly, had 
as their peculiar mission not the recovery of the human meaning of 
social interactions but rather the 'dissolving' of the category of 
'man' and the 'reintegration of culture in nature' .226 
Merleau-Ponty's initial conception of the task of philosophy 
could not have been more opposed to Levi-Strauss's views. In his 
1945 essay 'The Metaphysical in Man' he wrote: 
Metaphysics begins from the moment when, ceasing to live in the 
evidence of the object - whether it is the sensory object or the 
object of science- we apperceive the radical subjectivity of all our 
experience as inseparable from its truth value. It means two 
things to say that our experience is our own: both that it is not the 
measure of all imaginable being in itself and that it is nonetheless 
co-extensive with all being of which we can form a notion. This 
double sense of the cogito is the basic fact of metaphysics: I am 
sure that there is being - on the condition that I do not seek 
another sort of being than being-for-mc.227 
Where Levi-Strauss sought to understand being in relation to itself, 
Merleau-Ponty conceived metaphysics as consisting of an inquiry 
which concerned itself only with 'being-for-me'. Could Levi-Strauss 
have asked for a more telling illustration of the continued hold 
Descartes exercised over even the most unorthodox of 
phenomenologists? 
'The Metaphysical in Man', however, was not Merleau-Ponty's 
final word on the subject. Even as he was arguing in 'From Mauss to 
Oaude Levi-Strauss' that the ethnologist must find a 'lived equival-
ent' to the structures he formalises, Merleau-Ponty was question-
ing, in one of the working notes to The Visible and the Invisible, 
whether the notion of 'lived experience' had anything at all to do 
with the p~;oper tasks of the philosopher: 
Philosophy has nothing to do with the privilege of the Erlebnisse, 
with the psychology of lived experience ... The interiority the 
philosopher seeks is ... intersubjectivity, the Urgemein Stiftung 
[primordially common foundation] which is well beyond 'lived 
experience' .228 
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The note does not completely reject his earlier argument- he had 
insisted in 'The Philosopher and Sociology' that the return to lived 
experience did not lead back to a 'private life' but, rather, returned 
to 'an intersubjectivity that gradually connects us ever closer to the 
whole of history' .229 But it does raise doubts as to whether this 
journey back to the Urgemein Stiftung on which communication 
with others ultimately rests could be made with the means Husser! 
had provided. 
This doubt, however, had been voiced much earlier- but not by 
Merleau-Ponty. At the close of the 1946 colloquy on Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception, Jean Beaufret (who two weeks earlier had 
addressed the series of questions to Martin Heidegger which 
occasioned his critique of Sartrean existentialism, the 'Letter on 
Humanism') commented: 
The only reproach I would make to the author is not that he has 
gone 'too far', but rather that he has not been sufficiently radical. 
The phenomenological descriptions which he uses in fact main-
tain the vocabulary of idealism. In this they are in accord with 
Husserlian descriptions. But the whole problem is precisely to 
know whether phenomenology, fully developed, does not require 
the abandonment of subjectivity and the vocabulary of subjective 
idealism as, beginning with Husser!, Heidegger has done.230 
The transcript of the session records no response from Merleau-
Ponty, but a decade and a half later one of the working notes to The 
Visible and the Invisible gave as decisive an assent as Beaufret could 
have wished for: 
It is the Cartesian idealization applied to the mind as to the things 
(Husser!) that has persuaded us that we were a flux of individual 
Erlebnisse, whereas we are a field of Being.231 
By his last writings he had journeyed far indeed from a defence of 
the cogito as the 'basic fact of metaphysics'. 
Merleau-Ponty had tried to read Husser! in a way which played 
down the idealist tendencies which Beaufret had criticised. He had 
also tried to conceive of a relationship between phenomenology and 
the human sciences which would maintain a balance between the 
claims of phenomenology and the results of empirical inquiries. On 
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both counts there were limits as to how far Husser! could be pushed. 
Descartes's ghost was not easily exorcised. Nowhere was this 
clearer than with the problem of the existence of others. We must 
turn to that question in order to understand why Merleau-Ponty at 
the close of his life spoke not of a 'flux of Erlebnisse' but rather of a 
'field of Being'. 
3 
Others 
Merleau-Ponty and his other 
The 'problem of the other' pervades Merleau-Ponty's writings. He 
concluded The Structure of Behaviour with a brief discussion of how 
we make sense of the action of others.1 The analysis of the perceived 
world in the Phenomenology of Perception culminated with an 
account of 'Others and the Human World' .2 He devoted a course at 
the Sorbonne to 'The Child's Relations with Others' and spent part 
of his course on 'Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language' 
reviewing the discussion of the other in Husser! and Scheler.3 The 
penultimate chapter of The Prose of the World dealt with 'Dialogue 
and the Perception of the Other' .4 The problematic status of 
'Being-for-others' played a major role in the critique of Sartre in 
Adventures of the Dialectic. 5 The problem of the other likewise 
occupied a prominent place in his last courses at the College de 
France.6 And finally, one of the more fecund working notes for The 
Visible and the Invisible argued that a successful resolution of 
dilemmas surrounding the problem of others 'requires a complete 
reconstruction of philosophy' .7 
A few points of reference remain constant. Husserl's account-
most notably in the second volume of the Ideas and in the fifth of the 
Cartesian Meditations- was the basic paradigm for Merleau-Ponty's 
own analyses.8 Hegel's dialectic of 'Lordship and Bondage' was 
usually lurking in the background and, when read through Marx, it 
imparted a political dimension to the discussion of intersubjectivity 
that is lacking in analyses of 'other minds' by Anglo-American 
philosophers.' Descartes was often invoked as well, primarily as an 
example of pitfalls to be avoided!0 But the greatest spur to 
Merleau-Ponty's reflections on the other was Jean-Paul Sartre's 
account in Being and Nothingness .11 
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Another Sartre? 
It is only fitting that Sartre's discussion of 'Being-for-others' should 
play this role. He was, after all, the 'other' who most decisively 
influenced Merleau-Ponty's development. There are few works by 
Merleau-Ponty in which Sartre is not cited, alluded to, or argued 
with. His hold over Merleau-Ponty was matched only by Husserl. 
But where Husser! could only inspire, Sartre could also annoy. 
It is easy, on first reading, to find in Merleau-Ponty only another 
Sartre, a junior partner- three years younger- in the existentialist 
enterprise.12 But from the start Merleau-Ponty had reservations 
about his friend's philosophy. Shortly after the publication of Being 
and Nothingness he observed that 'the book remains too exclusively 
antithetic'. The dichotomies of self and other and of 'for-itself and 
'in-itself more often than not 'seem to be alternatives' rather than 
poles in 'communication' with one another. As a consequence, its 
dialectic was 'truncated' .13 
He responded to these perceived shortcomings with a sort of 
syntactic jujitsu which, by rewriting some of Sartre's more notori-
ous statements, turned them to his own cause. Thus, 'We are 
condemned to freedom' became 'We are condemned to meaning'; 
'Hell is others' became 'History is others' .14 He could also be less 
Aesopian. The Phenomenology of Perception concluded with a 
critique of a notion of freedom that looked suspiciously like 
Sartre's.15 
The rationale behind the muting of his criticisms was that he 
seemed to feel, at least at first, that there was still another Sartre to 
be heard. There were implications yet to be articulated, analyses yet 
to be completed. While Being and Nothingness was in many respects 
problematic, 'all manner of clarification and completion' could be 
expected.18 Its account of freedom would doubtless appear in a 
different light once Sartre elaborated the expected 'theory of 
passivity'Y It lacked a social theory, but it had made a start by 
posing 'the problem of reciprocal relations between consciousness 
and the social world' .18 And, whatever failings the book might have, 
it nevertheless did confront 'the central problem of philosophy': 
After Descartes, it was impossible to deny that existence as 
consciousness is radically different from existence as thing and 
that the relationship between the two is that of emptiness to 
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plenitude. After the nineteenth century and all it taught us about 
the historicity of spirit, it was impossible to deny that conscious-
ness always exists in a situation. It is up to us to understand both 
things at once!9 
The 'us' in the last sentence meant, among others, Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty. Collaborating with Sartre in the publication of Les 
Temps Modernes, Merleau-Ponty seems to have hoped that the 
differences between the Phenomenology of Perception and Being 
and Nothingness would pass away as he and Sartre elaborated in 
tandem their accounts of language, politics, and history. 
Sartre as other 
The differences did not disappear. The works which followed only 
made them more obvious. What is Literature? moved Merleau-
Ponty to wonder, in The Prose of the World, if 'professional users of 
language' like Sartre had not overlooked an aspect of linguistic 
expression which could only be uncovered by examining the silent 
medium of painting.20 The Communists and Peace moved him to 
charge, in Adventures of the Dialectic, that the antitheses of Being 
and Nothingness had only been repeated, not overcome, when 
Sartre turned from personal history to literature and politics.21 
Finally, in The Visible and the Invisible he mounted a critique of 
Sartre's pre-reflective cogito which was so thoroughgoing that it was 
also a critique of the author of the Phenomenology of Perception. 22 
He was not entirely fair to Sartre, a point Simone de Beauvoir 
stressed in her bitter rejoinder to Adventures of the Dialectic. 23 
Throughout the 1950s he accentuated those differences with Sartre 
which, in the first years after the Liberation, he had downplayed. 'I 
borrow myself from others,' he wrote toward the end of his life, 'I 
make them from my own thoughts. This is no failure to perceive 
others; it is the perception of others.' 24 In 1945, to understand the 
implications of his own work, he tried to invent another Sartre. He 
finally understood them only by creating a Sartre who was totally 
other. And one of the central themes which sustained these 
inventions and reinventions was the 'problem of the other'. 
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Wrestling with monsters: Descartes, Hegel and Husser) 
What is the problem with others? 
The 'problem of the other' is not one of the more inspiring objects of 
philosophical scrutiny. To have come to the point where it is 
necessary to prove that others exist should be warning enough that 
something has gone awry. To fail to come up with a convincing 
proof is even more embarrassing. 
'That others than you can think,' Paul Valery wrote in one of the 
pithier statements of the problem, 'is an hypothesis and an acquired 
notion; it is not obvious.' 25 Certainty that others have thoughts, 
feelings, or other 'mental states' is alleged to be elusive since 
thoughts and feelings, unlike tables or human bodies, cannot be 
seen. One might argue in response that just as one knows that 
certain of one's own mental states are associated with certain of 
one's own physical states {for example, this feeling of pain and that 
finger, hit by a hammer) so, too, similar bodily states in others must 
be accompanied by the appropriate mental states (for example, that 
man, who just hit his finger with a hammer, must feel pain). But the 
problems with this solution- the so-called 'argument from analogy' 
-are legion. It rests on an inference, not otherwise verifiable, from 
one case (one's own experience of one's own body) which may not 
be typical and may not be even coherent (do we really have a way of 
denoting mental and physical states which does not already 
presume the existence of others?; wouldn't this require a private 
language?).26 At best the argument yields, as Sartre noted, only a 
'probable knowledge' that the other is more than a body .27 At worst 
it tells us nothing and, as Merleau-Ponty insisted, 'presupposes what 
it is called on to explain'.28 
As traditionally conceived, the problem of the other necessitates 
a sorting-out of the relations between four terms: my mental states, 
my physica! states, the other's mental states, and the other's 
physical states.29 To pose the problem is thus, inevitably, to presume 
that 'mind' and 'body' can be given distinct and unequivocal 
definitions. Conversely, to resolve the problem may well require a 
dismantling of the philosophical tradition which assumes that mind 
and body can be clearly distinguished. And to do this, Merlcau-
Ponty realised, was to confront those monsters which Descartes had 
set loose on succeeding generations of philosophers. 
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The well-dressed automaton: the Cartesian legacy 
The problem of the other originates with Descartes's solution to 
Montaigne's 'What do I know?' What I know, Descartes argued, 
and know with absolute certainty, is that I am a 'res cogitans', a 
'thinking thing'. What I am less sure of, at least at the start of the 
Meditations, is the existence of the 'res extensa', things beyond me, 
extended in the world. This latter class of objects includes those 
'beings passing by on the street below'. From my window I can see 
nothing, Descartes writes, 'beyond hats and cloaks which might 
cover automatic machines'. I take these objects to be other human 
beings only through an act of judgement, 'a faculty proper not to my 
eyes but to my mind'. What is certain here is my thinking that I see 
others in the street, not their actual existence.30 
Likewise, the evidence provided by what Descartes calls the 
'inner senses' is less than compelling. How can we be sure that our 
experience of our own body does not deceive us as well? Amputees, 
for example, continue to feel pain in limbs which have been 
removed.31 Descartes was able to resist the slide towards solipsism 
which his radical doubt inaugurated only because he thought he 
found at least one idea that must have an existence beyond the 
confines of hiscogito: God.32 And, having assured himself that God 
does not deceive, he could win back his body, the other, and the 
world. But what if we remove God from the picture? Are we not left 
with a situation in which the existence of others is at best a creature 
of our faculty of judgement? 
Such a state of affairs is not a happy one. As Merleau-Ponty once 
observed, it is 'repugnant to the other ... to be only the conscious-
ness I have of him' 33 - which Leon Brunschvicg learned when 
Andre Cresson asked him what sort of consciousness he had of the 
consciousness of Andre Cresson: 
BRUNSCHVIcG: The idea that I have of his consciousness is a 
component in the system of my judgements about existence. 
CRESSoN: I cannot accept that I might be reduced to a judgement 
in Mr. Brunschvicg's consciousness, and I doubt whether those 
present, for their part, would be prepared to accept this either. 
Moreover, to be consistent, Mr. Brunschvicg ought to declare his 
as the only consciousness, and that the sole aim of knowledge is to 
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draw up a harmonious table of its representations for the 
purposes of his solitary ego.34 
As Vincent Descombes (who ferreted out this priceless exchange in 
the first place) has suggested, Brunschvicg's response should be 
annoying to entities other than Andre Cresson: 
If Brunschvicg's work-table or his pen -objects whose status in 
his doctrine is equally that of phenomena integral to the sum of 
his judgements concerning existence - could talk, they would no 
doubt protest with the same vigour as Andre Cresson against 
their reduction to such a purely intentional status.35 
What is at stake, then, is not simply the existence of 'other minds' .It 
is ultimately a question of whether the cogito admits of 'otherness' 
of any kind. If the cogito meets everywhere only its own cogitationes 
then has it not become, as Levi-Strauss suspected, a prison? In 
search of a way out, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty turned to Hegel and 
Husser!. 
Pugnacious solipsists:. Kojeve's Hegel 
What they found in Hegel was the dialectic of 'Lordship and 
Bondage' .36 That this brief section of the Phenomenology of Spirit 
came to be viewed by an entire generation of French intellectuals as 
the key to all the secrets of Hegel's philosophy was in no small way 
the achievement of Alexandre Kojeve, a Russian refugee who 
lectured on the book at the Ecole des Hautes-Etudes between 1933 
and 1939.37 His reading of Hegel had the effect of translating the 
sort of farcical exchanges which transpired between Brunschvicg 
and Cresson into the stuff of which epics are made.38 The struggle 
for 'recognition'- Hegel's term for the concession that Cresson was 
trying to wring out of Brunschvicg that he indeed had an existence 
beyond Brunschvicg's consciousness of him - was for Kojeve the 
driving force of Hegel's entire philosophy of history. Hegel, he 
taught, saw man as a 'desiring being' who, aiming at the 'nihilation 
of being', is motivated by a desire which transcends simple physical 
satisfaction. This desire, the desire for recognition as an 'indepen-
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dent consciousness', leads inevitably to what Kojeve terms a 'battle 
of pure prestige'. Made of rougher stuff than the run-of-the-mill 
Cartesian, Kojeve's solipsists risk their lives to show that they value 
the affirmation of their autonomy as minds more highly than their 
survival as bodies.39 
This struggle has two possible outcomes: either one contestant 
kills the other (thus destroying the only possible source from which 
recognition could come), or one of the combatants, feeling the 
terror of death, surrenders to the other, recognising him as an 
independent being and consenting to serve as his slave. But even 
here, Kojcve stresses, the desired recognition by the other is not 
forthcoming; the master cannot be affirmed as an independent 
consciousness by an individual who has been reduced to a mere 
instrument of another's whims. At the close of the episode we find a 
master who is still seeking recognition and a slave who has 
sublimated his fear of death into a labour which transforms the 
world. For Kojeve, the entire Phenomenology is the working out of 
the consequences of the episode, since only with the creation of a 
world in which recognition is possible can the dialectic at last come 
to rest. All human history is thus 'the history of the labouring 
slave' .40 
The degree of Kojevc's influence on Sartre is unclcar,41 but there 
is no denying the importance of Hegel's discussion of Lordship and 
Bondage for Sartre's account of the other. He found Hegel's 
analysis to be 'filled to overflowing' with a 'richness and profoun-
dity' that few other thinkers approached. In Hegel the Cartesian 
priorities had been reversed: the other was the ground on which 
self-consciousness emerged, 'the road of interiority passes through 
the other', and 'solipsism seems to be put out of the picture once and 
for all' .42 But Sartre had reservations. Hegel, he argued, saw the 
other as an epistemological rather than an ontological problem 
while Sartrc, for his part, maintained that any attempt to link self 
and other 'externally' on the level of knowledge was doomed to 
failure.43 We do not merely know the other; we also exist for others. 
He argued as well that Hegel was guilty of a double optimism. He 
was guilty, first, of an 'epistemological optimism' which presup-
posed that there was a 'common measure' between the 'other-as-
object' and 'Me-as-subject' which enabled me to sec myself as an 
object for the other and to understand that the other was a subject 
for himself.44 Second, he was guilty of an 'ontological optimism': 
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placing himself from the start of the account 'at the vantage point of 
truth' and forgetting 'his own consciousness', he refused to take the 
standpoint of any particular consciousness and thus already presup-
posed that intersubjectivity which his account was supposed to 
prove.45 'But if Hegel has forgotten himself,' Sartre concluded, 'we 
cannot forget Hegel. This means that we are referred back to the 
cogito.' 46 
Merleau-Ponty, unlike Sartre, attended Kojeve's lectures and 
was greatly influenced by them. They were a crucial impetus in the 
genesis of Merleau-Ponty's atheism and a decisive influence on his 
post-war political writings.47 But as an account of the experience of 
others, the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage was invoked by 
Merleau-Ponty only as a preliminary gesture, and quickly taken 
back. Consider, for example, a pivotal passage in the Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception: 
With the cogito begins that struggle between consciousnesses, 
each one of which, as Hegel says, seeks the death of the other. For 
the struggle ever to begin, and for each consciousness to be 
capable of suspecting the alien presences which it negates, all 
must necessarily have some common ground and be mindful of 
their peaceful co-existence in the world of childhood.48 
The disparity with Sartre's critique of Hegel is striking: for Sartre, 
Hegel had erred in presuming a 'common measure' which was in 
fact nonexistent; for Merleau-Ponty, Hegel's error lay in his 
ignoring of a 'common ground' which was the prerequisite for 
conflict itself. 
The spectre in the dark comer: Husser/ and the problem of solipsism 
The thinker who, in Merleau-Ponty's eyes, made the greatest 
contribution to the elucidation of this 'common ground' was 
Edmund Husser!. Husser! carried out his inquiries with the full 
recognition that phenomenology seemed to promise, at first glance, 
only a 'pure solipsism'.49 He was by no means ignorant of the 
troubling implications of the 'monstrous' notion that the ultimate 
basis on which the world rests is the cogito's 'I am': 
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For children in philosophy, this may be a dark corner haunted by 
the spectres of solipsism and, perhaps, of psychologism, of 
relativism. The true philosopher, instead of running away, will 
prefer to fill the dark corner with light.50 
His attempt to illuminate the problem of the other had taken but a 
scant two pages in the Sorbonne lectures. It came to occupy a little 
under half of the hundred-and-forty-page Cartesian Meditations .51 
The terms on which he posed the problem were uncompromising. 
He began by invoking a 'second epochC' which, by disregarding 
everything which made reference to the existence of others, 
attempted a 'reduction to my transcendental sphere of peculiar 
ownness'.52 This reduction, as Paul Ricoeur has noted, had the 
effect of 'transforming the objection of solipsism into an argu-
ment' .53 It forced Husser! to find within 'my own concrete being' an 
'immanent transcendency' which could account for my experience 
of the other and of the objective world.54 
The goal of this reduction was to reveal a stratum of experience 
that was so peculiarly my own that it could serve as the benchmark 
for all subsequent distinctions between 'mine' and 'other' .55 
Examining our concept of an objective world, open to anyone's 
experience, Husser! removed all reference to others, all imputations 
of objectivity, and thus arrived at the abstraction of a 'mere nature', 
uniquely my own. Within this sphere, my body has a unique status. 
Unlike those objective bodies (Korper) which I must manipulate 
externally, it is a Jiving body (Leib) which I can animate immedi-
ately.58 
Thus far, the reduction seems only to have thrown us into the 
arms of solipsism. But 'something remarkable strikes us'. Here, at 
what Suzanne Bachelard has called 'the farthest limit to which the 
phenomenological reduction can be carried', we find that 'my whole 
world of experiencing life' including my 'actual and possible 
experience of what is other' continues, oblivious to the 'screening 
off' of all that is other.57 The 'reduced' ego still functions as 'a 
member of the world' with others outside it. Otherness continues to 
be constituted intentionally within it.58 
The challenge Husser! faces is thus that of explaining how the 
experience of the other as other can be given within this uniquely 
personal field. The hinge on which his account turns is the peculiar 
way in which the body of the other is perceived. In my perception of 
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physical objects, the perception of the front of an object is regularly 
accompanied by an 'appresentation' of the back. To see the front of 
a house is to see an object whose other side is given to me as 
something I could see were I to walk around it. Likewise, to 
perceive the body of the other is also to be presented with an object 
which has 'another side' -it is aLeib for the other as well as a Korper 
for me. But this 'other side' can never be seen by me; no 
modification of my location will allow me to experience the other's 
body as the other lives it.59 Husser! argues that the motivation for 
this 'appresentation' of the other's body as another animate body is 
founded on my own experience of my own body. Through an 
'"analogizing" apprehension', resting on 'a similarity connecting 
within my primordial sphere that body [Korper] over there with my 
body [Korper]', the other's body is seen as an animate body.60 
This animate body 'continues to prove itself' to be a body similar 
to mine through 'its changing but incessantly harmonious 
"behaviour" '.61 A concordance of expression, gestures, and 
behaviours verifies 'what is not originally accessible' and allows me 
to confirm the other's body as 'an analogue of something included in 
my peculiar ownness' .62 Further, even though I cannot occupy the 
position the other occupies with respect to his own body, I can take 
up- in reality or in my imagination- the positions which the other 
takes up in the face of the world. Thus, just as my 'here' can appear 
as 'there' for the other, so too the 'there' that I see can also be the 
other's 'here' .63 In this way the other comes to be known as a fellow 
member of that 'community of monads' who inhabit a shared world. 
Little in this account impressed Sartre. His allegiances Jay more 
with the 'non-egological' theory of consciousness elaborated in the 
Logical Investigations than with the 'transcendental egology' of the 
Cartesian Investigations. The latter approach 'loaded down' con-
sciousness and deprived it of that essential spontaneity which was 
the distinctive attribute of a consciousness defined solely as 
intentionality.64 The spectre of solipsism, he argued in his 1937 
essay 'The Transcendence of the Ego', was a creature born of 
Husserl's abandonment of his earlier standpoint. As 'an object 
which appears only to reflection', the Ego was by definition 
'radically cut off from the world' .65 But, once one realises that the 
Ego is a product of reflective consciousness, it and all of the states it 
is alleged to have cease to be 'my exclusive property': 
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Consequently, if Paul and Peter both speak of Peter's love ... it is 
no longer true that the one speaks blindly and by analogy of that 
which the other apprehends in full. They speak of the same thing. 
Doubtless they apprehend it by different procedures, but these 
procedures may be equally intuitional. And Peter's emotion is no 
more certain for Peter than for Paul. For both of them, it belongs 
to the category of objects which can be called into question.66 
Thus 'solipsism becomes unthinkable' from the moment that the 
Ego ceases to have a privileged status.67 
In Being and Nothingness Sartre modified his stance slightly. 
While no more enthusiastic about the transcendental ego, he now 
conceded that getting rid of it 'does not help one bit to solve the 
question of the existence of others'.68 The problem he now saw in 
Husserl's account was that it did not succeed in doing what it would 
have to do to free transcendental phenomenology from the onus of 
solipsism- namely, show that the other is equally a transcendental 
ego- and instead tried to prove the one thing which no reasonable 
person had ever doubted: that empirical others exist.69 In other 
words, Husserl does not refute the charge that transcendental 
phenomenology terminates in solipsism; the Cartesian Meditations 
shows us only how the other is constituted on the mundane level.70 
Even on the mundane level, Sartre felt that Husserl's account left a 
good deal to be desired. Like Kant and Hegel before him, Husser) 
saw the problem of the other as an epistemological rather than 
ontological question: knowledge of the other is the 'indispensable 
condition for the constitution of the world'.71 
Husserl replies to the solipsist that the Other's existence is as sure 
as that of the world, and Husser) includes in the world my 
psycho-physical existence. But the solipsist says the same thing: it 
is as sure, he will say, but no more surc.72 
Thus Husscrl docs not answer the solipsist's objections; he only 
repeats them. 
While Merleau-Ponty was a good deal more appreciative of the 
Cartesian Meditations than Sartre, he too had reservations. The 
book crystallised for him a fundamental ambivalence in Husserl's 
thought. On the one hand, Husser) attempted 'to gain access to 
others by starting with the cogito, with the "sphere of own ness" '. 
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On the other hand, he denied that there even was a 'problem of the 
other' and abandoned the standpoint of the cogito in order to begin 
his analysis 'with a consciousness which is neither self nor other' .73 
Merleau-Ponty's Husser!- the 'existentialist' Husserl- of course 
preferred the latter approach. Hence, where Sartre opposed the 
Husser! of the Cartesian Meditations with arguments drawn from 
the Logical Investigations, Merleau-Ponty read the Cartesian Medi-
tations from the perspective of the Crisis. 
For this reason, the criticisms which Sartre mounted against 
Husser! fell most heavily on what mattered least to Merleau-Ponty: 
the transcendental egology. Much of what Sartre wrote could either 
be granted or ignored. The Structure of Behaviour closed with an 
endorsement of Sartre's position in 'The Transcendence of the 
Ego' .74 In the Phenomenology of Perception he drove the argument 
home with an appeal to the Crisis, arguing that the self which 
perceives and the self which is perceived are 'not cogitationes shut 
up in their own immanence, but beings which are outrun by their 
world, and which consequently may be outrun by each other' .75 
Maintaining that Husserl's best instincts moved him to incarnate 
transcendental subjectivity into the world as intersubjectivity, 
Merleau-Ponty had few quarrels with Sartre's rejection of the 
transcendental ego. 
Sartre's criticisms of the adequacy of Husserl's analysis of the 
problem of the other on the mundane level were, in contrast, of 
relevance to Merleau-Ponty's argument. But they could easily be 
shown to have missed the point. Husser) did not, as Sartre charged, 
pose the relationship between self and other as a matter of 
knowledge. Rather, Merleau-Ponty stressed, Husser) had been at 
pains to insist that the 'assimilative apprehension' of the other was 
not an 'inference from analogy'. Apperception 'is not inference, not 
a thinking act' .76 We are no more confronted here with an argument 
from analogy than we are in the case of a child who, finally having 
understood what scissors are, 'from now on sees scissors at first 
glance as scissors' without 'explicit reproducing, comparing, and 
inferring' .77 Every apperception, Husser) argued, 'points back to a 
"primal instituting" [ Urstiftung] in which an object with a similar 
sense became constituted for the first time' .78 In the encounter with 
others, my lived body serves as a 'primarily institutive original 
[urstiftende Original]' which is 'always livingly present'. Ego and 
alter ego are thus 'always and necessarily given in an original 
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"pairing" ' through which they are always associated but never 
completely identified.79 The other is thus always present, as the 
partner of my body, but nevertheless always 'other'. 
In this account of the other, Merleau-Ponty found the most 
fecund of Husserl's analyses and the most powerful of the concepts 
which he would eventually marshall against Sartre. But, as we shall 
see, what he took from Husser) cut in two ways. In criticising Being 
and Nothingness, he came to criticise the Phenomenology of 
Perception as well. 
Regarding the regard of the other: Phenomenology of Perception vs 
Being and Nothingness 
Merleau-Ponty criticised Sartre's account of the other on at least 
three occasions. His discussion of 'Others and the Human World' 
in the Phenomenology of Perception was in large part a restrained 
but penetrating critique of the analysis of 'Being-for-Others' in 
Being and Nothingness. 80 In Adventures of the Dialectic his polemic 
against Sartre's essay The Communists and Peace examined the 
failings of Sartre's account of Being-for-Others so as to clarify the 
foundation on which Sartre's questionable politics rested.81 Finally, 
in the second chapter of The Visible and the Invisible he sought once 
again to illuminate the failings of Sartre's ontology by focusing on 
his treatment of the other.82 
Each time he returned to Being and Nothingness the stakes were 
raised. The critique in the Phenomenology of Perception was 
sympathetic to Sartre's general project, but anxious to see it purged 
of those overly antithetic tendencies which Merleau-Ponty felt 
plagued Sartre's presentations of his philosophy. In Adventures of 
the Dialectic, spurred by irreconcilable political differences with 
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty made explicit what had been held back 
throughout the Phenomenology of Perception: the extent to which 
he and Sartre disagreed on most of the fundamental issues at stake 
in the analysis of the other. Finally, in the more temperate but no 
less uncompromising critique of The Visible and the Invisible, 
Merleau-Ponty came to see that Sartre's inability to do justice to our 
experience of others had important ramifications for the argument 
of the Phenomenology of Perception as well. 
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Looks that kill: the other in 'Being and Nothingness' 
Let us sketch, then, the main points of the analysis to which 
Merleau-Ponty returned again and again.83 The account in Being 
and Nothingness began by des_cribing the transformation my 
experience of the world undergoes with the appearance of another 
person. The other is not simply another part of my world; it is rather 
an alternative locus around which the world may be organised. With 
the entry of another person into my visual field 
suddenly an object has appeared which has stolen the world from 
me. Everything is in place, everything still exists for me; but 
everything is traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the 
direction of a new object.84 
The other is 'a kind of drain hole' in the middle of the world; into it 
flow all of the objects of my world.85 
Unsettling as this experience may be, my seeing the other is only 
the prelude to an even more convulsive experience: 'Being-seen-
by-another'. To be seen by an actual, physically present other 
person - the locus classicus is Sartre's famous description of the 
voyeur surprised at a keyhole by another person86 - is to begin to 
fathom a dimension of our experience which can occur even in the 
absence of an actual person: the experience of falling under the 
'regard d'autrui': 
What most often manifests a look [regard] is the convergence of 
two ocular globes in my direction. But the look will be given just 
as well on occasion when there is a rustling of branches, or the 
sound of a footstep followed by silence, or the slight opening of 
a shutter, or a light movement of a curtain. During an attack men 
who are crawling through the brush apprehend as a look to be 
avoided, not two eyes, but a white farm-house which is outlined 
against the sky at the top of a little hill.87 
The omnipresence of the 'regard d'awrui' testifies to the fact that I 
am open to the other in the very depths of my being. 'Being-for-
others' is a permanent possibility. 'At each instant,' Sartre intones 
ominously, 'the other is looking at me [me regarde ].' 88 
The unveiling of the new ontological dimension of 'Being-for-
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Others' has wide-ranging implications for Sartre's philosophy. The 
other binds the 'for-itself' to the 'facticity' of its past and its 
situation. It spatialises and temporalises the 'for-itself', strips it of 
its transcendence, and thus brings about that connection between 
the 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself' which had been one of the major 
concerns of Sartre's inquiry.89 All of this persists, however, only so 
long as the 'regard d'autrui' is not returned. When it is, it is the 
other who is transformed into an in-itself, stripped of its transcen-
dence, fixed in a situation, spatialised and temporalised.90 We are 
presented with a duel of gazes, a contest with no final victor. The 
ever-shifting alternatives, consciousness as object/other as subject 
and consciousness as subject/other as object, are the two poles 
between which Sartre's extended and frequently dazzling discussion 
of such 'concrete relations with other' as 'love, language, and 
masochism' (on the one side) and 'indifference, desire, hate, and 
sadism' (on the other) vacillates.91 
What sustains conflict? The other in· Phenomenology of Perception· 
However much Sartre criticised Hegel, the analysis of 'Being-for-
Others' was cut from the same cloth as the dialectic of Lordship and 
Bondage. In Sartre, relations with the other are achieved by means 
of an 'internal negation', by a mutual denial and nihilation. They are 
fundamentally conflictual. 
As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty argued that Hegel's account of 
the 'conflict of consciousness' was dependent on the more funda-
mental experience of a 'common ground' .92 The 'regard d'awrui' was 
unbearable 'only because it takes the place of a possible communi-
cation'. As a refusal of communication, it 'is still a form of 
communication'.93 Consequently, the most important task facing 
his account of the other was that of comprehending the primordial 
community which sustained both conflict and co-existence. 
Like Husser! he sought a solution in the way the body of the other 
was pen:eived. As 'the vehicle for a form of behaviour', it is both 
'the very first of all cultural objects' and 'the one by which all the 
rest exist' .94 Rejecting the argument from analogy, he maintained 
that something akin to Husserl's 'analogizing apperception' was 
achieved by the lived body itself: 
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The observed correlations between my physical behaviour and 
that of others, my intentions and my pantomime, may well 
provide me with a clue in the methodical attempt to know others 
... but they do not teach me the existence of others. Between my 
consciousness and my body as I experience it, between this 
phenomenal body of mine and that of another as I see it from the 
outside, there exists an internal relation which causes the other to 
appear as the completion of the system.95 
What is crucial here, as for Husser!, is that the body of the other is 
given to me as animate -as a Leib - and not simply as a physical 
object- a Korper. The naturalistic picture of the body 'as a chemical 
structure of an agglomeration of tissues' is constructed 'by a process 
of impoverishment, from a primordial phenomenon of the body-
for-us, the body of human experience or perceived body' .96 The 
'for-itself is likewise a creature of an impoverishment which can be 
undone only if consciousness is conceived 'no longer as a constitut-
ing consciousness . . . but as a perceptual consciousness ... as 
being-in-the-world or existence' .97 In Merleau-Ponty's account, self 
and other meet as incarnate beings, not as sovereign regards. 
The animate body spontaneously achieves what no analogy 
working from physical body to mental states could possibly 
accomplish. My body and the body of the other are 'two sides of one 
and the same phenomenon'; an anonymous existence 'inhabits both 
bodies simultaneously' .98 A simple experiment illustrates the point. 
If an adult takes the finger of a fifteen-month-old baby and playfully 
pretends to bite it, the child will open its mouth. There can be no 
analogy constructed here since the child has 'scarcely looked at its 
face in a glass' and its teeth are unlike those of the adult. Instead of 
speaking of an argument from analogy, we must understand that the 
child's mouth and teeth 'are immediately for it capable of the same 
intentions' as those of the adult. The intention of 'biting' has 
'immediately, for it, an intersubjective significance' .99 
To account for such behaviour, Merleau-Ponty made recourse, in 
his course on 'The Child's Relations with Others', to Husserl's 
discussion of 'pairing' or- as Merleau-Ponty translated the term-
'coupling' [accouplement]: 
In perceiving the other, my body and his are coupled, resulting in 
a sort of action which pairs them [action a deux). This conduct 
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which I am able only to see, I live somehow from a distance. I 
make it mine; I recover it or comprehend it. Reciprocally I know 
that the gestures I make myself can be the objects of another's 
intention. It is this transfer of my intentions to the other's body 
and of his intentions to my own, my alienation of the other and his 
alienation of me, that makes possible the perception of others.'00 
The 'problem of others' is thus not resolved on the level of 
constitutive consciousness. The certainty that others exist is, rather, 
the consequence of a 'passive synthesis' which precedes and sustains 
the activities of the conscious subject. 
Merleau-Ponty's exploration of how this synthesis was achieved 
led him most immediately in two directions: into an intensive study 
of developmental psychology and into an increased concern with 
the role of dialogue in the perception of the other. Both themes had 
been touched upon in the Phenomenology of Perception, but their 
implications were more fully elaborated only after the publication 
of the book. And these implications began to suggest the extent to 
which the problem of the other strains the entire apparatus of 
Husserlian phenomenology. 
The child, the other, and the mirror 
The attention Merleau-Ponty devoted to the cognitive development 
of the child in his courses at the Sorbonne may well have been 
simply an artifact of his peculiar teaching responsibilities: he held a 
chair in Child Psychology and Pedagogy.101 But regardless of his 
reason for offering these courses, their content proved to be of 
considerable relevance to the problems he had struggled with in the 
Phenomenology of Perception. Husser) had chosen a most peculiar 
example to illustrate the phenomenon of 'assimilative appercep-
tion': a child's learning, and then applying, the notion 'scissors'. 
Would not a more relevant question be how the child learns to 
employ the notion 'other person'? Could not the research of 
psychologists such as Wallon, Guillaume, and Piaget illuminate the 
'primal instituting' that pairs my body with that of the other? 
In their writings Merleau-Ponty found discussions of the 
emergence of the concept of the other which confirmed and 
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completed Husserl's account. The child, at about six months of age, 
leaves behind an initial phase of 'pre-communication', in which 
'there is not one individual over against the other but rather an 
anonymous collectivity', and begins a process - never fully com-
pleted- of segregation and distinction between self and other.102 
The acquisition of knowledge of the other as other is coupled with 
the realisation by the child that its own body is distinct and bounded. 
My body and the others's body are, as Husser! had described it, 
'paired'; they are both given in the same stroke. Children do not 
begin from the cogito and then learn that others exist. Rather, they 
begin from a diffuse standpoint, which admits of no distinction 
between self and other, and come to know themselves only in so far 
as they make progress in knowing others. 
The child's fascination with its own image in a mirror - a 
phenomenon that had been noted by Kohler, Guillaume, and 
Wallon among others103 - is paradigmatic of this dual achievement. 
By giving the child, for the first time, the opportunity to see its own 
body as a discrete and bounded entity, it also enables the child to 
distinguish between itself and others.104 But to understand the 
affective dimension of the child's experience of the mirror image, 
Merleau-Ponty turned from the classic discussion in Wallon's Les 
Origines du caractere chez /'enfant to consider a more recent 
contribution by one of his fellow auditors in Kojeve's lectures on 
the Phenomenology: Jacques Lacan's 1949 paper 'The Mirror 
Stage as Formative of the Function of the I' .105 
Following Lacan, Merleau-Ponty argued that the most important 
lesson which the child learns in the process of recognising the image 
in the mirror as its own is that 'there can be a viewpoint taken on 
him'. The mirror teaches the child 'that he is visible, for himself and 
for others' .106 This recognition that one is- as Merleau-Ponty put it 
in The Visible and the Invisible -a 'visible seer' is the precondition 
for the development of the 'imaginary me' or 'ideal ego'. But with 
the acquisition of this consciousness of oneself as a distinct and 
separate individual comes 'a sort of alienation': 
I am no longer what I felt myself, immediately to be; I am that 
image of myself that is offered by the mirror. To use Dr. Lacan's 
terms, I am 'captured, caught up' by my spatial image. Thereupon 
I leave the reality of the lived me in order to refer myself 
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constantly to the ideal, fictitious, or imaginary me, of which the 
specular image is the first outline. In this sense I am torn from 
myself, and the image in the mirror prepares me for another still 
more serious alienation ... the alienation by others. For others 
have only an exterior image of me, which is analogous to the one 
seen in the mirror. Consequently others will tear me away from 
my immediate inwardness much more surely than will the 
mirror.107 
The image in the mirror 'turns the child away from What he 
effectively is' and orients him instead 'towards what he sees and 
imagines himself to be'. 108 
There was one aspect of Lacan's argument, however, which 
Merleau-Ponty passed over. Lacan's essay closed by drawing out 
the implications of the mirror stage for 'any philosophy directly 
issuing from the cog ito', especially the 'contemporary philosophy of 
being and nothingness' .109 Sartrean existentialism, Lacan argued, 
was refuted by the implications psychoanalysis drew from the 
mirror stage. The ego must be seen as 'the function of meconnais-
sance [misrecognition]'; it is an imaginary object, which tears the 
subject away from what it is and chains it to what Lacan, drawing on 
Kojeve, later characterised as 'the desire of the other'.110 To take 
the cogito as the starting-point for philosophy would thus condemn 
philosophy to a foundation which vanished under scrutiny. 
While Lacan's critique was directed at Sartre, his argument had 
troubling implications for Merleau-Ponty's position as well. The 
Phenomenology of Perception argued that the lived body is our 
primordial means of contact with the world. But, given Lacan's 
analysis of the mirror stage, what sort of relation can we posit 
between the 'lived me' and the 'imaginary me'? It was on this score 
that Lacan, in an article written shortly after Merleau-Ponty's 
death, expressed severe reservations about the degree to which 
Merleau-Ponty had appreciated the full implications of the mirror 
stage! 11 Recourse to a 'tacit' or 'pre-reflective' cogito did not, in 
Lacan's opinion, overcome the superficiality which plagued all 
'philosophies of consciousness'. No matter how indeterminate the 
cogito is made, Lacan argued, it continued to imply 'all the powers 
of reflection by which subject and consciousness are con-
founded' .112 Merleau-Ponty still clung to the pre-Freudian tendency 
to equate 'consciousness' (be it 'reflective' or 'pre-reflective') with 
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'subjectivity' and thus to ignore the important role played by 
unconscious processes in the creation of the subject.113 
In the Phenomenology of Perception, drawing more on Bins-
wanger's Daseinanalysis than on Freud, Merleau-Ponty had argued 
that psychoanalysis uncovered an 'incarnate significance' which was 
the original phenomenon of which 'body and mind, sign and 
significance are abstract moments' .114 Likewise in a 195llecture he 
had suggested that what Freud had tried to introduce 'between the 
organism and ourselves' under the rubric of 'unconscious' was, in 
fact, what 'other thinkers have more appropriately named ambigu-
ous perception'.115 In these formulations, critics sympathetic to 
Lacan have found a blurring of the boundary between the 'con-
scious/preconscious system' and the unconscious.116 Such formula-
tions seem to suggest that the psychoanalyst's passage back from the 
conscious to the unconscious is the same thing as the 
phenomenologist's passage from the objective to the pre-objective. 
But this is precisely an analogy which Lacan rejected. 
For Lacan - as for Levi-Strauss- phenomenology was unable to 
appreciate the radical heterogeneity which the concept of the 
unconscious introduces into the account of subjectivity. Husser!, 
like Descartes, had assumed that the reflecting ego could make a 
complete inventory of its own contents. But the split between the 
ego and the unconscious- a rift whose origin Lacan traced to the 
imaginary identifications of the mirror stage- plays havoc with the 
Cartesian project. Lacan's reformulation of the cogito was a good 
deal more extensive than Husserl's: 'I am not wherever I am the 
plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do not think to 
think.' 111 
If the unconscious- that place where, in Lacan's formulation, I 
think of what I am without realising that I am thinking at all - is 
conceived as the locus of the 'discourse of the other' ,118 it is difficult 
to accept Merleau-Ponty's description of it as the 'other side' of 
consciousness. It is rather, as J. B. Pontalis suggested, what Freud 
once called 'an other scene'. 119 The contents of this 'other scene' 
cannot be explored through self-reflection, since to stay on the level 
of philosophical reflection is to remain on the level where, as Lacan 
would have it, 'I am the plaything of my thought'. To reach this 
'other scene' one must enter into the complex dialectic of the 
analytic process in which the task of interpretation, in Lacan's 
words, 'consists precisely in distinguishing the person lying on the 
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analyst's couch from the person who is speaking'.120 And that was 
precisely the step which Merleau-Ponty, at this point, was unable to 
take. 
Dialogue, de-centering, and institution 
He did, however, complement his analysis of the child's relations 
with others with a second concern, broached in Phenomenology of 
Perception but pursued more extensively in his courses at the 
Sorbonne and in his unpublished study The Prose of the World: the 
way in which relations with others are mediated through language. 
For Sartre, dialogue was a continuation of conflict by other means. 
The discussion of language in Being and Nothingness was but a 
parenthesis in the analysis of 'seduction' within the first cycle of 
'concrete relations with others' ('Love, Language, and Masoch-
ism').121 Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, had argued in Phenomenology 
of Perception that while the other, 'by inserting me in his field, 
stripped me of part of my being', this loss could be recovered 'by 
establishing relations with him, by bringing about his clear recogni-
tion of me' .122 Language was uniquely capable of accomplishing this 
task: 
In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the 
other and myself a common ground; my thought and his are 
interwoven into a single fabric, my words and those of my 
interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and 
they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is 
the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me 
no longer a mere bit of behaviour in my transcendental field, nor I 
in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate 
reciprocity. 123 
To learn to speak, he stressed in his course 'Consciousness and the 
Acquisition of Language' ( 1949-50), is not simply to master a new 
intellectual faculty; it is also to acquire the capacity of living with 
others}24 
Language could play this role, Merleau-Ponty went on to argue in 
The Prose of the World, because the relationship between 'speak-
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ing' or 'expressive' subjects 'is no longer that alternation which 
makes a rivalry of the relations between minds': 
I am not active only when I am speaking; rather, I precede my 
thought in the listener. I am not passive while I am listening; 
rather, I speak according to ... what the other is saying. Speaking 
is not just my own initiative, listening is not submitting to the 
initiative of the other, because as speaking subjects we are 
continuing, we are resuming a common effort more ancient than 
we, upon which we are grafted to one another and which is the 
manifestation, the growth, of truth.125 
Dialogue provided a paradigm of interaction which differed radi-
cally from Sartre's analysis of the 'regard d'autrui'. It did not 
culminate in the unstable dyads of 'consciousness as object/other as 
subject' and 'consciousness as subject/other as object'. Rather, self 
and other were reciprocally de-centered and hence able to 
'encroach upon one another'. Both drew upon expressive acts which 
'derive from the same institution'.126 
Thus, against Sartre's primordial conflict of self and other, 
Merleau-Ponty invoked Husserl's conception of a 'pairing' of self 
and other which rested on a 'primal instituting' that assured their 
co-existence in a shared world. But, as has already been suggested, 
to stress this aspect of Husserl's work was to embark on a reading of 
phenomenology which was at odds with certain of Husserl's more 
Cartesian arguments. And to develop this aspect of Husserl's 
thought by recourse to a philosophy of language was implicitly to 
call into question the extent to which phenomenology, as a 
'philosophy of consciousness', could come to terms with the 
problem of the other. 
Merleau-Ponty confronted these issues head-on in his course on 
'Institution in Personal and Public History' (1954-5) at the College 
de France. Asking whether the notion of 'institution' might not 
resolve 'certain difficulties in the philosophy of consciousness'- not 
least among them its tendency to treat the other as 'the negation of 
itself' - he came to the conclusion that to accept the notion of 
'institution' was necessarily to abandon the notion of'constitution': 
If the subject were taken not as a constituting but an instituting 
subject, it might be understood that the subject does not exist 
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instantaneously and that the other person does not exist simply as 
the negative of myself ... an instituting subject could coexist with 
another because the one instituted is not the immediate reflection 
of the activity of the former and can be regained by himself or by 
others without involving anything like a total recreation. Thus the 
instituted subject exists between others and myself, between me 
and myself, like a hinge, the consequence and guarantee of our 
belonging to a common world. 127 
Husserl's notion of institution thus provided Merleau-Ponty with a 
means of curbing those tendencies in Husserl's discussion of 
'constitution' which led to Sartre's picture of self and other as 
eternal antagonists, each forever negating the other. But there is 
something peculiar in his argument: the subject which he is 
analysing here is presented both as an 'instituting subject' and as an 
'instituted subject'. To speak of the subject as 'instituting' is to see 
consciousness as actively creating meaning through a series of 
intentional acts. To speak of the subject as 'instituted' is to open the 
door to a rather different view of the subject and to see the subject 
not as an agent creating meaning but as a creature whose meaning 
must be sought outside its own actions. 
Does the subject institute or is it instituted? Merleau-Ponty 
would appear to want to have it both ways- a stance which is by no 
means unreasonable but which is, at least at this point, scarcely 
supported by anything else in his philosophy. The Prose of the 
World, in its role as prolegomena to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of 
expression, was to have taken up this curious status of the subject in 
greater detail. But that work remained unfinished. When 
Merleau-Ponty next examined the problem of the other it was in a 
markedly different context: a critique of Sartre's politics. 
The political dimension: Ad~·entures of the Dialectic and The 
Communists and Peace 
Breaking points 
Merleau-Ponty's long and bitter critique of Sartre in Adventures of 
the Dialectic was provoked by a series of articles which Sartre wrote 
in response to the bizarre sequence of events which followed the 
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arrival in Paris, on 28 May 1952, of General Matthew B. Ridgway. 
Ridgway, who was to assume command of NATO forces from 
Dwight David Eisenhower, had been the target of attacks in the 
communist press because of the alleged American use of bac-
teriological weapons in Korea. He was greeted in Paris by a 
demonstration which was swiftly and forcefully dispersed by the 
police. In the aftermath, Jacques Duclos, a leading figure in the 
French Communist Party and a member of parliament, was arrested 
-allegedly with a loaded pistol, a truncheon, a wireless transmitter, 
and two carrier pigeons in his car. Only after he had been 
imprisoned on charges of conspiracy did it become widely known 
that the pistol and truncheon belonged to his driver/bodyguard, that 
the wireless transmitter was, in fact, an ordinary radio, and that the 
pigeons were neither carrier pigeons nor even alive; they were 
destined not for a meeting with the KGB in Moscow but rather for a 
rendezvous with some petits pais in a casserole.128 
For Sartre, these events- which opened a campaign to outlaw the 
French Communist Party- were the 'one straw' which pushed him 
past the 'breaking point'. 'In the language of the Church,' he later 
wrote, 'this was my conversion.' 129 Swearing 'an undying hatred of 
the bourgeoisie' and taking up the defence of the French Com-
munist Party, he wrote day and night and produced the first of a 
series of articles which appeared in Les Temps Modernes between 
July 1952 and April 1954 under the title 'The Communists and. 
Peace'.130 
For Merleau-Ponty, these articles were the final straw. In an 
attack which consumed over half of Adventures of the Dialectic he 
gave public expression to the private disagreements which, since the 
outbreak of the Korean War, had increasingly estranged him from 
Sartre. And this attack on Sartre's politics culminated in a re-
examination and rejection of Sartre's philosophy. 
The problem of communism 
The immediate cause of the quarrel was a mutual redefining of 
political allegiances. As Sartre wrote in 1961: 
Each of us was conditioned, but in opposite directions. Our 
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slowly accumulated disgust made the one discover, in an instant, 
the horror of Stalinism, and the other, that of his own class.131 
Prior to his 'conversion', Sartre had been a good deal less concerned 
with politics and a good deal further from Marxism than Merleau-
Ponty. In the division of labour that grew up at Les Temps Modernes 
Merleau-Ponty assumed the responsibilities of editor-in-chief and 
political editor. He refused, however, to allow his name to appear 
along with Sartre's on the masthead of the journal, apparently 
fearing - Sartre later conjectured - that Sartre might move the 
journal to the right. He wanted to be able to dissociate himself 
without a public breach with Sartre!32 
In the years immediately following the Second World War, Les 
Temps Modernes maintained a position of neutrality toward both 
the United States and the Soviet Union, with Merleau-Ponty 
concerned to defend the principles of communism against liberal 
critics while at the same time ready to criticise the Soviet Union and 
the French Communist Party for betraying their Marxist heritage.133 
He held to this stance as late as January 1950 when, in an editorial 
on recent revelations of the extent of the concentration camp 
system in the Soviet Union, he both argued that 'there is no 
socialism when one out of every twenty citizens is in a camp' and yet 
nevertheless maintained that 'whatever the nature of the present 
Soviet society may be, the USSR is on the whole situated, in the 
balance of powers, on the side of those who are struggling against 
the forms of exploitation known to us' .134 
The outbreak of the Korean War forced his hand. His 'wait and 
sec' attitude towards Marxism now seemed 'a dubious dream'. The 
independence on which such an attitude rested placed him 'outside 
communism'.135 In 1952, ostensibly in protest over the deletion of a 
critical preface he had attached to an article by Pierre Naville on 
'The Contradictions of Capitalism', Merleau-Ponty resigned from 
Les Temps Modemes and terminated his friendship with Sartre.136 
The party as other: from 'Being and Nothingness' to 'The 
Communists and Peace' 
Political issues such as these would appear to be far removed from 
the philosophical problem of our relations with others. But for both 
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Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, the connection could not have been 
more intimate. Once the arguing started, Sartre later recalled, their 
differences could not be confined to politics: 
Suddenly his tongue loosened. And so did mine. We launched 
into a long and futile explanation which bounced from one 
subject to another and from one discussion to another. Is there a 
spontaneity of the masses? Can groups find their cohesion from 
within? Ambiguous questions which at times took us back to 
politics ... and at other times back to sociology, to existence 
itself, which means, to philosophy, to our 'style of life', to our 
'anchorage' and to ourselves.137 
The two 'ambiguous questions' which Sartre mentioned were, in 
fact, the point of departure for Merleau-Ponty's critique in Adven-
tures of the Dialectic. And in the book, as in their discussions, the 
critique of The Communists and Peace irresistibly led Merleau-
Ponty back to Being and Nothingness. 
The reasons for Merleau-Ponty's focusing on Sartre's treatment 
of class are not far to seek. The Communists and Peace was 
concerned not so much with the anti-Ridgway demonstration as 
with the failure of French workers to support the June 4 strikes 
called by the French Communist Party to protest against the May 28 
arrests. Segments of the liberal press hailed this inaction as evidence 
of the proletariat's having begun to act independently of its 
representatives in the party .138 Sartre, denying that the proletariat 
was capable of such action against the party, developed an 
argument which was greatly indebted to his account of the other in 
Being and Nothingness. His analysis of the failed June 4 strike -
which, at this point, Merleau-Ponty would have rejected on political 
grounds alone- was thus linked to parts of Being and Nothingness 
which had long been suspect to Merleau-Ponty on philosophical 
grounds. 
In Being and Nothingness Sartre had d~alt with class conscious-
ness as an example of the two modalities in which feelings of 
community with others can be experienced: as an us-object 
[nous-objet] and a we-subject [nous-sujet]. The former occurs when 
the dyad of self and other is confronted by a third party. One 
possible outcome is that the 'third' will regard both the 'I' and the 
'other' as a single entity, fusing both into a similar situation and 
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imputing to both a common project. Sartre noted that certain 
contexts are more conducive than others to this taking place, the 
situation of communal work being among the most favourable. It is 
not work per se that integrates individuals into a collectivity, Sartre 
argued, but rather work carried out for another under the watchful 
eye of an other.139 Solidarity with other members of a class is thus 
introduced from the outside, by the 'Other', and the goal of class 
struggle can only be the abolition of this status of being an 
'us-object', a goal which requires the eradication of the other.140 
The main lines of this account were carried over into The 
Communists and Peace, where Sartre argued that, as a consequence 
of transformations in the French economy, a blurring of class 
distinctions had taken place which frustrates the constitution of a 
proletarian 'us-object'. Workers rarely find themselves watched by 
capitalist 'thirds'; the complex hierarchy of workers and managers 
defuses class conflicts.141 The party must step into the role 
abandoned by the capitalist 'third'. Described by Sartre as 'pure 
action', unencumbered by facticity, and without divisions, it pro-
vides the 'regard d'autrui' which binds the proletariat together.142 
The account in Being and Nothingness thus leads inexorably to 
the conclusions of The Communists and Peace: the proletariat did 
not assert its independence on June 4 since, by definition, only 
'individuals' and never the 'proletariat' criticise or fail to follow 
party directives: 
'Then, who refused to strike?' Well, individuals, and a great 
number of them at that; if you like, the great majority of workers. 
'And isn't that what's called the proletariat?' No, it is not ... The 
worker restricts himself to refusing to participate personally; he 
doesn't pass judgement. And far from wishing, like Kant and the 
drunks of the Fourth Republic, 'to raise the principle of his own 
act to a universal law', he strives to keep it private.143 
For the proletariat to criticise the party it would have to become a 
'we-subject' - an active, collective subject. And that is no simple 
feat. 
The concept of'we-subject' is among the more obscure aspects of 
Sartre's early social thought and one of the more important 
concerns of his later Critique of Dialectical Reason. 144 The analysis 
in Being and Nothingness focuses on the way the production and use 
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of manufactured objects shapes an anonymous, collective subject. 
These objects, having been produced by non-individualised 'they-
subjects', reveal their users as 'an undifferentiated transcen-
dence'.145 Thus active solidarity with others is won, paradoxically, 
only at the price of a surrender to the power of objects. 146 
A similar argument emerges in the final instalment of The 
Communists and Peace .141 While continuing to insist that the masses 
are 'the object of history' and 'never act by themselves', Sartre 
granted that the militant's transformation of the 'masses-object' 
into a 'proletarian-subject' requires some 'prior unity' within the 
proletariat. This unity, he argued, arises through a process of 
mimesis in which I imitate, not the 'Other', but rather 'myself 
become my own object'. Imitator and imitated are both 'inter-
changeable and separated' and the proletarian's capacity for 
imitation resides in his being 'anyone at all' .148 
Each sees the other come to him as anyone at all, that is, as 
himself. To the extent that massification engenders both isolation 
and interchangeability, it gives rise to imitation as a mechanical 
relationship between molecules; and imitation is neither a 
tendency nor a psychic characteristic: it is the necessary result of 
certain social situations.149 
While this prior unity may serve as fodder for the militant, taken by 
itself it remains 'a false unity of isolations, masking a perpetual 
dispersion' .150 The party still constitutes the proletariat. 
Appalled by this argument, Merleau-Ponty began a critique of 
Sartre's essays which returned to the ultimate basis on which they 
rested: the account of the other in Being and Nothingness. But was 
he simply recasting what was essentially a political squabble into a 
difference of philosophies? How serious was his attack on Sartre's 
philosophy? Might it not be merely a tactic designed to make more 
serious a disagreement which was, after all, primarily political? 151 
To answer these questions we must look briefly at Merleau-Ponty's 
analysis of class and party in the period before his break with Sartre. 
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Class and party in 'Phenomenology of Perception' and 'Humanism 
and Terror' 
Merleau-Ponty had countered Hegel's description of the 'struggle 
of consciousnesses' by recalling their 'peaceful coexistence in the 
world of childhood'. But he never assumed that history was an affair 
of children. In Humanism and Terror he wrote that it was 
essentially a struggle- the struggle of the master and slave, the 
struggle between classes - and this is a necessity of the human 
condition; because of the fundamental paradox that man is an 
indivisible consciousness no one is able to affirm himself except 
by reducing the other to objects!52 
His mentors in politics were Machiavelli, Marx, and Weber. 
'Political action is of its nature impure,' he wrote in Humanism and 
Terror, 'since it is the action of one person upon another.1153 
Violence cannot be expelled from politics; to that extent he agreed 
with Weber's 'Politics as a Vocation' .154 All one could do was apply 
Machiavelli's test to see if violence- something that was inherently 
evil- could nevertheless be 'used well'. Was its use 'economical'? 
Did it lessen or increase with use? 155 Or, to speak like Marx, did 
violence eventually lead to the ending of the domination of masters 
over slaves? Did it serve, as Kojeve put it, the cause of mutual 
recognition? 156 Phenomenological analyses may show that conflict 
is impossible without a more basic commonality, but this does not 
mean that history knows no incidents of domination and struggle. 
The primacy intersubjectivity enjoyed over conflict in Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenology is not- and need not be- carried over into 
his philosophy of history .157 
Merleau-Ponty did not, however, interpret all forms of social 
interaction in terms of a conflict between self and other. A theory of 
class consciousness had been sketched in the Phenomenology of 
Perception which diverged sharply from Sartre's account. 
Merleau-Ponty saw class consciousness as 'a mode of dealing with 
the world and society' which grounds both specific political 
practices and reflective judgements about class identity.158 Class 
consciousness thus exists before the advent of the other as a 'shared 
lot' or 'general style of existence'. 159 This is of the utmost 
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importance for Merleau-Ponty's account of the party since it allows 
him to see the party as the nexus where the prethematic experience 
of class consciousness is articulated through an encounter with 
leaders whose function is in essence 'pedagogical' .160 The party is 
thus not a regard which creates the proletariat; it is instead an 
interlocutor in the dialogue through which the proletariat comes to 
self-consciousness. 
The major themes of Merleau-Ponty's subsequent dispute with 
Sartre were present well before their explicit political dis-
agreements of the early 1950s. The conflict, however, remained 
latent. When facing concrete political problems, both Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty could very well reach similar conclusions, analysing 
the situation in terms borrowed from Hegel's dialectic of Lordship 
and Bondage. Such agreements, however, were of the most fragile 
sort, resting as they did on a more fundamental disagreement over 
the primacy of conflict at the level of social ontology. When they 
came at last to disagree on political issues, and were forced to make 
explicit the bases on which their commitments rested, Merleau-
Ponty found himself driven to confront once again all of the 
shortcomings of Sartre's treatment of the problem of others. 
The 'intermonde' lost: 'Being and Nothingness' revisited 
Merleau-Ponty could not, then, treat The Communists and Peace 
simply as a wrong-headed analysis of contemporary events. By its 
very 'reference to the present' it was already theoretical, treating 
the event as 'ineffaceable, as a decisive test of our intentions and an 
instantaneous choice of the whole future of all that we are'. 161 It 
implied, in short, Sartre's entire philosophy of consciousness, 
facticity, and time.162 It was an attempt 'to annex history to his 
philosophy of freedom and the other' .163 
The Communists and Peace, Merleau-Ponty argued, was less a 
development of Sartre's social theory than a repetition of an 
unchanging set of ontological motifs. Relationships between clas-
ses, relationships within classes, and ultimately history itself had all 
been treated as if they were nothing more than slightly more 
complex variants of the contests Sartre had analysed in Being and 
Nothingness; never mediated through things, these relationships 
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were always 'immediately readable in the accusation of a regard' .164 
Throughout The Communists and Peace 'we remain within the 
philosophy of the subject' .165 
The social can enter his philosophy of the cogito only by way of 
the alter ego: if I am a thinking being, only another I can contest 
the thought I have of myself. Inversely, the other can have the 
status of a self only by taking it away from me, and I can recover it 
only by reacting to the magic of the regard with the countermagic 
of pure action. 'Sociality' as a given fact is a scandal for the 'I 
think'.166 
Sartre's ontology did not ground a social theory; it had become a 
substitute for one. 
At its most basic level, Merleau-Ponty argued, Sartre's project is 
marked by a paradox. He regularly invokes a 'middle ground ... 
between consciousness and things' but then revolts against it.167 
While Merleau-Ponty once argued that the revolt was only apparent 
-and waited for Sartre to remedy the overly antithetical character 
of his ontology- in Adventures of the Dialectic he concluded that it 
was Sartre's commitment to explore the 'middle ground' between 
his antinomies which was only apparent: 
Contrary to appearances, being-for-itself is all that Sartre has 
ever accepted, with its inevitable correlate: pure being-in-itself 
... There is no hinge, no joint or mediation, between myself and 
the othcr. 16" 
Lacking this mediation, S~rtre could not, like Marx, conceive of 
history as a 'mixed milieu, neither things nor persons' in which 
intentions arc 'absorbed and transformed'; in Sartre there can be no 
'coming-to-be of meaning in institutions' .169 Since 'men and things 
arc face to face' nothing is ever continued; it is only willed ancw. 170 
The question is to know whether, as Sartrc says, there arc only 
men and things or whether there is also the intcrworld, which we 
call history, symbolism, truth-to-be-made. If one sticks to the 
dichotomy ... each man, in literature as well as in politics, must 
assume all that happens instant by instant to all others ... If, on 
the contrary, one agrees that no action assumes as its own all that 
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happens, that it does not reach the event itself, that all actions, 
even war, are always symbolic actions ... if one thus renounces 
'pure action', which is a myth (and a myth of the spectator 
consciousness), perhaps it is then that one has the best chance of 
changing the world.111 
Sartre now joined Brunschvicg, behaviourism, and the other 
partisans of the 'philosophy of the spectator consciousness' .172 He 
too failed to appreciate the density of history and society as an 
interworld of symbols. 
Visibility, carnality, reversibility: The Visible and the Invisible 
The panorama and the chiasm 
In Adventures of the Dialectic Merleau-Ponty's critique of Sartre's 
ontology had been subordinated to the exigencies of his polemic 
against Sartre's politics. That quarrel now behind him, Sartre's 
ontology was given a more direct - and slightly more charitable -
accounting in the second chapter of The Visible and the Invisible .173 
Here, Merleau-Ponty granted that Sartre's 'philosophy of the 
negative' was a considerable improvement over the idealism of the 
'philosophy of reflection'- a term in Merleau-Ponty's lexicon which 
was elastic enough to encompass a philosophy like Brunschvicg's as 
well as the Kantian tendencies within Husserl's phenomenology. 
While reflective philosophy had been unable to show how a 
constitutive consciousness could 'pose another that would be its 
equal' - witness Brunschvicg's difficulties with Cresson - Sartre 
had managed to turn this 'stumbling block' into 'the principle of a 
solution' .174 The very struggle between self and other showed that 
consciousness was not shut up in its own world. Each individual 
world open'> onto 'a background world that exceeds all its perspec-
tives'. It is but a 'partial being', connected to 'the whole of Being' .175 
Sartre 's solution, nevertheless, left Merleau-Ponty with a sense of 
'uneasiness'. Being and Nothingness, he wrote, 
described our factual situation with more penetration than had 
ever before been done - and yet one retains the impression that 
this situation is one that is being surveyed from above, and indeed 
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it is: the more one describes experience as a compound of being 
and nothingness, the more their absolute distinction is confirmed; 
the more the thought adheres to experience, the more it keeps it 
at a distance. Such is the sorcery of the thought ofthe negative.176 
Under Sartre's spell the elements which comprise 'perceptual faith' 
-the term Merleau-Ponty used to denote our unshakeable convic-
tion that the world and others indeed exist177 - undergo a strange 
mutation. The 'one ~ho sees' becomes a 'seer who forgets that he 
has a body', an abstract, disembodied consciousness, a 'for-itself' .178 
The thing seen is transformed into the 'in-itself', an absolute 
plenitude, a 'positivity' bereft of 'density, depth, the plurality of 
planes, the background worlds' .179 And the relationship of the seer 
to other seers is presented only in an 'ambivalent' or 'labile' form. 180 
All this, Merleau-Ponty argued, was the consequence of Sartre's 
vantage point. Being and nothingness opposed one another in a 
clear and unequivocal fashion only for an observer who looked at 
the world from a high enough altitude.181 From such a position it 
was possible to overlook the 'inherence of being in nothingness and 
of nothingness in being'; from such a perspective the world 
appeared monochromatic, one-dimensional, and unambiguous.182 
A philosophy perched here enshrined as 'dialectic' not our immedi-
ate ~;ontact with being, but rather the experience of vision as 'a 
panorama'.183 Given this vantage point it was impossible to 
ameliorate the antithetic character of Sartre's philosophy which had 
for so long bothered Merleau-Ponty. Antitheses could never be 
overcome; they only 'more quickly succeed one another before 
thought' .184 
The blindness inherent in Sartre's panoramic vision was particu-
larly evident in his treatment of the other. 'Vision ceases to be 
solipsistic only up close,' Merleau-Ponty wrote, 
when the other turns back upon me the luminous rays in which I 
had caught him, renders precise that corporeal adhesion of which 
I had a presentiment in the agile movements of his eyes, enlarges 
beyond measure that blind spot I divined at the center of my 
sovereign vision, and, invading my field through aJI its frontiers, 
attracts me into the prison I had prepared for him and, as long as 
he is there, makes me incapable of solitude. ISS 
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For a description of the relation between self and other that was 
more faithful to what transpired 'up close', Merleau-Ponty drew on 
Paul Valery's account of the 'exchange' of regards: 
Once gazes interlock, there are no longer quite two persons and 
it's hard for either to remain alone. This exchange ... effects ... a 
transposition, a metathesis, a chiasm of two 'destinies', two points 
of view. You take my appearance, my image, and I take yours. 
You are not I, since you see me and I don't see myself. What is 
missing for me is this 'I' whom you can see. And what you miss is 
the 'you' I see.186 
Just as Sartre's panoramic vision had overlooked the interweaving 
of being and nothingness, so too it had been blind to the chiasm in 
which self and other were tangled. Sartre viewed the regard as a 
'look that kills'; in Valery, the crossing of regards initiates a process 
of 'simultaneous, reciprocal limitation' which yields a 'decentering', 
not an 'annihilation'. Sartre knew only 'a me-other rivalry'; in 
Valery we have a 'co-functioning' of self and other.187 
Valery did something more, however, than simply confirm 
Merleau-Ponty's misgivings about Sartre's description of the 
'regard d'autrui'. His use of the term 'chiasm' - a word which 
denoted X-shaped configurations of the sort frequently encoun-
tered in anatomy (for example the interweaving of optic nerves) and 
by extension referred to all those interweavings, reciprocal inter-
penetrations, and crossings that Merleau-Ponty had sought to 
evoke through his use of rhetorical chiasmata - suggested an 
alternative to Sartre's panoramic vision. 
At the close of Adventures of the Dialectic, Merleau-Ponty had 
been groping towards an understanding of dialectical thought which 
would free itself from the standpoint of a 'spectator consciousness': 
There is dialectic only in that type of being in which a junction of 
subjects occurs, being which is not only a spectacle that each 
subject presents to itself for its own benefit but which is rather 
their common residence, the place of their exchange and of their 
reciprocal interpenetration .188 
To remain faithful to this conception of the dialectic, he went on to 
argue in The Visible and the Invisible, was to recognise that the 
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dialectic was above all else 'the refusal of panoramic thinking'.189 
But, then, how was it to be conceived? Drawing on Valery, he 
suggested in one of the working notes to The Visible and the 
Invisible that the dialectic must be grasped as a 'chiasm', a 
'reversal' .190 The intertwining of self and other which Valery had 
described can be generalised to all of our ties with the world: 191 
'every relation with being is simultaneously a taking and a being 
taken; the hold is held' .192 This was how Hegel's expression 'an sich 
oder for uns' [in-itself or for-us] was to be understood: every 
attempt at grasping things as they are 'in themselves' culminates in a 
'retiring into oneself', just as every attempt at grasping things as 
they are 'for us' throws us back into the world of things in 
themselves.193 The proper task of philosophy is not to try to 
untangle this intertwining of self and world; 'every analysis which 
disentangles renders unintelligible' .194 Rather, philosophy must be 
content with 'interrogating' this tangle, situating itself 'neither in 
the for Itself nor in the in Itself' but, rather, 'at the joints, where the 
multiple entries of the world cross'.195 
Tangible touchers and visible seers: transforming the problem of the 
other 
One of Merleau-Ponty's favourite tangles, the one which occurs 
when one hand touches the other hand while this other hand is 
touching something else, is particularly helpful in attempting to 
fathom the implications of the notion of the chiasm for his 
philosophy. As early as Phenomenology of Perception -before his 
first recourse to Valery's 'chiasm of regards'- Merleau-Ponty had 
discussed this example.196 He returned to it once again in the last 
two years of his life - after having made the chiasm the central 
metaphor in his 'new ontology' .197 By contrasting the two discus-
sions, we can begin to perceive the differences between The Visible 
and the Invisible and the Phenomenology of Perception and begin to 
understand the implications these differences had for his approach 
to the problem of the other. 
The discussion in Phenomenology of Perception was yet another 
of his tacit dissents from Being and Nothingness. Sartre had argued 
that 'to touch and be touched' were 'radically distinct' phenomena 
that 'exist on two incommunicable levels' .198 Merleau-Ponty 
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granted that 'the two hands are never simultaneously in the 
relationship of touched and touching to each other', but he refused 
to concede that this meant that the touched hand is simply an object 
in the world like any other thing: 
In passing from one role to the other, I can identify the hand 
touched as the same one which will in a moment be touching ... 
In this bundle of bones and muscles which my right hand presents 
to my left, I can anticipate for an instant the integument or 
incarnation of that other right hand, alive and mobile, which I 
thrust towards things in order to explore them. The body catches 
itself from the outside engaged in a cognitive process; it tries to 
touch itself while being touched, and initiates 'a kind of reflec-
tion' which is sufficient to distinguish it from objects.199 
This equivocation between touching and being touched is one ofthe 
'structural characteristics of the body itself'; the body is both 
subject and object, capable of both 'seeing' and 'suffering' .200 
The disagreement with Sartre over the status of the touched hand 
reflects their more basic divergence regarding the nature of the 
'pre-reflective cogito' - that 'non-positional' self-consciousness 
which, for both, grounded all reflective acts. Sartre's distinction 
between the body which touches and the body which is touched is, 
as M. C. Dillon has argued, merely one instance of 'the ontological 
distinction he draws between consciousness and its objects' .201 
Consciousness is always of a different order than its objects; my 
experience of my body is no exception. I am no more intimately 
related to it than I am to any of the other objects I confront. Indeed, 
I come to know it first through the agency of the other.202 
Throughout the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty had 
argued for a different understanding of the pre-reflective cogito. It 
must be understood as an incarnate consciousness, as a body-
subject. Hence, there can be no question of the body being simply 
an object among other objects in the world.203 
Without downplaying the extent of Merleau-Ponty's dissent from 
Being and Nothingness, it is necessary to stress what he shared with 
Sartre here: both saw the concept of the pre-reflective cogito as a 
necessary and adequate response to the idealism in which they had 
been trained. In Sartre, the argument that the pre-reflective cogito 
is always other than its objects neatly summarised his earlier attack 
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on Brunschvicg's 'digestive philosophy'. In Merleau-Ponty, the 
argument that the reflective cogito was supported and sustained by 
a tacit, incarnate cogito marked the culmination of his effort to show 
- contra Brunschvicg - that perception could not be reduced to 
judgement. But, in The Visible and the Invisible, the very coherence 
of the notion of a pre-reflective cogito is called into question. A 
working note from January 1959 makes it clear that it is not simply 
Sartre's notion which is being rejected: 
What I call the tacit cogito is impossible. To have the idea of 
'thinking' (in the sense of 'thought of seeing and of feeling'), to 
make the 'reduction', to return to immanence and to conscious-
ness of ... it is necessary to have words. It is by the combination 
of words (with their charge of sedimented significations, which 
are in principle capable of entering into other relations than the 
relations that have served to form them) that I form the 
transcendental attitude, that I constitute the constitutive con-
sciousness. The words do not refer to positive significations ... 
Mythology of a self-consciousness to which the word 'conscious-
ness' would refer - - There are only differences between 
sign ifica tions.204 
The tacit cogito, like the distinction between self and other, is an 
artifact of language, a creature of the sedimented meanings and the 
diacritical oppositions which make up the language the philosopher 
employs.205 Merleau-Ponty continued to insist that there is 'a world 
of silence' to which the philosopher must somehow give voice; the 
perceived world was 'an order where there are non-linguistic 
significations' .206 But the tacit cog ito had imported into this silent 
world of vision the already-formulated language of the philosophy 
of consciousness, and in doing so had misrepresented the relation-
ship between vision and speech. 
Merleau-Ponty's later examinations of the touched hand thus 
proceed without recourse to the tacit cogito. All of the terms 
associated with the philosophy of the cogito are now suspect. In a 
long working note from May 1960 he stressed a point which had 
been noted only in passing in his earlier discussion: the touching 
hand is 'never exactly the touched'; it always eludes us. We cannot 
say that the touching and the touched 'coincide in the body' as he 
----~=--=-~=========-,....._,....._ _________ ~ 
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had implied in 1945. Instead, he wrote somewhat cryptically, 
'Something other than the body is needed for the junction to be 
made; it takes place in the untouchable. ' 207 We gain nothing by 
foisting another name onto this untouchable and saying that the 
touching and the touched 'coincide "in the mind" or at the level of 
"consciousness"'. These words only transform 'a true negative' into 
'a positive that is elsewhere (a transcendent)' .208 The place where the 
toucher and the touched meet is not simply de facto untouchable; it 
is untouchable de jure. It, like the 'invisible of vision' or the 
'unconsciousness of consciousness', is the 'other side or the reverse 
(or the other dimensionality) of sensible Being'.209 
In stressing that the touching hand always escapes the hand that 
tries to touch it, Merleau-Ponty is not suggesting that the two 'sides' 
of the body, the sensible and the sentient, are divided by an abyss of 
the sort that Sartre posits between the in-itself and the for-itself. 
Rather than an 'abyss', we must speak here of an 'ecart'- a 'spread' 
or 'divergence'.210 The non-coincidence of the touching and the 
touched is not a 'failure' which must either be set right by further 
analysis or installed as absolute.211 It is, rather, the sort of joining of 
obverse and reverse which is typical of the chiasm.212 The analysis of 
the touched hand must take as its starting-point the fundamental 
lesson the chiasm teaches: 'there is not identity, nor non-identity ... 
there is inside and outside turning around one another' .213 
The relation of self and other needed to be rethought along 
similar lines. 'There is not the For Itself and the For the Other', he 
wrote in a working note from November 1960, 'They are each the 
other side of the other.' 214 Self and other are not to be taken as 
'positive subjectivities', each unknowable by the other. Their 
relationship is rather that of 'two entries into the same Being', two 
'moments of the same syntax'. They are 'not two contradictories, 
but rather each the reverse of the other' .215 I never have the other's 
experiences; if I did there would be no reason to talk of self and 
other. But this non-coincidence must be understood in the same 
way that we understand the non-coincidence of the touching and the 
touched. It points not to a failure or a problem but is, rather, that 
particularecart around which a chiasm has been tied. Although my 
hands are never able to coincide with one another, they neverthe-
less are able - because of 'a very peculiar relation from one to the 
other across corporeal space'- to join together as one 'sole organ of 
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experience' and explore the world. In the same way, the monocular 
views of my individual eyes are tied together into 'one sole 
cyclopean vision' .216 
'Why would this generality, which constitutes the unity of my 
body,' Merleau-Ponty asked, 'not open it to other bodies?' 
The handshake too is reversible; I can feel myself touched as well 
and at the same time as touching ... Why would not the synergy 
exist among different organisms, if it is possible within each? 
Their landscapes interweave, their actions and their passions fit 
together exactly: this is possible as soon as we no longer make 
belongingness to one same 'consciousness' the primordial defini-
tion of sensibility, and as soon as we rather understand it as the 
return of the visible upon itself, a carnal adherence of the sentient 
to the sensed and the sensed to the sentient.217 
The problem of the other is not so much 'solved' as 'transformed' .218 
Others present a problem only to a philosophy which operates with 
a set of categories which separate mind and body, consciousness and 
world, subject and object. It was precisely this vocabulary which 
Merleau-Ponty abandoned in The Visible and the Invisible. The 
other is not a problem because 'it is not I who sees, not he who sees'; 
instead an 'anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision in 
general, in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to the 
flesh' .219 
Flesh on flesh, or the story of the eye 
Merleau-Ponty's long struggle with Sartre's account of 'being for 
others' thus culminat~d with the recognition that the problem of the 
other defied analysis 'into being and nothingness, into existence as 
consciousness and existence as a thing'; its resolution required 
nothing less than 'a complete reconstruction of philosophy'.220 
Sartre had ventured a somewhat more suggestive approach to the 
problem than the 'philosophy of reflection', but in the end he too 
remained tied to the vantage point of the 'spectator conscious-
ness' .221 Just as Descartes, seated in his room, gazed out the window 
at the suspicious forms on the street below, so too Sartre's 
consciousness peered out 'through the holes of the eyes' from the 
Others 97 
depths of its 'invisible retreat' at the panorama that lay open before 
it.222 For both, consciousness was a voyeur, eager to see everything, 
but careful to remain unseen. 
In coming to terms with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty was forced to 
question the view of the relationship of mind and body, of 
consciousness and world, which had dominated philosophy since at 
least Descartes. As outlined, The Visible and the Invisible - like 
Husserl's Crisis- would attempt to trace the crisis of contemporary 
philosophy back to its origins in the Cartesian project.223 Only by 
doing this could the presuppositions and commitments which had 
brought about the present state of affairs be finally revealed. While 
Merleau-Ponty did not Jive to complete this part of the manuscript, 
his last published essay, 'The Eye and the Mind', included a 
painstaking dissection of Descartes's Dioptric. By looking at it, we 
can begin to appreciate the magnitude of the reconstruction he felt 
was needed to save philosophy. 
In the Dioptric, Descartes sought to apply the principles outlined 
in his Discourse on Method to the phenomena of light and 
reflection, the functioning of the eye and the nature of vision, and 
the ways in which vision might be improved through devices such as 
the telescope.224 It was, of course, the discussion of vision -which he 
had analysed as early as The Structure of Behaviour225 - that most 
concerned Merleau-Ponty. Descartes's essay, he wrote, was 'the 
breviary of a thought that wants no longer to abide in the visible' .226 
It consistently talked about vision as if it were something else. For 
example, at the start of the essay, vision is treated as one incidence 
of the more general case of touch. Light, it is argued, should be 
understood as a case of 'action by contact'; the blind are said to 'see 
with their hands' and the blind man's sticks are claimed to duplicate 
exactly, in his hands, the effect produced by the impact of light rays 
on the back of the eye.227 With this shift from seeing to touching, 
Merleau-Ponty argued, Descartes managed 'at one swoop' to 
eliminate 'zction at a distance' and relieve us 'of that ubiquity which 
is the whole problem of vision': 
In the world there is the thing itself, and outside this thing itself 
there is that other thing which is only reflected light rays and 
which happens to have an ordered correspondence with the real 
thing; there are two individuals, then, bound together externally 
by causality .228 
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In much the same way, looking at paintings is equated with the 
reading of texts. Copper engravings, Descartes wrote, 'excite our 
thought' in the same way as 'signs and words, which have no manner 
of resemblance to the things they signify' .229 Vision thus becomes a 
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process of interpretation, a process of reflection and judgement, an 
activity proper to the mind, not the eye.230 
But how can a mind see anything? How can a res cogitans be 
effected by a res extensa? The Dioptric provided an elaborate 
diagram of the path traced by light rays leaving an object and 
travelling into the chamber of the inner eye.231 But, as Merleau-
Ponty asked in a working note from September 1959, 'Who will see 
the image painted in the eyes or in the brain?' 232 At the bottom of 
the diagram- but never mentioned by Descartes in his discussions-
is a man who, as Paul Valery wrote, seems to be 'busy looking at the 
image that forms on the retina' .233 Descartes's cleaving of mind 
from body obliged him to place, inside the objectified eye, a man 
who is able to reflect on what is there to be seen.234 But does this 
little man have, in the chamber behind his eyes, yet another man? 
And who might be hiding in the even smaller room behind this other 
man's eyes? We can stop this infinite regress, Merleau-Ponty 
argued, only by recognising that 'the primordial vision that one 
must indeed come to cannot be the thought ofseeing'.235 It is the eye 
which sees, after all, not the soul. The eye- that most peculiar res 
extensa- performs 'the prodigious work of opening the soul to what 
is not soul' .236 
Vision thus eludes the models suggested by the spectator 
consciousness. What Merleau-Ponty was attempting, in Marc 
Richir's apt image, was a 'defenestration of the cog ito' .237 The 
philosopher in his room, the little man behind the eye, the 
'for-itself' which 'flees' from the 'in itself': all these images rest on 
the same understanding of vision. They assign the philosopher the 
role of a 'kosmotheoros'- the seer who surveys the entire universe-
and thus lose sight of the fact that, like everyone else, the 
philosopher looks at the world from its midst.238 'He who sees is of it 
and in it': the seer is not hidden away in a room, he is down in the 
street, a visible part of the world he sees. 239 
We have to reject the age-old assumptions that put the world and 
the seer in the body, or, conversely, the world and the body in the 
seer as in a box. Where are we to put the limit between the body 
and the world, since the world is flesh? Where in the body are we 
to put the seer, since evidently there is in the body only 'shadows 
stuffed with organs', that is, more of the visible? The world is not 
'in' my body, and my body is ultimately not 'in' the visible world: 
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as flesh applied to flesh, the world neither surrounds it nor is 
surrounded by it. A participation in and kinship with the visible, 
the vision neither definitively envelops it nor is enveloped by it.24o 
Vision should be understood as the 'turning back' of one part of the 
visible upon the rest. It is an affair of what Merleau-Ponty termed 
' 'the flesh', a name he chose to designate that for which 'there is 
no name in traditional philosophy' .241 Neither 'matter', nor 'some 
"psychic" material', nor 'a fact or sum of facts "material" or 
"spiritual" ', nor 'a representation for a mind', nor 'the union or 
compound of two substances', the flesh- in one of the few positive 
definitions Merleau-Ponty ever gave - 'is the sensible in the 
two-fold sense of what one senses and what senses'.242 It is an 
attempt to designate, without untangling, the chiasm which is our 
primordial relation with the world. 'The seer is caught up in what he 
sees, it is still himself he sees: there is a fundamental narcissism of all 
vision.' 243 
After Descartes 
In his 1945 discussion of the reception of Being and Nothingness, 
Merleau-Ponty had hailed the book as an attempt to think through 
'the central problem of philosophy': the reconciliation of the lessons 
of Descartes with those of nineteenth-century historicism. 'After 
Descartes,' he wrote, 'it was impossible to deny that existence as 
consciousness is radically different from existence as thing and that 
the relationship between the two is that of emptiness to plen-
titude.'244 But this was precisely what The Visible and the Invisible 
questioned. 
By the end of his life Merleau-Ponty had come to view half of 
what he had once charged philosophy with understanding in a 
totally different light. After Descartes, 'existence as consciousness' 
and 'existence as thing' must no longer be juxtaposed to one 
another as nothingness and plentitude. Rather, they must be 
understood as 'obverse' and 'reverse', as abstracts from the same 
'flesh'. As Marjorie Grene has argued: 
Sartre is the last of the Cartesians. He shows us, brilliantly and 
maddeningly, the impasse to which in our time the modern mind 
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has come. Merleau-Ponty, groping, obsessed with one paradox-
the paradox of visual perception - over rhetorical, yet speaks to 
us as one of the first truly post-Cartesians.245 
Being and Nothingness still inhabited a Cartesian universe. The 
Visible and the Invisible was an attempt to understand how 
philosophy, after the demise of the Cartesian ontology, could go on. 
But what of the second of the two lessons to which contemporary 
philosophy was supposed to respond? In 1945 Merleau-Ponty had 
also argued, 'After the nineteenth century and all it has taught us 
about the historicity of spirit, it was impossible to deny that 
consciousness always exists in a situation.' 246 The importance of 
Being and Nothingness lay not simply in its faithfulness to 
Descartes; rather, its greatness lay in its attempt to fuse the 
Cartesian project with the great themes of nineteenth-century 
historicism. How do matters stand with the 'historicity of spirit' in 
the face of Merleau-Ponty's critique of Cartesian ontology? To 
understand the relationship between his critique of Descartes and 
his growing estrangement from the vision of history which found its 
fullest expression in that Hegelianised Marxism which he professed 
in the years immediately after the Second World War, we must 
leave behind the problem of the other and consider Merleau-
Ponty's account of expression and history. And to do this is to turn 
from his long argument with Sartre to his peculiar dialogue with 
Ferdinand de Saussure. 
4 
Speech, Expression, and the 
Sense of History 
From perception to history, via expression 
Few concerns play as central a role in the evolution of Merleau-
Ponty's thought as the problem of expression. His inquiries took 
him beyond linguistics and aesthetics to grapple with questions that 
were basic to his studies of politics, society, and history. He hoped 
that by turning to the models suggested by linguistics and aesthetics 
he could acquire the categories needed to understand the social 
world and thus bring to completion the project he had begun with 
The Structure of Behaviour and the Phenomenology of Perception. 
But his attempt to elaborate a theory of expression ultimately led 
him to question the standpoint he had adopted in his first two books 
and thus to submit his entire project to radical criticism. 
Beyond perception 
At the 1946 colloquium on the Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty stressed that the book represented 'only a prelimi-
nary study, since it hardly speaks of culture or history'. It had shown 
a way of 'getting closer to present and living reality', but an 
extension of its approach to 'the relation of man to man in language, 
in knowledge, in society and religion' was still to be attempted.1 The 
Phenomenology of Perception had shown that perception was 'an 
original modality of consciousness', reducible neither to association 
nor judgement, and that the perceptual world was neither 'a sum of 
objects' nor a set of analytic propositions.2 The fruit of this 
restoration of the world of perception, however, was a 'bad 
ambiguity'- 'a mixture of finitude and universality, of interiority 
and exteriority'. 
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But there is a 'good ambiguity' in the phenomenon of expression, 
a spontaneity which accomplishes what appeared to be impos-
sible when we observed only the separate elements, a spontaneity 
which gathers together the plurality of monads, the past and the 
present, nature and culture into a single whole. To establish this 
wonder would be metaphysics itself and would at the same time 
give us the principle of an ethics.3 . 
The examination of this 'good ambiguity' was to be the task of The 
Origin of Truth and its prologue, The Prose of the World. 
The Origin of Truth was to give 'a precise description of the 
passage of perceptual faith into explicit truth as we encounter it on 
the level of language, concept, and the cultural world' .4 It would 
thus show how the 'bad ambiguity' of the perceptual world was 
overcome in the 'good ambiguity' of expression. This more 
ambitious work was to be preceded by a shorter study devoted to 
the problem of literary expression: The Proseofthe World .It would 
examine how language is able to 'sublimate rather than suppress our 
incarnation' in the communication with others.5 Its account of 
literature would, he hoped, provide the key to 'the more general 
order of symbolic relations and institutions' .6 
The course Merleau-Ponty set for himself in the years immedi-
ately following the completion of the Phenomenology of Perception 
is thus clear enough: he hoped to work from perception to 
expression and onward from expression to history and truth. The 
study of expression would show how the world of perception is 
transposed into a world of signs which have meaning for others. It 
would thus set the stage for an inquiry into the ways in which these 
meanings were instituted and transformed in history. What is not so 
clear is why he found himself unable to bring any of this to 
completion. 
Resources 
In these inquiries- as elsewhere - he found a starting-point in the 
work of Husser! and Sartre. What mattered in Husser! was not the 
attempt in the Logical Investigations to construct a universal 
grammar but rather his late essay 'The Origin of Geometry as an 
Intentional-Historical Problem' .7 Here Husser! was not construct-
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ing an eidetic of language; rather he was attempting to understand 
the path which led from an immediate, 'lived' contact with space to 
an idealised, geometrical space. He was concerned not so much with 
providing a rational reconstruction of grammatical forms as with 
showing how reason itself emerges in history.8 
Sartre played his usual role of agent provocateur: The Prose of the· 
World was initially conceived as 'a sort of What is Literature? with a 
longer section on the sign and prose'.9 Sartre's essay had opened 
with a discussion of prose and the sign which posed a number of 
arguments (at one point appealing to the Phenomenology of 
Perception for support) which Merleau-Ponty eventually came to 
reject. Sartre began by denying that music or painting could be 
discussed using the same concepts employed in the study of 
language: 'Notes, colors, and forms are not signs. They refer to 
nothing exterior to themselves.' 10 He went on to distinguish the way 
poetry and prose regard language: 
The poet has withdrawn from the language-instrument in a single 
movement. Once and for all he has chosen a poetic attitude which 
considers words as things and not as signs. For the ambiguity of 
the sign implies that one can penetrate it at will like a pane of glass 
and pursue the thing signified, or turn his gaze toward its reality 
and consider it as an object. The man who talks is beyond words 
and ncar the object, whereas the poet is on the side of them.11 
For the writer of prose, then, language was a tool, transparent like a 
window pane, which leads us directly into the world of things. 12 
Husserl and Sartre were not, however, Merleau-Ponty's only 
sources of inspiration. In his studies of expression, as in his account 
of perception, non-philosophers were as important as philosophers. 
He drew on studies of aphasia by Gclb and Goldstein - analyses 
which already had claimed a prominent place in the Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception - and was acquainted as well with Roman 
Jakobson's work on aphasia and children's language.13 Discussions 
of language acquisition in the writings of Henri Wallon, Paul 
Guillaume, and Jean Piaget also played an important role in his 
courses and writings in the late 1940s as did certain arguments of 
the linguist Gustave Guillaume.t4 But the theorist who would most 
decisively influence Merleau-Ponty's approach to the problem of 
expression was Ferdinand de Saussure. 
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Reading (and misreading) Saussure 
Merleau-Ponty's relation to Saussure is marked by a paradox. He 
was, as Roland Barthes once noted, the first French philosopher to 
take an interest in Saussure's linguistics.15 But his reading of 
Saussure was so idiosyncratic that it makes his notoriously loose 
readings of Husser! look like models of hermeneutic chastity. He 
openly admitted that he was 'pushing Husser! further than he 
wanted to go', but there is scant evidence that he saw anything 
unorthodox in his interpretation of Saussure!6 
Mer/eau-Ponty's Saussure 
Merleau-Ponty began a serious reading of Saussure only after the 
publication of the Phenomenology of Perception. 11 Saussure's name 
first appears in courses given at Lyon, the Ecole Normale, and the 
Sorbonne between 1947 and 1950.18 His work is discussed briefly in 
a 194 7 article and examined much more extensively in the 
unfinished manuscript of The Prose of the World. 19 The discussion 
of history in the inaugural lecture at the College de France 
culminated in the claim that Saussure's work showed how the 
dilemmas which plagued Hegel and Marx could be overcome.20 
And, in his first courses at the College de France, Saussure's 
writings occupied a position of almost undisputed pre-eminence.21 
On all these occasions, Merleau-Ponty presented Saussure's 
achievement in much the same way. Saussure had rejected attempts 
at approaching language as if it were a natural object and had 
maintained that it was fruitless to seek causal linkages between 
present facts of speech and historically antecedent states. He 
instead took up 'the perspective of the speaking subject who lives in 
his language' and founded, alongside the already established 
'diachronic linguistics of language [langue]', a new 'synchronic 
linguistics of speech [parole]'. From the standpoint of parole 
Saussure was able to reveal an order, a system, and a totaiity where 
earlier only chaos and accident had ruled.22 
Merleau-Ponty saw in Saussure's return to the speaking subject a 
way of transcending the rigid dichotomies philosophy had estab-
lished between the existing and the possible, the constituted and the 
constituting, facts and conditions of possibility, and- ultimately-
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between science and philosophy itself.23 Saussure's approach freed 
history from historicism and made a new conception of reason 
possible.24 He thus achieved something far loftier than his stated 
aim of showing the linguist 'what he is doing' .25 He revealed 'a 
rationality in the contingent, a lived logic, a self-constitution' which 
cast needed light on 'the union of contingency and meaning in 
history' .26 Indeed, Saussure 'could have sketched a new philosophy 
of history' 27 - could have, but didn't; so the job was left to 
Merleau-Ponty. 
The Saussure of the 'Course' 
It is difficult to reconcile these claims with the actual content of 
Saussure's Course in General Linguistics. 28 The primacy Merleau-
Ponty accorded to the 'speaking subject' and the 'linguistics of 
speech' flies in the face of Saussure's insistence that the sole 
appropriate object of linguistics was langue - human speech 
(langage) considered as a social institution whose conventions 
constrain and govern individual acts of speaking (parole). 29 At the 
very start of the Course, Saussure stressed the need to 'put both feet 
on the ground of language [langue] and use language as the norm for 
all other manifestations of speech [langage ]' .30 The 'linguistics of 
speech' was, in Saussure's opinion, the. concern of a set of disciplines 
-anatomy, speech physiology, and phonology- whose connection 
to linguistics was at best tenuous.31 
It is even more difficult to understand why Merleau-Ponty 
thought Saussure had juxtaposed 'a synchronic linguistics of speech' 
to 'a diachronic linguistics of language'. A diagram printed in the 
Course which summarises Saussure's view of the 'rational form' of 
linguistics makes it abundantly evident that the distinction between 
parole and langue is by no means isomorphic with the distinction 
between synchrony and diachrony .32 
!Synchrony Langue Langage l Diachrony 
Parole 
Langue can be studied either synchronically or diachronically- it 
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can be regarded either as a set of co-existing terms which constitute 
a functioning system or as a consequence of a series of transforma-
tions, brought on by fortuitous accidents, which have forced the 
system to establish a new equilibrium.33 Parole is thus emphatically 
not the object of synchronic linguistics. Indeed, Saussure went so far 
as to argue: 'Taken as a whole,parole cannot be studied.' 34 In it one 
finds only momentary, individual articulations of a system whose 
coherence can be understood only by turning from the act of speech 
to consider the conventions of langue. 35 
Finally, beyond these terminological misunderstandings, 
Merleau-Ponty's portrait of Saussure as a potential philosopher of 
history seems strangely out of step with how Saussure himself 
regarded the relationship between linguistics and history. Seeking 
to establish the principles on which linguistics could rest, Saussure 
argued that the science of language should follow the practice of the 
'economic sciences': 
Here, in contrast to other sciences, political economy and 
economic history constitute two clearly separated disciplines 
within a single science ... Proceeding as they have, economists 
are ... obeying an inner necessity. A similar necessity obliges us 
to divide linguistics into two parts, each with its own principle. 
Here as in political economy we are confronted with the notion of 
value; both sciences are concerned with a system of equating 
things of different orders -labour and wages in one and a signified 
and signifier in the other.36 
Political economy sought to understand the relation between labour 
and wages without recourse to history (and that, in Marx's eyes, was 
its monumental blindness). Saussure urged linguistics to approach 
the relation of signifier to signified in the same way. The thinker that 
Merleau-Ponty felt could well have written a new philosophy of 
history had, in fact, conceived his entire project in isolation from 
history. 
There is thus little in the Course to support Merleau-Ponty's 
reading of Saussure. To be sure, there are passages which, if pulled 
from context and read against the main thrust of the lectures, would 
support parts of his interpretation.37 But this would be a rather 
perverse way of reading Saussure, and an attempt which explains 
Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of Saussure in this fashion leaves 
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unanswered the most interesting question: what led Merleau-Ponty 
to read Saussure so queerly?38 
The faces of the sign 
At the heart of Merleau-Ponty's reading of Saussure lies an 
idiosyncratic interpretation of Saussure's definition of the linguistic 
sign. At the start of the resume of his 1953-4 course on 'The 
Problem of Speech', Merleau-Ponty argued that in 'adopting speech 
as his theme', Saussure launched a wholesale revision of the 
received categories of linguistics: 
He challenged the rigid distinction between sign and signification 
which seemed evident when one considered instituted language 
[langue] alone, but breaks down in speech [parole] where sound 
and meaning are not simply associated. The famous definition of 
the sign as 'diacritical, appositive, and negative' means that 
language is present in the speaking subject as a system of 
differentiations [ecarts] between signs and between significations 
and that speech operates, in one gesture, the differentiation in 
these two orders.39 
Like most of Merleau-Ponty's claims about Saussure, there are 
considerable difficulties in reconciling this with the Course. But 
unlike other misreadings, this one has a strange coherence about it. 
In his famous definition of the nature of the linguistic sign, 
Saussure was not, as Merleau-Ponty implied, challenging the 
distinction between 'sign' and 'signification'. Rather, he was intro-
d!~eing a distinction, within the sign itself, between what he called 
the 'signifier' (or 'sound image') and the 'signified' (or 'concept').40 
To find anything approximating what Merleau-Ponty is alluding to 
we must turn to Saussure's discussion of the nature of linguistic 
value. There, langue is described as a 'series of contiguous 
subdivisions marked off on both the indefinite plane of jumbled 
ideas and equally vague plane of sounds' .41 Merleau-Ponty thus 
modified Saussure's position in two ways: first, he saw the operation 
of differentiation as being carried out on the plane of parole, not 
langue; second, he saw the process of differentiation as involving, 
not 'concepts' and 'sound images', but rather a 'perceptual chain' 
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and a 'verbal chain' .42 With the first move, the focus is shifted from 
an already existing system of differentiations to an act which fuses 
together sound and meaning through a process of mutual opposi-
tion. With the second move, the focus is shifted from the plane of 
ideas to the plane of perception.43 While Merleau-Ponty's double 
displacement is inconsistent with Saussure's argument, it is con-
gruent with a certain understanding of the nature of the linguistic 
sign. 
Roland Barthes has suggested a typology of the ways signs have 
been studied which is helpful in clarifying the presuppositions which 
guide Merleau-Ponty's reading of Saussure. 'Every sign,' he writes, 
'includes or implies three relations': 
To start with, an interior relation which unites its signifier to its 
signified; then two exterior relations: a virtual one that unites the 
sign to a specific reservoir of other signs it may be drawn from in 
order to be inserted in discourse; and an actual one that unites the 
sign to other signs in the discourse preceding or succeeding it.44 
Each relation suggests a different way of approaching the sign. The 
first, which Barthes terms the 'symbolic' relation, would have us 
focus on individual, isolated signs and investigate the analogical 
relation between the signifier and the signified. The signifier here is 
viewed as 'less a (codified) form of communication than an 
(affective) instrument of participation' .45 The signifier is seen as an 
attempt to capture the inexhaustible meaning of the signified 
through an always insufficient act of mimesis. For example, the 
cross 'symbolises' Christianity, but Christianity is always more than 
the cross.46 To investigate the inner relation of signifier and signified 
is thus to ask whether the signifier resembles the signified 
adequately, whether it captures it, whether it sufficiently embodies 
or expresses it. 
These are precisely the questions Saussure told us not to ask. His 
'first principle' of linguistics, the dictum that 'the linguistic sign is 
arbitrary' means- if nothing else- that there is no resemblance, no 
analogy, no natural bond between signifier and signified. The sole 
reason for preferring the sound' 1 kat' to any other possible series of 
sounds (for example,' S, a') as a way of signifying small, carnivorous 
mammals who shed hair on furniture is that it is an established 
convention among speakers of English to use the sound-image 
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' ' kat' to signify the concept 'cat' .47 Beyond noting that it is indeed 
the convention to use a certain sound image to designate a certain 
concept, there is simply nothing more to be said about the internal 
relationship between signifier and signified. 
The doctrine of the 'arbitrary nature of the sign' thus shifts 
attention to the two exterior relations Barthes noted: the virtual or 
'paradigmatic' relation of the sign to other signs which might have 
stood in its place, and the actual or 'syntagmatic' relation of the sign 
to neighbouring signs within the discourse itself.48 If the 'symbolic 
consciousness' saw the act of signification as a relation in 'depth• 
with the signifier pointing to the foundation on which all acts of 
signification draw, the 'paradigmatic consciousness' sees the sign in 
'perspective': 
It sees the signifier linked, as if in profile, to several virtual 
signifiers which it is at once close to and distant from ... The 
dynamics attached to this vision is that of a summons: the sign is 
chosen from a finite organized reservoir, and this summons is the 
sovereign act of signification.49 " 
For the paradigmatic consciousness, the act of signification cannot 
be understood as a simple gesture pointing unequivocally to a 
particular content. It is, rather, an act which takes its meaning as 
much from what it rejects- the series of other possible signifiers- as 
from what it takes up. Meaning here is diacritical, not indexical. 
While the paradigmatic consciousness is still concerned with the 
connecting of signifiers to signifieds, the 'syntagmatic conscious-
ness' takes up a stance which is even further removed from the 
standpoint of the 'symbolic consciousness'. Its concern is with the 
relation of signs to one another on the level of discourse itself. 
Focusing on the play of signifiers, it 'most readily renounces the 
signified' and is thus 'more a structural consciousness than a 
semantic one' .50 
Let us now try to determine which of these conceptions is most 
commensurate with Merleau-Ponty's reading of Saussure. It is 
clear, first of all, that his reading resists a thoroughgoing syntagma-
tic conception. Maurice Lagueux has suggested that his misreadings 
of Saussurc can at least partially be understood as a consequence of 
his overriding interest in questions of meaning.51 His was a 
semantic, not a structural consciousness, while the syntagmatic 
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consciousness is, as Barthes has stressed, 'a strictly fabricative or 
even functional imagination', concerned with the ways in which 
chains of signifiers fit together and not with the signifieds they 
designate.52 
To what extent does Merleau-Ponty's reading of Saussure appear 
to be grounded in a paradigmatic approach to the sign? Here his 
interest in questions of meaning presents fewer problems and, 
indeed, Barthes himself uses Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ex-
pression as an example of the paradigmatic consciousness.53 Such an 
approach to the sign may have been the position towards which 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of expression advanced, but his 
account of expression nevertheless carried in its wake crucial 
elements of a conception of expression which had been elaborated 
before his appropriation of Saussure. This account not only placed 
the speaking subject at the centre of the discussion of the process of 
signification, it also conceived of the process in terms which are 
closest to the one relationship between signifier and signified which 
Saussure expressly excluded: the symbolic relation. 
Speech as gesture, history as perception 
If we wish to understand Merleau-Ponty's peculiar reading of 
Saussure, we would do well to examine the account of expression 
and history he articulated prior to his study of Saussure's work. The 
Phenomenology of Perception included a chapter on 'The Body as 
Expression and Speech' whose premises regarding the nature of 
speech differed significantly from the arguments Merleau-Ponty 
advanced in The Prose of the World. In the years immediately after 
the publication of Phenomenology of Perception- and most notably 
in his 194 7 study Humanism and Terror- Merleau-Ponty outlined 
an approach to history which drew on the theory of expression 
sketched in the Phenomenology of Perception. By looking at these 
first efforts at a theory of expression and history, we can understand 
the questions which Merleau-Ponty brought to his reading of 
Saussure and thus comprehend a bit more clearly the reasons 
behind his idiosyncratic account of Saussure's work. 
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The word which points 
The problem of language entered the Phenomenology of Perception 
on much the same terms as the analyses of spatiality and motility or 
the discussion of sexuality: all of these phenomena testify to the 
body's 'intentionality and sense-giving powers'.54 Just as Merleau-
Ponty argued that the body projects itself into the perceptual world 
'by an "intentional arc" ... which brings about the unity of the 
senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility' and just as he 
maintained that the body enters the erotic world thanks to 'an 
intentionality which follows the general flow of existence and yields 
to its movements', so too the act of speech brought home to him 'the 
enigmatic nature of our body'. 55 
It is not a collection of particles, each one remaining in itself, nor 
yet a network of processes defined once and for all - it is not 
where it is, nor what it is - since we see it secreting in itself a 
'significance' which comes to it from nowhere, projecting that 
significance upon its material surrounding, and communicating it 
to other embodied subjects. 5 6 
We understand thoughts and intentions only because our body is 
capable of appropriating and expressing these thoughts and inten-
tions: 'It is the body which points out, and which speaks.'57 
Speech is thus 'a genuine gesture' and is meaningful in the same 
way as any non-linguistic gesturc.58 The meaning of words should no 
more be sought in their sounds than the meaning of a gesture should 
be sought in the physical act itself.59 I do not improve my 
understanding of what someone is pointing at by examining his 
index finger more intently; I must, rather, follow his gesture and see 
what it is that he is pointing towards. And what he is pointing 
towards is neither a 'concept' nor a 'mental image'; it is the world 
itself.60 
My friend Paul and I point out to each other certain details of the 
landscape; and Paul's finger, which is pointing out the church 
tower, is not a finger-for-me that I think of as oriented towards a 
church-tower-for-me, it is Paul's finger which itself shows me the 
tower that Paul sees, just as, conversely, when I make a 
movement towards some point in the landscape that I can see, I 
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do not imagine that I am producing in Paul, in virtue of some 
pre-established harmony, inner visions merely analogous to 
mine: I believe, on the contrary, that my gestures invade Paul's 
world and guide his gaze.61 
It is much the same with language: 'It presents or rather it is the 
subject's taking up ~ position in the world of meanings.' 62 The 
phonetic 'gesture' brings about 'a certain structural co-ordination of 
experience, a certain modulation of existence' between speaker and 
listener.63 Like the finger pointing to the church tower, 'le mot a un 
sens': the word has a meaning, a direction.64 
Both connotations of the French sens- 'meaning' and 'direction' 
- are crucial; throughout the Phenomenology of Perception, 
meaning is understood as orientation: 
In all uses of the wordsens, we find the same fundamental notion 
of a being oriented or polarized in the direction of what he is not, 
and thus we are always brought back to a conception of the 
subject as ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence 
between the subject and the world.65 
This conception of meaning as orientation allowed Merleau-Ponty 
to reject the 'empiricist' treatment of the word as simply a mark left 
by a stimulus without embracing the 'intellectualist' alternative of 
viewing the word as a category which structures experience.66 Sens 
is to be understood less 'in terms of the indescribable quality of its 
"mental concepts" than in terms of a certain manner of presenting 
its object'.67 While idealism had understood signification as an act 
which imposes meaning- in Husserl's terminology, signification is a 
Sinn-gebung - Merleau-Ponty argued that Gestalt psychology 
suggested a more profound conception of meaning. The significa-
tion 'circle' may well be recognised by 'an understanding which 
engenders it as the abode of points equidistant from a centre'. But 
the Gestalt of the circle is grasped only by a subject 'familiar with his 
world' who is able to seize the circle 'as a modulation of that world, 
as a circular physiognomy'.68 
We have no way of knowing what a picture or a thing is other than 
by looking at them, and their significance is revealed only if we 
look at them from a certain point of view, from a certain distance 
"--
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and in a certain direction, in short only if we place, at the service 
of the spectacle, our collusion with the world.69 
This, then, is the sort of meaning that gestures deliver to us. We do 
not understand them on the level of conscious, reflective acts of 
interpretation. They are, rather, grasped by a sort of 'blind 
recognition' by which 'I lend myself to the spectacle' and learn 
through my body what it is that the other's body is urging me 
towards.70 
The speech which breaks the silence 
However persuasive this may be as an account of gestures,71 is the 
act of speech really bes·t understood as a gesture? Do words turn us 
toward the world or do they only bring us to other words, to 
concepts, to a 'mental setting which is not given to everyone'? How 
convincing is it to treat the words as a gesture when we know -
because different languages use different sounds to refer to the 
same objects - that the link between sound and meaning is 
arbitrary? These objections, which might well have been voiced by a 
reader attentive to the implications of Saussure's approach to the 
linguistic sign, were in fact raised by Merleau-Ponty himself against 
his own presentation of the word as a gesture.72 But the speed with 
which he brushed them aside shows how far from Saussure his initial 
conception of expression was. 
In response, Merleau-Ponty invoked the 'celebrated distinction' 
between 'langages'- 'constituted systems of vocabulary and syntax' 
- and 'parole'- acts of speech in which 'unformulated meaning 
[sens] not only finds the means of being conveyed outwardly, but 
moreover acquires existence for itself, and is genuinely created as 
meaning [sens )' .73 This distinction {which is close to, but not 
identical with, Saussure 's distinction between langue and parole) is 
immediately restated, transposed onto the level of parole, as a 
distinction between the 'word in speaking' (parole par/ante) and the 
'spoken word' (parole parlee ).74 It is only in the former that we find a 
'significative intention' through which existence comes to be 
'polarized in to a certain "sens" '. 75 
Merleau-Ponty's account of speech is thus concerned with a quite 
specific class of speech acts, epitomised for him by the child's first 
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entering into the world of language or a writer's expressing 
something for the first time- speech acts which 'transform a certain 
kind of silence into speech' .76 While rather rare - and, one would 
assume, rather different from what goes on in ordinary discourse-
these acts are absolutely central to Merleau-Ponty's account. 
Constituted speech, as it operates in daily life, assumes that the 
decisive step of expression has been taken. Our view of man will 
remain superficial so long as we fail to go back to that origin, so 
long as we fail to find, beneath the chatter of words, the 
primordial silence, and as long as we do not describe the action 
which breaks this silence.77 
It is this word which breaks the silence, and only this sort of word, 
which is truly a gesture. 
This distinction - which owes more to Heidegger's distinction 
between Rede and Gerede than to anything in Saussure78 -limits the 
class of speech acts which Merleau-Ponty likens to gestures, but it 
does not respond to the main thrust of the objections raised against 
his account of speech. He still must show how, in the face of the 
multiplicity of languages, even this sort of 'originary expression' can 
be viewed as resembling the gestures which we use to point out 
objects in the world. Merleau-Ponty's response here is twofold: he 
argues, first, that non-linguistic gestures are by no means 'natural'-
they too vary from culture to culture - and, second, that the 
linguistic gesture is 'not entirely arbitrary' .79 lt is this second part of 
the response that commits him to a position diametrically opposed 
to Saussure. 
Signs will appear to be arbitrary, Merleau-Ponty argues, only so 
long as we consider spoken speech and examine only the 'final 
conceptual meaning' of words. 
But it would no longer appear so if we took into account the 
emotional content of the word ... It would then be found that the 
words, vowels, and phonemes are so many ways of 'singing' the 
world, and that their function is to represent things not, as naive 
onomatopoeic theory had it, by reason of an objective resemb-
lance, but because they extract, and literally express, their 
emotional essence. If it were possible, in any vocabulary, to 
disregard what is attributable to the mechanical laws of phone-
......... 
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tics, to the influence of other languages, the rationalization of 
grammarians, and assimilatory processes, we should probably 
discover in the original form of each language a somewhat 
restricted system of expression, but such as would make it not 
entirely arbitrary .80 
The arbitrary relation between signifier and signified is thus only 
apparent. Once the linguistic sign has been restored to its original, 
emotive function, it will become apparent that the signifier does 
indeed bear a certain resemblance to what it signifies. When we 
perform Merleau-Ponty's proposed linguistic epoche and make our 
return to 'originary speech', we find that what appeared to have 
been a sign was in fact a symbol. 
The Phenomenology of Perception thus contained an account of 
expression which differs markedly from Saussure's understanding 
of the nature of the linguistic sign. What, then, was the motivation 
for Merleau-Ponty's attempt, in The Prose of the World, to 
elaborate a theory of expression which was more clearly an attempt 
to appropriate Saussure's approach? An answer can be found by 
examining the three works described by Merleau-Ponty in a 
prospectus drawn up at the time of his candidacy to the College de 
France as having 'touched upon' certain themes which were still to 
be developed in The Origin of Truth and The Prose of the World: 
two essays from Sense and Non-Sense ('Cezanne's Doubt' and 
'Metaphysics and the Novel'), and Humanism and Terror.81 In the 
prospectus, Merleau-Ponty presents these essays as anticipations of 
an account whose 'philosophical foundations ... are still to be 
rigorously elaborated' .82 Yet it is possible to read these works in a 
different light. Far from Jacking a philosophical foundation, all 
three are firmly grounded in the account of expression of the 
Phenomenology of Perception. But in developing the implications 
of this account, Merleau-Ponty was Jed to recognise its limitations. 
The three essays lack a philosophical foundation only because they 
provoked a renewed reflection which undermined the theory of 
expression sketched in the Phenomenology of Perception. 
Cezanne, 'L'lnvitee', and the Moscow Trials 
Let us examine the three works Merleau-Ponty mentioned, but do 
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so with our eyes cast back to the Phenomenology of Perception, not 
forward to The Prose of the World. The debts owed to the 
Phenomenology of Perception by the two essays in Sense and 
Non-Sense are readily apparent. Cezanne's work is claimed to 
exemplify the risks that artists invariably run. 
Because he returns to the source of silent and solitary experiences 
on which culture and the exchange of ideas have been built up in 
order to know it, the artist launches his work just as a man once 
launched the first word, not knowing whether it will be anything 
more than a shout, whether it can detach itself from the flow of 
individual life in which it originates and give the independent 
existence of an identifiable meaning [sens] either to the future of 
that same individual life or to the monads coexisting with it or to 
the open community of future monads.83 
'cezanne's difficulties,' Merleau-Ponty concluded, 'are those of the 
first word.' 84 His work testified to the ambiguity of expression: it is 
impossible to find 'a single gesture which is not spontaneous', since 
there are no innate or inherited gestures, but it is also 'impossible to 
have a single gesture which is absolutely new in regard to that way of 
being in the world which ... is myself' .85 Freedom is always 
situated. The lesson we learn from Cezanne is the one we have 
learned in the Phenomenology of Perception. 
It is also the lesson we learn from Simone de Beauvoir's novel 
L'Invitee, the subject of the second essay in Sense and Non-Sense. 
Morality is not something which can simply be presumed; harmony 
can be 'taken for granted' only among 'Kantian consciousnesses' .86 
For the characters in L'/nvitee, value must be created by 'actively 
being what we are by chance'. Neither completely created nor 
entirely discovered, value emerges in the process of taking up a 
situation 'which we have not completely chosen' .87 Like 'Cezanne's 
Doubt', 'Metaphysics and the Novel' explores 'the revolt of life's 
immediacy against reason', and attempts, without losing sight of the 
experience of 'unreason' (deraison ): to formulate 'a new idea of 
reason' .88 What sens we arc able to make in the world must emerge 
against a background of non-seflS. 
The same general theme may be found in Humanism and Terror, 
although the argument here is a good deal more complex and, when 
all is said, a good deal less convincing. On the most immediate level, 
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the book is a critique of Arthur Koestler's novel Darkness at Noon. 
It seeks, through an examination of Nikolai Burkharin's testimony 
at the 1937 Moscow trials, to draw different lessons about the 
relationship between violence and history than those reached by 
Koestler and other liberal critics. Koestler, as Merleau-Ponty read 
him, presented the trials as a struggle between the 'yogi' and the 
'commissar' - between moral conscience and political Machiavel-
lianism. Rubashov, Koestler's fictitious amalgam of Zinoviev and 
Bukharin, vacillates between the two alternatives. He confesses his 
guilt before the tribunal because of his commitment to a philosophy 
of history which allows the Party to manipulate individuals like 
objects, but as he awaits execution in his call he loses himself in the 
'oceanic feeling' of pure inwardness.89 
For Merleau-Ponty the significance of the Moscow Trials lay 
elsewhere. They revealed the tragedy inherent in politics: the 
objective consequences of actions can be quite different from the 
intentions of their authors. The charges against Bukharin are false 
when judged against his intentions, but true when judged against the 
consequences of his acts. For this reason Bukharin's confession 
should not be understood as the collapse of the yogi before the 
commissar. It must instead be seen as Bukharin's attempt to show 
how actions, born of a certain reading of history, could display to an 
observer a pattern which was 'objectively' counter-revolutionary in 
spite of their subjective innocence.90 Bukharin's plight thus lay bare 
the 'maleficence' of history: 
It solicits men, tempts them so that they believe they are moving 
in its direction [sens], and then suddenly it unmasks, and events 
change and prove that there was another possibility. The men 
whom history abandons in this way and who see themselves 
simply as accomplices suddenly find themselves the instigators of 
a crime to which history has inspired them. And they are unable to 
look for excuses or to excuse themselves from even a part of the 
responsibility. For at the very moment when they were following 
the apparent curve of history, others were deciding to back off 
and to commit their lives along another road to the future.91 
There is no 'science of the future', it cannot be predicted with the 
certainty with which events in the natural world can be foretold.92 
The future is instead presented to us in a series of'perspectives'; it is 
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a 'horizon of possibilities' analogous to our perceptual horizon. Just 
as an object on our perceptual horizon may reveal itself, as we move 
closer to it, to be something quite different from what we originally 
took it to be, so too the future which we approach may turn out to be 
quite different from what we initially supposed.93 Political actors 
such as Stalin, Trotsky, and Bukharin each have different perspec-
tives within the ambiguous field of history and, on the basis of their 
different readings of the future, they each formulate different 
projects which seek to realise different ends.94 
The drama of the Moscow Trials, then, lay in their attempt to 
confront 'the collaborator before he was wrong historically' .95 
Merleau-Ponty insists that Bukharin's testimony represents a 
confession that the future he was working towards was not a 
possible future. His opposition to forced collectivisation and rapid 
industrialisation could only have rendered the Soviet Union 
defenceless in the face of the threat posed by Nazi Germany: 
If he had been arrested a few years earlier or even judged a few 
months earlier Bukharin would probably have refused to surren-
der. But in the world situation as of 1938 the liquidation of the 
opposition can no longer be regarded as an accident. Bukharin 
and his colleagues were defeated; this means that they were up 
against a persistent police force and an implacable dictatorship. 
But their failure means something even more essential, namely, 
that what broke them was necessitated by that phase of history .96 
The sens of history had eluded him, and in his confession he 
accepted the consequences. 
As an analysis of Bukharin 's testimony, Humanism and Terror is, 
quite simply, rather dreadful. While Merleau-Ponty, unlike Koes-
tler, focuses on the peculiar character of Bukharin's 'confession'-
Bukharin accepted complete and total 'political responsibility' for 
everything he and his co-defendants were charged with doing and 
then proce.!ded, point by point, to disprove and deny all the 
particular charges against him - to explain these peculiarities as 
resulting from a belated recognition on Bukharin's part that Stalin's 
policies had been historically vindicated by the need to oppose 
fascism, is to display a staggering ignorance of the real situation 
Bukharin faced. It was Bukharin, not Stalin, who made the earliest 
and in many ways most prescient appraisal of the threat posed by 
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Hitler. His opposition to forced collectivisation and rapid industrial-
isation rested at least in part on the argument that such tactics were 
likely to alienate the citizenry, thus making resistance to a German 
attack difficult to muster.97 Further, there is precious little evidence 
to support Merleau-Ponty's assumption that the Soviet Union was 
in the end better able to withstand the German invasion because of 
Stalin's policies.98 But the greatest failing in Merleau-Ponty's 
interpretation of the Moscow Trials lies with his willingness to take 
the charges against Bukharin and the 'Bloc of Rightists and 
Trotskyites' at face value. He seems utterly incapable of recognising 
the tactical importance of the trials in Stalin's drive to consolidate 
power, and appears blissfully unaware of the three main functions 
the charges served: they shifted the responsibility for Stalin's own 
crimes -for example, the assassinations of Kirov and Gorky - to 
others, they attributed the failures of collectivisation and industrial-
isation to the sabotage of others, and they provided a pretext for 
liquidating the first generation of Bolsheviks, a step which removed 
the Party as a possible check on Stalin's own future actions.99 
But if these were the real functions of the charges, why did 
Bukharin confess? The blanket acceptance of 'political responsi-
bility' appears to have been the price Bukharin had to pay to insure 
the survival of his second wife and three-year-old son - both of 
whom had been placed in detention within weeks of his own arrest. 
It was also the prerequisite for his being able to take the stand at all. 
But once on the stand, he proceeded to make a shambles of the 
charges against him through what his biographer has aptly 
described as 'a dazzling exhibition of double-talk, evasion, code 
words, veiled allusions, exercises in logic, and stubborn denuncia-
tion' .100 To read this testament of the 'last Bolshevik', Merleau-
Ponty would have had to school himself in a political hermeneutics 
which, at this point at least, was apparently beyond him. 
Marx's wager: the 'sens' of history 
Our concern here, however, is not with the often staggering nai'vete 
of Humanism and Terror as a piece of political analysis but rather 
with the way it illustrates some characteristic features of Merleau-
Ponty's initial attempt to move from perception to history. So we 
must disengage his dubious specific claims about Bukharin's 
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testimony from his more general discussion of what it means to 
impute a sens to history. This uncoupling is made a bit easier by the 
fact that certain parts of his more general argument can also be 
found at the close of the Phenomenology of Perception. 
There he argued that the conclusions reached in his discussion of 
the problem of others showed that my 'absolute individuality' is 
surrounded by 'a kind of halo of generality or a kind of atmosphere 
of "sociality" '. Our existence in the world thus bears a 'double 
anonymity'. My life has 'a sens which I do not constitute', both on 
the individual level- my body sustains certain projects which have 
not necessarily been consciously thematised- and the social level- I 
am born into a particular society, a particular class, and here too we 
find certain pre-reflective projects.101 
Provided that this is so, there can be situations, a sens of history, 
and a historical truth: three ways of saying the same thing. If I 
indeed made myself into a worker or a bourgeois by an absolute 
initiative, and if in general terms nothing solicits our freedom, 
history would display no structure, no event would be seen to take 
shape in it, and anything might emerge from anything else ... 
History would never move in any direction, nor would it be 
possible to say that even over a short period of time events were 
conspiring to produce any definite outcome. The statesman 
would always be an adventurer, that is to say he would take 
advantage of events by conferring upon them a meaning which 
they did not have. 102 
History has a sens, then, in the same way as an individual life. 
Certain possibilities are offered. They arc taken up and modified by 
a freedom which is neither bound to the terms of the situation it 
assumes nor completely free from the situations in which it is 
engaged. Nothing guarantees that a life or a history will have only 
one sens from beginning to end, but lives and histories are, 
nevertheless, 'condemned to meaning' .103 It is impossible for them 
not to express something. 
In Humanism and Terror, Merleau-Ponty argued that Marx's 
account of history rested on a similar vision of the nature of 
historical intelligibility.104 Marx, like Hegel before him, rejected the 
view that history was only 'the simple encounter and discrete 
succession of absolutely autonomous individuals, without roots, 
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without posterity, without any interaction'. In history we instead 
find 'situated beings' who are 'characterized by a certain type of 
relation to men and the world, by a certain activity, a certain way of 
treating other people and nature' ! 05 There is, in other words, 'not a 
plurality of subjects but an intersubjectivity' and the actions of one 
group of individuals are bound to affect the lives of others in as 
much as all are participants in 'a single common situation' .106 
To articulate a philosophy of history, Merleau-Ponty insisted, is 
to demonstrate that these various individual situations are indeed 
united in one common situation and that this common situation is 
'moving toward some privileged state which gives the whole its 
meaning' .107 Marxism rests on such a wager: 
In essence Marxism is the idea that history has a sens -in other 
words, that it is intelligible and has a direction- that it is moving 
toward the power of the proletariat, which as the essential factor 
of production is capable of resolving the contradictions of 
capitalism, of organizing a humane appropriation of nature, and, 
as the 'universal class', able to transcend national and social 
conflicts as well as the struggle between man and man. To be a 
Marxist ... is to believe that history has a Gestalt ... a holistic 
system moving toward a state of equilibrium, the classless society 
which cannot be achieved without individual effort and action, 
but which is outlined in the present crisis as its solution.108 
In Humanism and Terror, Marxism is not simply a philosophy of 
history, 'it is the philosophy of history'. To renounce it is to 'dig the 
grave of reason in history' .109 If the proletariat proves incapable of 
transcending the alternatives of lordship and bondage, if it cannot 
bring about mutual recognition betwen men, it would mean not 
merely that Marx's conjectures had been refuted. 'It would mean 
that there is no history-ifhistory means the advent of humanity and 
humanity the mutual recognition of men as men.' 110 
The discussion of the sens of history in the Phenomenology of 
Perception has entered here into an uncomfortable menage a trois 
with Kojeve's Hegel and Lukacs's Marx. The Phenomenology of 
Perception contributes the basic metaphors: historical meaning, like 
perceptual meaning, emerges as a figure against a background; it is 
brought to the foreground by gestures which elicit but do not 
constitute it; freedom is always situated freedom. Kojeve's reading 
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of Hegel defines the direction in which this history is moving: 
towards a state of mutual recognition in which the struggle of master 
and slave finally ends. And Lukacs' reading of Marx identifies the 
major actor in the drama: it is the proletariat which, by becoming 
conscious of its own position in society, finally unveils the mystifica-
tions which have blinded men to the true meaning and direction of 
history. This vision of history is a most unstable mixture, destined to 
fall apart for both practical and theoretical reasons. 
On the practical level, everything hinges on Marxism's not simply 
being an ideology of 'adventurers' who impose meaning willy-nilly 
on a passive and blank history. As a gesture which reveals rather 
than constitutes the sens of history, Marxism must rest on the 
'extrapolation of a praxis already at work in history, of a reality that 
is already committed, namely, the proletariat'.111 There must be 
something in the historical field to which Marxism can appeal, just 
as there must be something- however ambiguous- on the horizon 
of the perceptual field which I try to make my friend see as a church 
tower. And, sooner or later, I must get my friend to understand 
what it is I am pointing at, just as sooner or later, the future towards 
which Marxists are gesturing must become plausible to those they 
address. 
But what if the future which Marxism tries to make palpable 
constantly slips from view? What if it is evident only to the party, 
and not to the masses, that history is moving, in spite of reversals, 
detours, and diversions, towards a classless society? In 1945, 
Merleau-Ponty held out the possibility that history might 'consist of 
a series of diversions' from the path Marx had projected, diversions 
which might last 'for as long as we live and perhaps even for 
centuries' .112 In such a situation, 'Marxism could ... only be stated 
in terms of negative propositions'. We would know that crises will 
not cease unless the means of production have been socialised, but 
we would know 'neither that a universal socialist production would 
achieve equilibrium nor that the course of events ... is heading 
toward that outcome' .113 What such a series of detours might mean 
on a practical level was driven home in Humanism and Terror: 
The contact broken between the spontaneous life of the masses 
and the exigencies of a proletarian victory planned by the leaders 
should be re-established after some foreseeable interruption and 
within a man's lifetime. Otherwise the proletarian will not see for 
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what he is sacrificing himself and we shall have returned to the 
Hegelian philosophy of the State: a few functionaries of History 
who possess knowledge for all and carry out the will of the World 
Spirit with the blood of others. Local history must have a patent 
connection with universal history without which the proletariat 
lapses into the provincialism it should have transcended.114 
By 1952 he was convinced that history had indeed strayed from the 
Marxist path, and that to hold Marxism in suspension as a set of 
negative truths while waiting for history to cohere once again into a 
Marxian Gestalt was, in effect, to have already abandoned Marxism. 
A philosophy of history which kept waiting for history to come back 
to its true sens was not Marxism; it was a poorly disguised Kantian 
rationalism.115 
In addition to these troubling practical questions, Merleau-
Ponty's synthesis of Hegel, Marx, and an existentialised Husser) was 
threatened on the theoretical level. Here everything hinges on 
Merleau-Ponty's ability to show meaningful parallels between 
perceptual meaning and historical meaning. While he was fairly 
successful in drawing analogies between the way the perceptual 
field is structured and the way the future is presented to historical 
actors, it is less clear whether an analogy can be sustained between 
the subject for whom the perceptual world is meaningful and the 
subject who brings a sens to the historical world. 
The subject of perception is an incarnate consciousness which 
confronts a world it has not created and grasps this world in a series 
of always partial syntheses. The subject of history as described in 
the Phenomenology of Perception likewise has only a limited grasp; 
history has some sens, but there is no claim that there is a single 
history moving in one direction.118 Yet Merleau-Ponty advances 
precisely this claim in Humanism and Terror when he elevates 
Marxism to the status of the philosophy of history. Such a claim 
would be congruent with the vision of history one finds in either 
Kojeve or Lukacs - for Kojeve the entirety of history is the 
labouring slave's effort to achieve recognition, for Lukacs it is the 
history of the coming to consciousness of the proletariat as the 
'identical subject-object' of world history .117 But such a conception 
of history demands a subject with a far more comprehensive grasp 
than the subject described in the Phenomenology of Perception. All 
the theoretical obscurities of Humanism and Terror arise from the 
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fact that Merleau-Ponty has simply coupled the universal history he 
found in Kojeve and Lukacs to the perspectival account of historical 
meaning he outlined in the Phenomenology of Perception. 118 The 
passage from perception to history thus takes the form of a leap. 
Enter Saussure 
By 1952 these practical and theoretical problems had placed in 
question the conception of history elaborated in Humanism and 
Terror. In the discussion of history in his inaugural lecture at the 
College de France, Merleau-Ponty tried to come to grips with why 
Marxism had been led astray- and called on Saussure for help. 
He was more careful than in his earlier works to distinguish 
Marx's vision of history from Hegel's. Marx refused to locate 
historical reason on any level other than 'the life of men'. History, 
for him, was 'the situation in which all meanings are developed' and 
'praxis' was that peculiar sort of meaning which 'works itself out 
spontaneously in the intercrossings of those activities by which man 
organizes his relations with nature and other men'.119 Marx did not 
see history as 'directed at the beginning by an idea of universal or 
total history' nor is it driven by a 'dialectic of matter' .120 The sens of 
history is, rather, 'immanent in the interhuman event' .121 
The very novelty of Marx's approach sealed its fate. 'Nothing in 
sociology or positive history was preparing the way for the 
intellectual reform which he called for' and neither he nor his 
followers fully understood what this notion of history implied. 
Where, in fact, was this immanent meaning of inter-human events 
to be placed? It is not, or certainly it is not always, in men, that is, 
in their minds, but outside them. Once he had stopped placing 
any absolute knowledge in things, it seemed that there were only 
blind events. Where then was the historical process, and what 
mode of existence must be recognized in such historical forms as 
feudalism, capitalism, proletariat, which are spoken of as though 
they were persons, knowing and willing, hidden behind the 
multiplicity of events, without seeing clearly what these masks 
represent? After rejecting the expedient of the Hegelian Objec-
tive Spirit, how could the dilemma of existence as thing versus 
existence as consciousness be avoided? 122 
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Seeking to place itself beyond idealism and materialism, Marxism 
wound up vacillating between the two, unable to decide between an 
account of history which places all hope with the voluntary action of 
a class which abolishes all classes, and an account which sees 
everywhere only the blind movement of anonymous forces. 
It was here that Merleau-Ponty thought the 'theory of signs' could 
make a contribution. The relation between the subject's 'will to 
express' and the 'means of expression' provided by language could 
serve as a paradigm for understanding the relationship between 
'productive forces and forms of production and, more generally, 
between historical forces and institutions': 
Just as language is a system of signs which have meaning only in 
relation to one another, and each of which has its own usage 
throughout the whole language, so each institution is a symbolic 
system that the subject takes over and incorporates as a style of 
functioning, as a global configuration, without having any need to 
conceive it at all. When equilibrium is destroyed, the reorganiza-
tions which take place comprise, like those of language, an 
internal logic even though it may not be clearly thought out by 
anyone!23 
Language thus presents us with a system, governed by a logic which 
may not be fully understood by any of those who employ it, which is 
set in motion by the will of these same speakers to make themselves 
understood. In the same way, history can be viewed as a symbolic 
structure, governed by rules and beset by transformations which 
none of its agents fully comprehends, which is driven by the will of 
these agents 'to coexist and to recognize one another'. 124 
It is in this way ... that the forms and processes of history, the 
classes, the epochs, exist ... they are in a social, cultural, or 
symbolic space which is no less real than physical space and is, 
moreover, supported by it. For meaning lies latent not only in 
language, in political and religious institutions, but in modes of 
kinship, in machines, in the landscape, in production, and, in 
general, in all the modes of human commerce.125 
Here, then, was the answer to the question of where the 'immanent 
meaning of inter-human events' was to be placed. History, like 
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language, was a system of signs. Marx's historical materialism will 
find its proper form as a Saussurian semiology of history. 
Saussure, the sign, and the problem of history 
In his inaugural lecture Merleau-Ponty suggested that Saussure's 
work 'perhaps implies a concept of historical meaning which gets 
beyond the opposition of things versus consciousness' ! 26 The 
crucial word is 'perhaps'. Whether such a concept could in fact be 
got out of Saussure's work was, for Merleau-Ponty, a question 
whose final resolution depended on what could be achieved in The 
Proseofthe World, a book which at the time of the inaugural lecture 
was unfinished, but not yet abandoned. 
The written and unwritten 'Prose of the World' 
As originally outlined, The Prose of the World was to fall into three 
parts. The book would begin, like Sartre's What is Literature?, with 
an analysis of the nature of prose and a discussion of the linguistic 
sign. The second part would focus on a few specific authors and 
show how they transformed conventions of discourse so as to 
produce new modes of expression. The concluding part, as 
Merleau-Ponty wrote in his prospectus, would 'elaborate the 
category of prose beyond the confines of literature to give it a 
sociological meaning' .127 He hoped, in this final section, to extend 
the analysis developed in the discussion of literary uses of language 
to the domain of politics and religion.128 Only the first of the 
projected three parts was actually begun and even it remained 
unfinished. 
The posthumously published manuscript of The Prose of the 
World consists of a somewhat motley assortment of chapters. The 
short opening discussion is devoted to dispelling the 'spectre of a 
pure language' - a conception, close to Sartre's in What is 
Literature?, which sees language as a set of signs which function like 
'an all purpose tool', teferring us to particular meanings and, 
beyond these meanings, to particular objects in the world. 129 In the 
second chapter, Merleau-Ponty turned to Saussure and, drawing on 
his discussion of the 'diacritical' character of linguistic values, 
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argued that signs are never meaningful in and of themselves but 
instead take on meaning only through their opposition to other 
signs.130 As a way of exploring how meaning arises 'between' words, 
Merleau-Ponty proposed that we perf~Hm a 'reduction' upon 
language and turn away from what it signifies in order to explore 
how it goes about expressing meaning.131 Thus begins an extended 
discussion of the parallels between literary expression and painting; 
the contrast to Sartre's brusque conclusion that no meaningful 
analogies could be constructed here is presumably intentional.132 
This complex and extraordinarily suggestive discussion - most of 
which was eventually published in a revised form as 'Indirect 
Language and the Voices of Silence' 133 - is followed by three 
chapters which are a good deal shorter and considerably less 
provocative. The first of these three chapters attempts to show that 
even the most formal mode of expression, the algorithm, still pre-
supposes a primordial 'carnal' contact with the world!34 The next 
focuses on the way speech allows us to move beyond our immediate 
perceptual experience of other people and create a community with 
the other through dialogue.135 The last begins to draw parallels 
between the way a child's babbling is superseded by true phonemic 
oppositions and the way a child's scribbles give way to actual 
drawings, but comes to an abrupt end after only eight pages!36 
The Prose of the World was thus broken off before it could fulfil 
the promise Merleau-Ponty had seen in Saussure's linguistics. In a 
brief aside in the chapter on children's drawings, Merleau-Ponty 
promised that the next chapter would deal with 'the nature of the 
relationship between the expressive operation and the thinker 
whom it presupposes and forms as well as the history which it 
continues and recreates'. 137 While he never wrote this chapter, he 
did give a course entitled 'Materials for a Theory of History' 
( 1953-4) which examined the work of Max Weber- in particular 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - and Georg 
Lukacs- in particular History and Class Consciousness. 138 These 
inquiries may well have been undertaken with an eye towards the 
ultimate concern of The Prose of the World: the problem of 
meaning in history. They were, however, destined for a different use 
and became the first two chapters of his 1955 critique of Marxism, 
Adventures of the Dialectic. 
Merleau-Ponty's attempt to resolve the problems he found in 
Marx by turning to Saussure thus leaves us with two works whose 
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relationship is quite puzzling. The Prose of the World was intended 
to Jay the basis of a new understanding of Marx's attempt to place 
meaning in history; but it provides only a discussion of linguistic 
expression and - apart from a few comments in the chapter on 
'indirect language' - never explicitly comes to grips with the 
problem of history. Adventures of the Dialectic does - but the 
relevance of Saussure's work for its discussions of Weber, Lukacs, 
Trotsky, and Sartre remains obscure. It is little wonder, then, that 
students of Merleau-Ponty's social thought have, for the most part, 
confined their attention to the later book, leaving The Prose of the 
World to those of their colleagues concerned with aesthetics and 
literature.139 But that option is not open to us. We have seen that 
The Prose of the World was at least in part intended to resolve the 
tensions which beset Merleau-Ponty's attempt, in Humanism and 
Terror, to develop a philosophy of history on the basis of the 
philosophy of expression sketched in the Phenomenology of 
Perception. It is thus of the greatest importance to understand why 
The Prose ofthe World was unable to reach its goal and to see what, 
if anything, this might have to do with the critique of Marxism he 
undertook in Adventures of the Dialectic. And to do this, we must 
proceed as we did with his first attempt to move from expression to 
history and see how he now conceived of the linguistic sign. 
The diacritical gesture: the theory of expression in 'The Prose of the 
World' 
We have seen that the relation of signifier to signified in the 
discussion of expression in the Phenomenology of Perception could 
best be described, in the terms provided by Barthes's typology, as 
'symbolic'. The reduction performed on language terminated in a 
conception of the sign as representative of a primordial, emotional 
response to the world. In this alleged 'originary speech', the relation 
between signifier and signified was held to be 'not entirely 
arbitrary'. 
Something of this hope for an approach to language which would 
look beyond the conventions of institutionalised language and 
make contact with an 'originary' gesture continued to haunt The 
Prose of the World. Phonology, as Merleau-Ponty understood it, 
was a way of looking at language which 'considers modulations 
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introduced by speech ... as expressive in themselves' .140 But this 
originary act of expression is no longer conceived as a one-to-one 
coupling of signifiers to signifieds. We are not led back to 'a golden 
age of language in which words . . . adhered to the objects 
themselves' .141 Phonology reveals, not a domain of unequivocal 
gestures, but rather a 'sublinguistic life whose whole effort is to 
differentiate signs and systematize them' .142 We no longer find a 
primordial language which 'sings' the world; we instead encounter a 
language which, oblivious to the world, would appear to be simply 
humming to itself. At first glance it would seem that 'language never 
has anything to do with anything but itsdf'; it 'never says 
anything' .143 It is instead 'a series of gestures' which point to nothing 
in particular but are rather concerned with differentiating them-
selves from one another in a way that 'presents differences clear 
enough for the conduct of language' .144 If the conception of the sign 
in the Phenomenology of Perception appeared to be 'symbolic', in 
The Prose of the World we find an approach which would seem to be 
avowedly 'paradigmatic'. 
~erleau-Ponty endorses a study of this 'primordial level of 
language' which adheres to the programme laid out by Saussure. 
Signs are not to be seen as 'representations of certain significations', 
they are, rather, 'the means of differentiation in the verbal chain'. A 
language is to be understood less as 'a sum of signs' than as 'a 
methodological means of differentiating signs from one another'. 
To speak a language is not to deploy a finite number of signs; it is, 
rather, to employ 'a principle of distinction' .145 In his summary of 
the opening chapters of The Prose of the World at the start of 
'Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence', Merleau-Ponty made 
his debts to Saussure quite clear: . 
What we have learned from Saussure is that, taken singly, signs 
do not signify anything, and that each one of them does not so 
much express a meaning as mark a divergence [ecart] of meaning 
between itself and other signs. Since the same may be said for all 
other signs, we may conclude that language is made of differences 
without terms; or more exactly, that the terms of language are 
engendered only by the differences which appear among them. 146 
Because the sign is 'diacritical from the outset', meaning will arise 
'at the edge of signs' as a product of a charade in which all the 
Speech, Expression and the Sense of History 131 
gestures, taken individually, are 'equivocal or banal'. 147 The ability 
of language to 'signify a thought or a thing directly' is thus but a 
'secondary power' of language; it masks the more primitive 
operation of self-differentiation which lies at the heart of all 
speech.148 
To say that direct signification is a 'secondary power' of language 
is, however, not to 'deny that language does indeed signify. While 
Merleau-Ponty embraced Saussure's account of the diacritical 
nature of linguistic values, his earlier concern with questions of 
reference- or, as he put it, 'the transcendence of signification'- is 
not abandoned. 'In the end language must signify something and 
not always be language about language', he stressed in a marginal 
note to The Prose of the World directed against Joseph Vendryes 
(whose Le Langage was a useful reference for Merleau-Ponty) and 
'perhaps Saussure'.149 The Prose of the World has not broken with 
the notion -so central to the argument of the Phenomenology of 
Perception -that language points towards the world. But what has 
been put in question is an account of the linguistic gesture which, 
like that in the Phenomenology of Perception, sees individual signs 
as gesturing towards discrete concepts or objects. Thus, while 
Merleau-Ponty's conception of the nature of the linguistic sign 
changed markedly between the Phenomenology of Perception and 
The Prose of the World, with a 'paradigmatic consciousness' 
increasingly displacing a 'symbolic consciousness', his conception of 
the function of the sign remain unchanged. Signs transcend the 
closed system of language and make reference to the world. But this 
reference is indirect, the product of the diacritical play of signs 
which, on first glance, seem only to be pointing at each other. 
Let us make sure his argument is understood, for it is a rather 
unique one. Language makes reference to the world not in spite of 
the fact that 'originary' language seems only to refer to itself but 
because of this fact. Self-reference makes reference to the world 
possible: 
It is words that words arouse and, to the degree that we 'think' 
more fully, words so precisely fill our minds that they leave no 
empty corner for pure thought or for significations that are not 
the work of language. The mystery is that, in the very moment 
where language is thus obsessed with itself, it is enabled, through 
a kind of excess, to open us to a signification ... In an instant this 
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flow of words annuls itself as noise, throwing us completely into 
what it means. 150 
In a marginal note inserted at this point in the manuscript, he 
reiterated the argument by making an analogy to perception: 
Just as the analysis of perception makes clear the transcendence 
of the thing in relation to the contents and Abschattungen 
[adumbrations; perspectival shadings]. The thing emerges over 
there, while I think I am grasping it in a given variation of the hyle 
where it is only in adumbration. Similarly, thought arises over 
there, while I am looking for it in a particular inflection of the 
verbal chain.151 
For this reason -pace Sartre - meaningful analogies can be drawn 
between painters and writers. Both deploy the oppositions made 
possible by the systems in which they work - figures and grounds, 
colours and canvas, words and silence - in a way that allows a 
meaning to emerge which transcends the dots of paint on the canvas 
or the flecks of ink on the page.152 Both must express 'indirectly'; for 
both, meaning arises in the intervals between signs. What dis-
tinguishes writing from painting is the fact that it is easier to forget 
all this in the act of speaking and, like Sartre, simply assume that 
speech takes us directly and unambiguously to the things we speak 
about. 153 Every time we speak, we of necessity forget everything 
Saussure has taught us about the nature of linguistic value.154 
Here, as perhaps nowhere else, Merleau-Ponty has articulated a 
position which defies neat classification. Where Sartre reduced the 
sign to a simple and unequivocal-reference to things, Merleau-Ponty 
drew on Saussure's account of the diacritical nature of linguistic 
value and insisted that words refer to things only by referring to 
other words. Where subsequent disciples of Saussure would aban-
don all concern with reference and see language instead as a closed 
system, having to do with nothing save itself, Merleau-Ponty 
continued to concern himself with the way in which this incessant 
self-differentiation nevertheless opens onto the world. 155 Little 
wonder that his reading of Saussure was so idiosyncratic. The 
questions he tried to make Saussure answer were questions 
Saussure had never asked. Saussure sought the proper 'object' on 
which a science of language could be grounded. He found it by 
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turning from the individual act of speech to consider instead the 
social conventions of language.156 Merleau-Ponty read Saussure to 
find a way of analysing the interaction between the will to express 
and the means of expression provided by language. He found it by 
confounding Saussure's neatly drawn distinctions and envisioning a 
'synchronic linguistics of parole'. 
Structure, event, advent: the sense of history in 'The Prose of the 
World' 
The import of this 'synchronic linguistics of parole' for the 
philosophy of history can best be understood if we examine the 
dichotomies which Merleau-Ponty hoped it would resolve. His 
Sorbonne course, 'Consciousness and the Acquisition of Lan-
guage', closed with the suggestion that, 'if generalized', Saussure's 
approach to language might provide a way beyond the impasse of 
treating history either as 'the sum of independent chance events' or 
as 'providential', as a 'manifestation of an internal structure' .157 The 
Prose of the World stressed the need to leave behind those 'empty 
discussions' which posit history as an 'external power' and thus 
force on us the dilemma of choosing 'between this power and 
ourselves'. 158 In Adventures of the Dialectic he examined Max 
Weber's writings to see how one could avoid the unhappy choice 
between a history which 'judges, situates, and organizes' facts in 
light of the 'troubles and problems of the present' and an 'agnostic 
history which lines up civilizations one after the other like unique 
individuals who cannot be compared' .159 And the preface to this 
same work spoke of the need to overcome Alain's dichotomy 
between a 'politics of reason' which 'totalizes history' and sees all 
particular problems as destined to be resolved in a future which will 
constitute 'a new beginning' and a 'politics of understanding' which 
'does not flatter itself with having embraced all of history' and 
instead 'resolves problems one at a time' .160 The task Merleau-
Ponty assigned to his Saussure-inspired approach to history was 
thus that of mediating between event and structure, individual and 
history, present and past - in short, between concrete individual 
existence and universal historical meaning. Since this was the very 
task Hegel had set for himself, 'the Hegelian dialectic is what we call 
by another name the phenomenon of expression'. 181 But why did 
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Merleau-Ponty think that Saussure could be successful where Hegel 
had failed? 
Saussure's distinction between parole and langue would seem to 
be only another example of the dichotomy Merleau-Ponty was 
seeking to avoid, and not a particularly promising way of getting 
around it. Saussure understood parole as an order of unique and 
incomparable events and conceived of langue as the atemporal 
structure never totally manifested in any one of these events!62 To 
transpose such a view of language onto the plane of history would 
appear only to replicate the dichotomy as the distinction- quite out 
of keeping with Hegel but crucial, for example, in the work of a 
historian like Fernand Braude! - between history conceived as a 
sequence of events (Braudel's histoire evenemcntielle) and history 
viewed as a structure or group of structures (Braudel's longue 
duree). 163 But just as Merleau-Ponty undercut the dichotomy of 
langue and parole by mixing elements from both sides of the 
opposition to frame a new distinction between a 'synchronic 
linguistics of parole' and a 'diachronic linguistics of langue', so too 
he shifted the ground under the dichotomy between event and 
structure with a flanking manoeuvre which opened a new opposi-
tion between history as event and history as advent. 164 
The term 'advent' was taken from Paul Ricoeur, who used it to 
denote the emergence of a sens in history which transcends its time 
and continues to be effective in the present - for example, the 
'advent' of the notion of the cogito. The advent of such a sens is 
typically the concern of philosophical readings of history; empirical 
historians tend to eschew such discussions in favour of a chronicling 
of events.m Merleau-Ponty needed to look no further than 
Edmund Husser! for an example of a philosopher who scanned 
history in search of such. an advent of meaning. Ricoeur himself 
cited Husser! as one example of the genre and, as has already been 
noted, Husserl's essay 'The Origin of Geometry' played a central 
role in Merleau-Ponty's own reflections on the relation between 
expression and history. 
Husser! had sought to work backwards from current 'handed-
down forms' of geometry to the 'original beginnings of geometry as 
they necessarily must have been in their "primally establishing" 
[Urstiftende] function' ! 66 Such an inquiry- which Husser! stressed 
must not be taken as a response to a 'philological-historical 
question'- proceeds on the level of generalities, not on the level of 
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actual empirical facts, and inquires into the meaning and implica-
tions of the 'primal establishment' of geometry, not into its actual 
historical origins. It was, in Ricoeur's terms, a study of the advent of 
geometrical meaning which concerned itself with the conceptual 
transformations wrought by the beginnings of geometrical thought; 
it was not a study ofthe historical events which led to the creation of 
geometry. Its central task was to understand how geometrical 
objects, which have no 'objective meaning' and accordingly must 
first have been intra-psychically created, could have become 'ideal 
objects' which possess an intersubjective meaning; it was not 
concerned with determining where, or when, or with whom 
geometry first began.167 
In analysing the problem, Husser) made use of a concept which, 
as we have already seen, is central to Merleau-Ponty's understand-
ing of phenomenology: Stiftung. In his discussion of the relationship 
between painters, past works, and the world, Merleau-Ponty 
paused to reflect on the richness of the notion: 
Husser) had used the fine word Stiftung- foundation or establish-
ment - to designate first of all the unlimited fecundity of each 
present which, precisely because it is singular and passes, can 
never stop having been and thus being universally; but above all 
to designate that fecundity of the products of a culture which 
continue to have value after their appearance and which open a 
field of investigations in which they perpetually come to life 
again.168 
A history which sought to discover such acts of institution must 
address the 'rise of styles, their mutations, their surprising trans-
formations, and also simultaneously their solidarity in a single 
history of painting' .169 Such a history of the way in which a painter 
'revives, reactivates, and renews the entire understanding of 
painting in each new work' is the forgotten foundation on which a 
history of events spins out its tale of 'dismemberment, ignorance, 
externality' .170 To turn from event to advent was thus to turn from a 
domain where history manifested only chaos to a domain where a 
sens could be found. 
Saussure's approach to linguistics could provide guidance for 
such a history of advents because the 'synchronic linguistics of 
parole' which Merleau-Ponty thought he had discovered reprc-
-
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sen ted an approach to language whose task perfectly paralleled that 
of the historian of advents: 
Alongside the linguistics of langue, which gives the impression, in 
the extreme, that language is a series of chaotic events, Saussure 
has inaugurated a linguistics of parole, which would reveal in it at 
each moment an order, a system, a totality without which 
communication and the linguistic community would be impos-
sible.171 
The diachronic study of langue, as Merleau-Ponty portrays it, 
presents us with a series of transformations, displacements, and 
rearrangements in the system of language which make sense only in 
so far as we can frame causal accounts of the fortuitous events which 
produced these results. The synchronic study of parole, in contrast, 
forces us to look not at specific events but rather at a continuing 
advent. The synchronic viewpoint, he stressed, is not 'instantane-
ous'; there is, rather, a constant overlapping of each temporal phase 
upon the next.172 Ignorant of the chance events which create in a 
given language a set of structural constraints, the speaker animates 
these structures with each act of speaking, just as each painter 
renews and reactivates the entire project of painting in each of his 
works. 
A 'true history of painting' must thus treat each painter as 
'something like an institution'. It must look 'beyond the immediate 
aspects of the canvases' attributed to a painter and search instead 
for 'a structure, a style, and a meaning against which the discordant 
details (if there are any) that fatigue, circumstance, or self-imitation 
has torn from his brush cannot prevail' .173 In moving from the 'order 
of events' to the 'order of expression', the historian of painting puts 
aside attempts to explain individual works by particular circum-
stances and sees the work not as an 'effect' but rather as 'a response' 
to the circumstances which it transforms into a signifying system.174 
The task of political or social historians is no different. They too 
must look beyond such labels as 'Parliament under the ancien 
regime' or 'the French revolution' to see 'what they really signify in 
the dynamics of human relations and what modulation of these 
relations they represent'.175 
The Prose of the World provides, however, only the vaguest of 
suggestions as to how the emergence of meaning which Marx 
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claimed to find in history could be reformulated along the lines 
suggested by Saussure. The little discussion that one can find of the 
character of a 'history of advents' is devoted to problems in the 
history of painting, not to problems in the writing of political or 
social history. Indeed, even with respect to the history of painting 
we have less an illustration of how one might proceed than an 
assertion that all the historian needs to do is follow Saussure. The 
historian seeking guidance as to how the shortcomings of Marx's 
philosophy of history are to be remedied is thus presented with an 
analogue twice removed. A social history of advents will resemble a 
history of the advent of styles and schools in painting which, in turn, 
resembles Saussure's 'synchronic linguistics of parole' which- as we 
have seen- resembles nothing in the Course in General Linguistics. 
Our attempt to understand what Merleau-Ponty thought Saussure 
could do to remedy the lacunae of Marx's philosophy of history has 
led us, it would seem, to a dead end. But we need only turn to the 
first chapter of Adventures of the Dialectic to find what has been 
sought in vain in The Prose of the World. There, in the guise of an 
interpretation of Max Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism we meet as clear an illustration of what Merlcau-Ponty 
felt Saussure implied for the social sciences as one could ever hope 
to see. 
Max Weber and the 'histoire avi?tzementielle' of capitalism 
The first chapter of Adventures of the Dialectic drew tacitly on the 
categories developed in The Prose of the World to provide a 
methodological foundation for Weber's study of the relation 
between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism. Weber, 
Merlcau-Ponty argued, sought to grasp the 'intelligible nuclei' of 
history, those 'symbolic matrices' which 'for a shorter or longer 
time' structure the way in which men respond to nature, each other, 
and death. The rise and fall of these matrices is not to be explained 
through an appeal to 'external forces'; rather it must be understood 
by showing how these matrices either disintegrate internally or arc 
reorganised when a previously secondary element comes to prc-
dominatc.176 'Rationalization', the guiding theme in Weber's social 
theory, may thus be understood as a matrix composed of elements 
which can be found scattered throughout history, but which take on 
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a unique value only when fused with other elements in a coherent 
structure: 177 
In law, science, technology, and Western religion we see prime 
examples of this 'rationalizing' tendency. But only after the fact. 
Each of these elements acquires its historical meaning only 
through its encounter with others. History has often produced 
one of them in isolation (Roman law; the fundamental principles 
of calculus in India), without its being developed to the degree 
that it would have to be in capitalism. The encounter of these 
elements confirms in each one of them the outline of rationality 
which it bore. 178 
To speak ofthe 'advent' of'rationalization' is thus to reconstruct the 
process by which a number of discrete elements arose to form a 
synchronic system which, once created, continues to structure the 
interactions between its component parts until such time as it 
degenerates or is replaced by a new structure. 
Understood in this way, Weber's approach to history is fully 
commensurate with the argument of The Prose of the World. We 
need only note how Merleau-Ponty appealed in his discussion of 
Weber to two of the leading motifs of his earlier study: 
The meaning of a system in its beginning is like the pictorial 
meaning of a painting, which not so much directs the painter's 
movements but is the result of them and progresses with them. Or 
again, it can be compared to the meaning of a spoken language 
which is not transmitted in conceptual terms in the minds of those 
who speak, or in some ideal model of language, but which is 
rather the focal point of a series of verbal operations which 
converge almost by chance. Historical discourse comes to talk of 
'rationalization' or 'capitalism' when the affinity of these produc-
tions of the historical imagination becomes clear. But history 
does not work according to a model; it is, in fact, the advent of 
meaning.179 
Weber's account of capitalism thus traces how a synchronic system 
emerges, how a mode of signification which is composed of a 
number of initially discrete components comes to find an cquilib-
----------------
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rium which, for a greater or lesser period of time, is capable of 
maintaining a coherence in all its members. 
All of this was offered by Merleau-Ponty as a reading of Weber 
which, while forced to 'interpret freely', nevertheless claimed to 
refrain from 'imputing to Weber more than he would have wished to 
say'.180 Much of it flies in the face of interpretations which see 
Weber as requiring that social actions be understood in terms of the 
'subjective meaning' which they have for their authors. Merleau-
Ponty, in contrast, insists, 'It is not a question of coinciding with 
what has been lived but rather of deciphering the total meaning of 
what has been done.' The interpreter of a social action must restore 
'not only the perspective of the agent but also the "objective" 
content' .181 
But if Merleau-Ponty's reading is characteristically free, it is also 
remarkably attuned to Weber's actual achievement. It captures 
what is actually accomplished in The Protestant Ethic far more 
faithfully than those readings which remain content to summarise 
his methodological rules as outlined at the start of Economy and 
Society. 182 Weber's use of a text by Benjamin Franklin in which time 
is likened to money is not part of an effort to understand Franklin's 
intentions. Franklin's text provides Weber instead with an anticipa-
tion of a set of relations between temporality and economic activity 
which bridge the transformation from a Protestant to a capitalist 
ethos. In interpreting Franklin, Weber has discovered an 'objective 
meaning'; he has restored an 'anonymous intention, the dialectic of 
a whole'.183 This, then, is how Weber's 'ideal type' must be 
understood: 
They give only, as Weber says, a provisional illustration of the 
point of view chosen, and the historian chooses this point of view 
in the same way that one remembers a word of an author, or 
someone's gesture: in one's first encounter with it, one becomes 
aware of a certain style.184 
The ideal type is thus a first and one-sided attempt at grasping a 
symbolic matrix which will gradually be filled in more completely as 
subsequent perspectives are unfolded and explored. 
This does not mean that the experience of agents is to be totally 
ignored. We have already seen how Merleau-Ponty stressed, in his 
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discussion of Levi-Strauss's work, that the theorist's structures must 
-at some point or another- have a 'lived equivalent' .185 Likewise, 
the advent of a new meaning in history must not be totally unnoticed 
by those who live through its arrival. Merleau-Ponty notes that 
Weber found in Wesley's writings a realisation that religion, by 
producing 'both industry and frugality', could not help but also 
foster those riches whose increase always brings with it the decline 
of religion. Indeed, Wesley himself had concluded that 'although 
the form of religion remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away' .186 
The historian, like the linguist, grasps a symbolic system which both 
structures the actions of agents and, in turn, is structured by their 
actions. It is a system whose full complexity necessarily escapes 
those who make use of it. But its meaning could not have completely 
eluded them. 
While this reading of Weber enables us to see what Merleau-
Ponty seems to have thought an extension of Saussure's approach to 
the domain of history might have involved, it tells us nothing about 
how a Saussure-inspired philosophy of history could go about 
resolving the problems facing the account of history sketched in 
Humanism and Terror. Indeed, the vision of history which emerges 
from Merleau-Ponty's reconstruction of Weber is at loggerheads 
with the account of his earlier book. The double implication of sens 
- direction and meaning - which was so crucial in both the 
Phenomenology of Perception and Humanism and Terror is 
explicitly revoked in Merleau-Ponty's discussion of Weber. History 
for Weber 'does not have a direction [sens ]like a river' but it docs 
have 'a meaning [sens ]'which, even though incapable of teaching us 
what truth is, can nevertheless show us what 'errors to avoid' .187 The 
sens of history is not to be found in 'a pure development of the idea'; 
rather it must be sought 'in contact with contingency, at the moment 
when human initiative founds a system of life by taking up anew 
scattered givens' .188 History is not the voice of rcason.lt is, rather, 'a 
distracted interlocutor, it allows the debate to become sidetracked; 
it forgets the data of the problem along the way'. 189 It eliminates 
valid achievements as well as false solutions and thus purges itself of 
both sens and non-se11s. 190 
It is thus a most sceptical philosophy of history which Mcrlcau-
Ponty finds with his Saussurian reading of Weber. It is clearly a good 
deal less than he would have needed to redeem the analyses 
sketched in Huma11ism and Terror or to overcome the shortcomings 
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of Marx's conception of history noted in his inaugural lecture. But 
then we must remember that the discussion of Weber stands not at 
the close of The Proseofthe World, as the culmination of an analysis 
of expression, but rather at the start of Adventures of the Dialectic, 
as the point of departure for an examination of Marxism which 
concluded with a critique of the argument of Humanism and Terror. 
Having tried to fathom where The Prose of the World was supposed 
to have led Merleau-Ponty, we must now see where, in fact, his 
study of expression and history took him. 
Beyond Marx and Husserl: a new ontology 
The Prose of the World stopped short of its goal: an account of the 
subject which expression 'presupposes and shapes' and of the history 
which expression 'continues and re-creates' ! 91 It was thus unable to 
serve as a bridge between the analysis of the perceptual world in the 
Phenomenology of Perception and the philosophy of history whose 
contours had been sketched in Humanism and Terror. In the face of 
the failure of The Prose of the World, the simplest course of action 
Merleau-Ponty could have taken would have been to reformulate a 
philosophy of expression along lines other than those suggested by 
Saussure. If, for whatever reasons, a paradigmatic conception of 
expression was problematic, the project could always be rethought 
along the lines suggested by his earlier 'symbolic' conception of the 
sign. But this is precisely what Merleau-Ponty did not do. The lesson 
he took from The Prose of the World was not that Saussure's 
conception was somehow deficient. Rather, he came to feel that 
there were severe problems with the two positions he was attempt-
ing to tie together with it. After 1953, he turned, not to a 
reformulation of his philosophy of expression, but rather to a 
critique of his earlier writings on perception and history. In 
Adventures of the Dialectic he re-examined Marx's philosophy of 
history and came to the conclusion that it was no longer possible to 
adopt the 'wait and see' attitude towards communism which he had 
articulated in Humanism and Terror. In The Visible and the Invisible 
he took up again the analysis of the perceptual world and 
questioned whether his existentialised Husser! had done justice to 
it. 
b 
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Marxism and the inertia of history 
The very first sentence of Adventures of the Dialectic betrays the 
lacuna that The Prose of the World had failed to fill: 'We need a 
philosophy of both history and spirit to deal with the problems we 
touch upon here.'~92 Adventures of the Dialectic was an attempt at 
'speaking philosophically of politics' without the guidance a fully 
achieved account of expression and history would have provided. 
He candidly described it as a set of 'samplings, probings, philo-
sophical anecdotes, the beginnings of analyses'.193 
It is, all said, not the most elegantly crafted of books. The last half 
of it is taken up by a sprawling critique of Sartre, while the first half 
consists of a trio of closely related chapters on Weber, Lukacs, and 
Soviet Marxism and a somewhat more tangential chapter on 
Trotsky. But if the book is ungainly in form, it is impressive in its 
content. It consists of nothing less than the careful construction and 
ruthless dismantling of one of the strongest possible cases that can 
be made for the Marxian philosophy of history. 
He was aided in the process of construction by Georg Lukacs's 
classic 1923 book History and Class Consciousness. It is to Lukacs-
who, in addition to being one of the most important Marxian 
theorists of the twentieth century, was once a student of Max Weber 
- that Merleau-Ponty turned in search of a way beyond Weber's 
sceptical philosophy of history. By pursuing 'the relativization of 
relativism to its limits', Lukacs attempted to regain 'a sort of 
totality' and thus hoped to restore to history that telos which Weber 
had evicted.194 Merleau-Ponty's juxtaposition of Weber and Lukacs 
is an impressive achievement on two levels. First, considered simply 
as an account of Lukacs' book, Advenlllres of the Dialectic 
articulated the concerns that lay at the heart of History and Class 
Consciousness with a seriousness, a passion, and a clarity which has 
rarely been matched by subsequent interpreters.195 Second, the 
juxtaposition of Weber and Lukacs made manifest, in the most 
compelling possible way, the tension between the philosophy of 
history which had inspired Mcrleau-Ponty's works prior to The 
Prose of the World and the view of history which The Prose of the 
World seemed to imply. Merleau-Ponty had read History and Class 
Consciousness as early as 1946 and much in his discussion of 
Marxism during the late 1940s was indebted to Lukacs' work.196 
Hence, if Weber speaks for the implications of The Prose of the 
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World, it is Lukacs who expresses the position that Merleau-Ponty 
now found himself forced to abandon -but not without giving it a 
few last words. 
Lukacs, he argued, found 'the road to follow' through his study of 
Weber. 197 For Weber, ideal types were partial, one-sided repre-
sentations of historical reality which of necessity are relative to our 
own time. Lukacs, however, argued that their very relativity bound 
them to the history they sought to capture; the advent of 'scientific 
history' is itself a part of the process of rationalisation which it 
claims to describe.198 Since our concepts inhere in the history they 
describe, history should not be thought of as an object separate 
from us; 'it is also our awakening as subjects'. 199 
We give a form to history according to our categories; but our 
categories, in contact with history, are themselves freed from 
partiality. The old problem of the relations between subject and 
object is transformed, and relativism is surpassed as soon as one 
puts it in historical terms, since here the object is the vestige left 
by other subjects, and the subject - historical understanding -
held in the fabric of history, is by this very fact capable of 
self-criticism.200 
Weber had not been able to recognise these implications of his work 
because he remained committed to 'the idea of a truth without 
condition and without point of view' .201 Lukacs, however, went 
further, and relativised Weber's relativism by conceiving of history 
as 'that movement in which knowledge looks back on its origins, 
recaptures its own genesis, equals as knowledge what it was as 
event, gathers itself together, and tends towards self-
consciousness' .202 
Writing a history of the development of capitalism would thus 
involve a providing of an account of the 'Vergesellschaftung der 
Gesellschaft'- 'the becoming social of society':203 
To say that there is a 'becoming social of society' is to say that men 
begin to exist for one another, that the social whole retraces its 
dispersion in order to totalize itself, that it goes beyond various 
partitions and taboos, toward transparency, that it arranges itself 
as a center or an interior from which it is possible to think it, that it 
gathers itself around an anonymous project in relation to which 
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various attempts, errors, progress, and a history would be 
possible, and, finally, that brute existence is transformed into 
truth and tends toward meaning [signification].204 
There is a 'complicity' between the consciousness of the historian 
and the 'structuration realized by history' which 'allows conscious-
ness to become knowledge of the social'.205 There is a sens to 
history, then, not because of 'an irresistible orientation toward 
certain ends' but rather because 'there is no event which does not 
bring further precision to the permanent problem of knowing what 
man and his society are' .206 History is the story of the 'emergence of 
a subjectivity'; in it one sees the genesis of a subject which can look 
backward and comprehend its own advent.207 Lukacs thus pointed 
the way towards a 'philosophical reading of history' which finds 
'behind the prose of everyday existence, a recovery of the self by 
itself which is the very definition of subjectivity' .208 
The 'ballast' or 'counterpart' of this interpretation of history lies 
with a 'historical fact': the proletariat.209 A commodity which comes 
to understand the way it had been forced to become a commodity, 
an object of history which can become aware of the forces which 
have reduced it to the status of a thing, the proletariat brings to full 
consciousness that 'becoming social of society' which is the ultimate 
meaning of capitalism. The proletariat is the identity of subject and 
object which philosophy had postulated as the criterion of truth; it is 
the Archimedian point on which the philosophy of history must 
rcst. 210 But the peculiar character of the proletarian consciousness 
must be emphasised. It is neither 'a state of mind, nor is it 
knowledge'. It is instead 'a praxis': 
It is less than a subject and more than an object; it is a polarized 
existence, a possibility which appears in the proletariat's situation 
at the juncture of things and this lifc.211 
For this reason Marxism is not simply 'a materialist transposition of 
Hegel'; the concept of 'praxis' forces a rethinking of the way in 
which meaning can appear in history: 
For a philosophy of praxis, knowledge itself is not the intellectual 
possession of a signification, of a mental object; and the 
proletarians arc able to carry the meaning of history, even though 
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this meaning is not in the form of an 'I think' ... The profound 
philosophical meaning of the notion of praxis is to place us in an 
order which is not that of knowledge but rather of communica-
tion, exchange, and association.212 
For this reason, the theory of the party 'is not a corollary of Marxism 
-it is its very center' .213 The party is the locus where 'the meaning 
which is understands itself'. Here the intepretation of the theorist 
and the experience of the proletarian are played off against one 
another in a process of 'indefinite verification' which gives rise to a 
notion of truth far different from that correspondence of idea and 
external ideatum which is the hallmark of the natural sciences. In 
this context truth is understood as 'non-falsity', 'the maximum 
guarantee against error that men may demand and get'. It is the 
knowledge that 'there is no disagreement between the theoretician 
and the proletarians' .214 
These, then, were the main arguments of Lukacs's 'lively and 
vigorous essay', a work which was immediately condemned by the 
Comintern as 'a revision and criticism of Marxism' and subse-
quently disowned by its author.215 History and Class Consciousness 
was denounced for its 'subjective idealism' and its 'ultra-leftism', 
positions which had become heretical once Lenin's Materialism and 
Empirico-Criticism had been made the canonical text on all 
philosophical issues facing the international communist movement. 
Merleau-Ponty had little respect for Lenin's book- it was a work, he 
wrote, which annulled 'all that has been said about knowledge since 
Epicurus' 216 - but he did not regard the rejection of History and 
Class Consciousness as simply the triumph of mechanistic dogma 
over dialectical truth. He maintained, rather, that the Party's 
recourse to Lenin's naturalism and Lukacs's subsequent retreat 
from his own arguments testified to 'an internal difficulty of Marxist 
thought' .217 Lukacs's reading of Marx recaptured a vision of the 
relation between philosophy and praxis that Marx had expressed in 
his own writings prior to 1850. But after 1850 (and, indeed, as early 
as the German Ideology) Marx had begun to speak of 'destroying 
philosophy rather than realizing it'.218 'Scientific' socialism became 
the new ideal 'and what is given to science is taken from 
philosophy' .219 While Marx would continue to affirm his debts to 
Hegel, Merleau-Ponty stressed that something crucial had changed 
in Marx's stance towards the dialectic. 
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What he looks for in Hegel is no longer dialectical inspiration; 
rather it is rationalism, to be used for the benefit of 'matter' and 
'relations of production', which are considered as an order in 
themselves, an external and completely positive power. It is no 
longer a question of saving Hegel from abstraction, of recreating 
the dialectic by entrusting it to the very movement of its content, 
without any idealistic postulate; it is rather a question of annexing 
Hegel's logic to the economy.220 
The conflict between 'western' Marxism and Marxism-Leninism 
was thus already prefigured in Marx himself. The 'circuit which 
always brings the dialectic back to naturalism' cannot be written off 
to the 'errors of epigones'. It has its truth; it 'testifies to an obstacle 
that Marxist thought tried, for better or worse, to get around' .221 
Drawing on Karl Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy - a work 
which appeared in the same year as History and Class Conscious-
ness and was condemned at the same meeting of the Comintern222 -
Merleau-Ponty argued that the 'dialectical' and 'philosophical' 
Marxism of the young Marx and History and Class Consciousness 
were 'suited to soaring periods, when revolution appears close at 
hand'. The orthodox and scientistic Marxism of Lenin's Materialism 
and Empirico-Criticism and the old Marx, in contrast, predominates 
during those 'stagnant periods' when the meaning alleged to be 
inherent in history vanishes under the press of contemporary events 
and 'the weight of infrastructures makes itself felt' .223 The vision of 
history articulated by the young Lukacs and the young Marx was out 
of step with such times: 
The Marxism of the young Marx as well as the 'Western' Marxism 
of 1923 lacked a means of expressing the inertia of the 
infrastructures, the resistance of economic and even natural 
conditions, and the swallowing-up of 'relations between persons' 
in 'things'. History as they described it lacked density and allowed 
its meaning to appear too quickly. They had to learn the slowness 
of mediations.224 
Unable to do justice to this inertia, dialectics bowed before 
naturalism, Lukacs accepted the judgement of the Comintern, and 
the young Marx made way for the old.225 
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The explanation Merleau-Ponty gives as to why the young Marx 
and the young Lukacs were unable to come to terms with the density 
of history has a familiar ring to it: 
In order to understand the logic and shifts of history, its meaning 
[sens] and what, within it, resists meaning, they still had to 
conceptualize the sphere proper to history, the institution, which 
develops neither according to causal laws, like a second nature, 
but always in dependence on that which it signifies, nor according 
to eternal ideas, but rather by bringing more or less under its laws 
events which, as far as it is concerned, are fortuitous and by letting 
itself be changed by their suggestions ... This order of 'things' 
which teaches 'relationships between persons', sensitive to all the 
heavy conditions which bind it to the order of nature, open to all 
that personal life can invent is, in modern language, the sphere of 
symbolism, and Marx's thought was to find its culmination 
here.226 
What Merleau-Ponty found lacking in Marx in Adventures of the 
Dialectic was what he had turned to Saussure to find in his inaugural 
lecture: an adequate account of the 'inter-human meaning of 
events'. In 1952 he had emphasised the inadequacy of naturalism in 
the face of Marx's conception of praxis. In 1955 he argued that the 
surrender of Marxism to naturalism was part and parcel of the way 
Marx had understood thesens of history. Neither a mechanical nor a 
dialectical Marxism could understand that history is both move-
ment and stagnation, both progress and regress, both sens and 
non-sens. 227 
What was ultimately at stake was the coherence of the notion of 
revolution. Lukacs had envisioned, in the revolutionary party, a 
unity of subject and object, individual and history, past and future, 
and discipline and judgement.228 But could such a 'sublime point' be 
preserved once it enters into history as a regime? 
Marx was able to have and to transmit the illusion of a negation 
realized in history and in its 'matter' only by making the 
non-capitalist future an absolute Other. But we who have 
witnessed a Marxist revolution well know that revolutionary 
society has its weight, its positivity, and that it is therefore not the 
absolute Other.229 
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Everything in history, Merleau-Ponty concluded, is 'at the same 
time movement and inertia'. Marx had denied that this was 'the very 
structure of history' by assigning the principle of movement to one 
class- the proletariat- and the principle of inertia to the other- the 
bourgeoisie.230 But this was to ignore the density of history and to 
dream the political equivalent of the 'spectre of pure language': a 
politics unencumbered by the ambivalences which plague institu-
tions: 
It is no accident that all known revolutions have degenerated: it is 
because as established regimes they can never be what they were 
as movements; precisely because it succeeded and ended up as an 
institution, the historical movement is no longer itself: it 'betrays' 
and 'disfigures' itself in accomplishing itself. Revolutions are true 
as movements and false as regimes.231 
Had Marxism learned to conceptualise the field of history properly, 
it would have had to abandon the dream of a revolution which, once 
and for all, exorcises the ghosts of the past, lifts the weight of dead 
generations from the brain of the living, and brings an end to the 
long reign of human 'pre-history'.232 It would have placed much 
more modest hopes in regimes which sought only to change history, 
not to remake it from top to bottom. It would have learned as well 
that a rather different critique of capitalism was needed, a critique 
which 
does not believe that capitalist institutions are the only mechan-
isms of exploitation, but ... also does not judge them to be 
any more natural or sacred than the polished stone hatchet or the 
bicycle. Like our language, our tools, our customs, our clothes, 
they are instruments, invented for a definite purpose, which 
found themselves little by little burdened with an entirely 
different function. A complete analysis of this change in 
meaning has to be made, going beyond the famous analysis of 
surplus value, and a program of action established consequent 
upon it.233 
But having learned all this, Marxism would cease to be Marxist- it 
would have become instead Max Weber's 'tragic liberalism' .234 
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Phenomenology and the opacity of the cogito 
The critique of Marxism carried out in Adventllres of the Dialectic 
was followed by a critique of phenomenology itself. Beginning with 
his 1954-5 course 'The Problem of Passivity', continuing through 
two courses on the concept of nature, and culminating in his 
1959-60 course 'Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology', 
Merleau-Ponty questioned the degree to which phenomenology 
could do justice to those phenomena which resist being treated as 
the products of a constitutive subjectivity. As he wrote in his 1959 
essay on Husser!! 
the ultimate task of phenomenology as philosophy of conscious-
ness is to understand its relationship to non-phenomenology. 
What resists phenomenology within us ... cannot remain outside 
phenomenology and should have its place within it. The 
philosopher must bear his shadow, which is not simply the factual 
absence of future light.235 
He had suggested as early as 1951 that the problem of language 
presented one of the more provocative starting-points for 'inter-
rogating phenomenology and recommencing Husserl's efforts 
instead of simply repeating what he said' .236 But the path these 
inquiries took in The Visible and the Invisible led beyond 
phenomenology altogether. With respect to Husserl as with respect 
to Marx, the point of departure for his increasingly heretical 
reflections was the failure of The Prose of the World to provide the 
promised account of 'the nature of the relationships between the 
power of expression and the thinker whom it presupposes and 
shapes, as well as the history which it continues and recreates'. 237 
Even though The Prose of tire World lacked the promised chapter 
on the expressive subject, the relation between perception, lan-
guage, ar.d thought had been broached at a number of places in the 
book. One of the more notable was a passage, taken over into the 
essay 'Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence', where 
Merleau-Ponty reflected on the relationship between the 'advent' 
of painting as a collective practice and the individual 'events' which 
are circumscribed within this 'histoire avenementielle': 
Advent is the promise of events. The domination of the many by 
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the one in the history of painting, like that domination which we 
have encountered in the use of the perceiving body, does not 
consummate succession in an eternity. On the contrary it insists 
upon succession; it needs it at the same time that it establishes its 
signification. And there is not simply a question of an analogy 
between the two problems; it is the expressive operation of the 
body, begun by the smallest perception, which is amplified into 
painting and art.238 
The subordination of individual events to an advent can be likened 
to the subordination of various individual movements and gestures 
to the more general 'motor project' or 'intentional arc' which carries 
the body into the world. And- as Merleau-Ponty argued with fewer 
reservations in 'Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence' than in 
The Prose of the World 239 - the subordination of event under advent 
in history is not simply analogous to the subordination of the many 
under the one in the Phenomenology of Perception: 'the quasi-
eternity of art is of a piece with the quasi-eternity of incarnate 
existence'. In our use of our own body 'we have the means of 
understanding our cultural gesticulation insofar as it involves us in 
history' .240 Any use of the body, including the act of perception, 'is 
already primordial expression' and, conversely, all acts of expres-
sion have as their substratum 'not a pure "I" ... but rather an "I" 
endowed with a body' .241 
The way he posed this chiasm of perception and expression was 
dependent in crucial ways on the discussion of the tacit cog ito in the 
Phenomenology of Perception. There, it will be recalled, it was 
argued that Descartes's cogito - an expressive act of crucial 
importance for the advent of a certain style of philosophising - is 
incomprehensible in the absence of the tacit cogito which it 
presumes: 
The cogito at which we arrive by reading Descartes ... is, then; a 
spoken cogito, put into words and understood in words, and for 
this reason not attaining its objective, since that part of our 
existence which is engaged in fixing our life in conceptual forms, 
and thinking of it as indubitable, is escaping focus and thought. 
Shall we therefore conclude that language envelops us, and that 
we arc led by it ... ? This would be to forget half the truth ... I 
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should be unable even to read Descartes' book, were I not, before 
any speech to begin, in contact with my own life and thought, and 
if the spoken cogito did not encounter within me a tacit cogito. 
This silent cogito was the one Descartes sought when writing his 
Meditations. 242 
Descartes's book, like any successful act of expression, possesses a 
generality which allows it to be understood by others. But, 
Merleau-Ponty insists, this generality 'is not that of the idea, but 
that of a behavioural style "understood" by my body in so far as the 
latter is a behaviour-producing power, in this case a phoneme-
producing one' .243 This generality of the body, then, allows me to 
'catch on' to the expressive acts of others, just as our original, mute 
contact with the world ultimately grounds all language. 
This is why consciousness is never subordinated to any empirical 
language, why languages can be translated and learned, and 
finally, why language is not an attribute of external origin, in the 
sociologist's sense. Behind the spoken cogito, the one which is 
converted into discourse and into essential truth, there lies a tacit 
cogito, myself experienced by myself.244 
All texts thus have a 'pretext'; the activities ofthe expressive subject 
are dependent on the originary activities of the perceptual sub-
ject.2•s 
As we know from our discussion of Merleau-Ponty's treatment of 
the problem of others, by the end of the 1950s he had come to 
regard the tacit cogito as 'impossible'. Such a notion, he argued, 
only serves to perpetuate the 'mythology of a self-consciousness to 
which the word "consciousness" would refer' .246 The tacit cogito, no 
less than the spoken cog ito, was a creature of language. Descartes's 
naivete in failing to see that the spoken cog ito rested on a tacit cog ito 
had only been seconded by the 'naivete ... of a silent cogito that 
would deem itself to be an adequation with the silent consciousness, 
whereas its very description of silence rests entirely on the virtues of 
language' .247 He did not deny that there was a domain of 'non-
linguistic significations'. He did reject the idea that one could treat 
this domain as if it were composed of positive entities which could 
be catalogued and named without radically changing their charac-
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ter.248 'One cannot make a direct ontology'; the only path open was 
an 'indirect' path and the only philosophy possible was a 'negative' 
one.249 
One of his reasons for questioning the coherence of the notion of 
the tacit cog ito speaks directly to our interests here: the inability of 
the tacit cog ito to generate a convincing account of the passage from 
perception to expression. A note from February 1959 entitled 
'Tacit Cogito and Speaking Subject' went to the heart of the 
problem. Arguing that the chapter on the cogito in the 
Phenomenology of Perception 'is not connected with the chapter on 
speech', Mcrlcau-Ponty stressed that the book could offer no 
insight into 'the problem of the passage from the perceptual 
meaning to the language meaning, from behaviour to thematiza-
tion'. It was not enough to invoke a tacit cogito. Rather one had to 
construct 'a theory of the savage mind, which is the mind of praxis'. 
The task of such a theory would be to grasp 'what, across the 
successive and simultaneous community of speaking subjects, 
wishes, speaks, and finally thinks' .250 
It is this question which dominates the discussion of expression in 
The Visible and the Invisible. A working note from September 1959 
entitled 'Perceiving Subject, Speaking Subject, Thinking Subject' 
sketched what it meant to understand the speaking subject as 'the 
subject of praxis': 
It does not hold before itself the words said and understood as 
objects of thought or ideates ... It is a certain lack of ... such or 
such a signifier, which docs not construct the Bild [image] of 
what it lacks. There is therefore here a nco-teleology, which no 
more permits being supported by a consciousness of . .. nor by an 
ec-stasy, a constructive project, than docs the perceptual telcol-
ogy.2sl 
The perceiving subject must likewise be seen as 'a tacit, silent 
Being-at I Etre-a] which returns from the thing itself blindly 
identified, which is only a separation lecart) with respect to it'; 
perception must be understood as 'imperception, evidence in 
non-possession: it is precisely because one knows too well what one 
is dealing with that one has no need to posit it as an object' .252 The 
perceptual and the expressive subject arc conceived in similar 
terms, but the organising metaphors arc now taken from Saussurc's 
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linguistics, not from the vocabulary associated with the pre-
reflective cogito. Saussure's approach to language can thus be 
generalised beyond its original domain. It 'confirms and rediscovers 
the idea of perception as divergence [ecart] by relation to a level' .253 
With perception and expression now conceived in a fashion that 
dispenses with the tacit cogito, the relationship between them can 
be approached in a different way. In The Visible and the Invisible, 
Merleau-Ponty no longer speaks of expression as the 'sublimation 
of perception'. Rather, it is 'a sublimation of the flesh'.254 
It is as though the visibility that animates the sensible world were 
to emigrate, not outside of every body, but into another less 
heavy, more transparent body, as though it were to change flesh, 
abandoning the flesh of the body for that of language, and 
thereby would be emancipated but not freed from every condi-
tion.255 
The tacit cogito had been the last refuge for a view of subjectivity 
which still conceived of the relationship between subject and world 
as that of interior to exterior, and accordingly subordinated 
language to a private, pre-linguistic contact with the world. With the 
'defenestration of the cogito' and with the opposition of subject and 
object now suspended in the chiasm of the sensing and the sensible, 
meaning is no longer to be seen as adhering to words 'like the butter 
on the bread, like a second layer of "psychic reality" spread over the 
sound' .256 Meaning is, rather, 'the integral of all the differentiations 
of the verbal chain, it is given with the words for those who have cars 
to hear': 257 
When the silent vision falls into speech, and when the speech in 
turn, opening up a field of the nameable and the sayable, inscribes 
itself in that field, in its place, according to its truth - in short, 
when it metamorphoses the structures of the visible world and 
makes itself a gaze of the mind, intuitus mentis- this is always in 
virtue of the same fundamental phenomenon of reversibility 
which sustains both the mute perception and the speech and 
which manifests itself by an almost carnal existence of the idea, as 
well as by a sublimation of the flcsh. 258 
Language translates no silent pretext; 'language is not a mask over 
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Being'. Both vision and thought, Merleau-Ponty insisted (with 
debts to Jacques Lacan's famous description of the unconscious), 
are 'structured like a language' .259 
The categories of Saussure's linguistics thus moved beyond the 
confines of a philosophy of expression to replace the now-evicted 
categories of the 'philosophy of consciousness'. To appreciate the 
extent of the rethinking Saussure had provoked, we need only recall 
the proposals for alterations in the terminology employed by 
philosophers which we quoted once before in our introduction: 
Replace the notions of concept, idea, representation with the 
notions of dimensions, articulation, level, hinges, pivots, config-
uration -- The point of departure = the critique of the usual 
conception of the thing and its properties -+ critique of the logical 
notion of the subject, and of logical inherence --+ critique of the 
positive signification (differences between significations), signifi-
cation as a separation [ecart], theory of predication- founded on 
this diacritical conception.260 
He turned to Saussure in hopes of finding the basis for a new 
philosophy of history. What he wound up taking from Saussure was 
a new ontology. But, could phenomenology accept this ontology 
and still remain even remotely related to Husserl's project? It is to 
this question which we must turn in our conclusion. 
5 
Conclusion: Between 
Phenomenology and 
Structuralism 
What, then, are we to make of Merleau-Ponty's reflections on the 
relation between philosophy and the human sciences, the problem 
of our knowledge of others, and the implications of the phenomena 
of speech and expression for the philosophy of history? In wrestling 
with these and kindred problems, was he deepening Husserl's 
analyses and applying an existential phenomenology to certain of 
crucial dimensions of social life? Or was he staking out a position 
beyond phenomenology, a position whose full implications would 
become clearer only in the decade after his death? We have seen 
how he became uncomfortable with such notions as 'lived experi-
ence', 'constitution', 'intentionality', and the 'tacit cogito'. Yet we 
have also seen that his reading of Saussure, his use of Lacan, and his 
response to Levi-Strauss betray a continued commitment to certain 
fundamental concerns of the phenomenological project. Where, 
then, are we to place this most elusive of thinkers? 
Merleau-Ponty at the limits of phenomenology 
In the last years of Merleau-Ponty's life, a group of new terms comes 
to the forefront of his writings. The relationship of these terms to 
the orthodox categories of Husserlian phenomenology is at best 
ambivalent. Notions like 'chiasm', 'flesh', 'ecart', and 'reversibility' 
are often introduced and illustrated in the company of certain 
characteristically Husserlian quandaries: for example, the analysis 
of the touched hand or the discussion of the way in which the 'other 
side' of the other's body is 'appresented'! Yet, the account which is 
given of these Husscrlian problems is an account which has been 
carefully purged of a number of the most basic terms in the 
phenomenological lexicon. In the working notes for The Visible and 
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the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty argued that his philosophy must 
proceed without recourse to such notions as 'Erlebnis' ,2 'concept, 
idea, mind, and representation' ,3 'consciousness and projections' ,4 
'subject',5 'intentional act and noema'.6 These concepts, so crucial 
for the articulation of Husserl's phenomenology, are dismissed by 
Merleau-Ponty as 'the bric-a-brac of positive psychic so-called 
"realities" ... abstractly carved out from the ontological tissue, 
from "the body of the mind" '.7 In 1946 Jean Beaufret had asked 
whether phenomenology, when 'fully developed', might not require 
'the abandonment of subjectivity and the vocabulary of subjective 
idealism'.8 In 1959, it was clear that Merleau-Ponty was in the 
process of dispensing with much of the terminology which had 
struck Beaufret as not 'sufficiently radical'. But it is not clear 
whether Merleau-Ponty saw what he was doing as a contribution to 
the continued 'development' of phenomenology. 
The discussion of phenomenology in the text of The Visible and 
the Invisible is a good deal more critical than in any of Merleau-
Ponty's previous analysis. It is now characterised as a philosophy 
of the 'pure gaze' .9 It is chastised for transforming the world into 
'ideates,cogitata, or noemata subsisting before the pure subject'.10 It 
is accused of perpetuating the dichotomies of subject and object and 
of fact and essence.11 His 1959 essay, 'The Philosopher and his 
Shadow', appears, in retrospect, to have been a last attempt, from 
within the camp, to 'push' Husser! away from subjective idealism. 
After 1959, he was no longer interested in moving phenomenology 
from within; he was now taking a measure of its failings from the 
outside. 
Much of what he had to say against phenomenology originated 
from a dissatisfaction with the concept of intentionality. A note 
from April 1960 began by discussing the extent to which the 
Freudian idea of the unconscious challenged the conventional 
Husscrlian understanding of time as a 'series of Erlebnisse' and 
culminated in a sweeping critique of Husserl's entire philosophy: 
The whole Husserlian analysis is blocked by the framework of 
acts which imposes upon it the philosophy of consciousness. It is 
necessary to take up again and develop the fimgierende or latent 
intentionality which is the intentionality within being. That is not 
compatible with 'phenomenology'. that is, with an ontology that 
obliges whatever is not nothing to present itself to consciousness 
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acrossAbschattung and as deriving from an originating donation 
which is an act, i.e. one Erlebnis among others.12 
Husserl's analyses made the world into the sum total of the 
perspectival experiences that consciousness has of it. The world 
attained unity and coherence only through the synthesising acts of 
this consciousness. By dissociating the notion of intentionality from 
consciousness and speaking of an 'intentionality within being', 
Merleau-Ponty was seeking to wrest the account of the life-world 
free from the account of transcendental subjectivity. The analysis of 
the life-world does not lead Merleau-Ponty back to the 'subjective 
operations' which Husser) saw as the ultimate foundation of this 
world. 13 Rather, the analysis of the life-world proceeds with no 
recourse to 'consciousness' whatsoever. What was fundamental for 
Merleau-Ponty was 'flesh' and the 'chiasm', not 'consciousness 
facing a noema'.14 
The concept of intentionality had long been a point of tension in 
Merleau-Ponty's relationship with phenomenology. Throughout 
the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty paid homage to 
the notion while nevertheless continuing to stress the independence 
and self-sufficiency of the life-world.15 He looked 'beneath inten-
tionality related to acts or thetic intentionality' for 'another kind 
which is the condition of the former's possibility' .16 In the 
Phenomenology of Perception (unlike The Visible and the Invisible) 
this 'operative intentionality' was alleged to be a fundamental 
attribute of 'consciousness', although this consciousness was 
described as an 'incarnate' rather than a 'transcendental' con-
sciousness. Yet, in crucial ways, this incarnate consciousness 
behaved no differently than a transcendental consciousness. As 
Gary Brent Madison has aptly observed, 'The substitution of a 
philosophy of experience for a philosophy of consciousness changes 
nothing in regard to the basic structure of this philosophy.' 
Operating with 'all the presuppositions of a philosophy of con-
sciousness', the Phenomenology of Perception represents- at best-
a 'palace revolution, a revolution within idealism' P 
Nowhere do the tensions inherent in Merleau-Ponty's dual 
commitment to the intentionality of consciousness and the auton-
omy of the world manifest themselves more forcefully than in his 
constant recourse to the rhetorical form of the chiasmus whenever 
he needs to reconcile the conflicting claims of consciousness and 
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world in the Phenomenology of Perception. Reading the book, one 
is constantly confronted with such passages as: 
There is a world for me because I am not unaware of myself; and I 
am not concealed from myself because I have a world!8 
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject who 
is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is 
inseparable from the world, but from a world which it projects 
itself.19 
We choose the world and the world chooses us.20 
It is as if Merleau-Ponty is torn between two positions and is unable 
to decide on the one or the other. Whenever he strays too far in the 
direction of idealism and asserts that subjects are conscious of the 
world by being self-conscious, or that the world is dependent on the 
subject, or that subjects choose their world, he must immediately 
restore an equilibrium by assuring the reader that subjects are 
self-conscious only by being conscious of the world, that subjects 
are dependent on the world, and that the world somehow 'chooses' 
the subject. 
His subsequent attempt at curbing some of the idealistic over-
tones of Husserl's phenomenology by speaking of an 'instituting' 
rather than a 'constituting' subject is no more successful. As we 
have seen, before his summary of his course on 'Institution in 
Personal and Public History' is over he has managed to reproduce 
the tensions of the Phenomenology of Perception within the new 
vocabulary. He now speaks of the subject as both 'instituted' and 
'instituting' .21 
All of the problems posed in the Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty reflected in a note from July 1959, 'are insoluble 
because I start there from the "consciousness"-"object" distinc-
tion' .22 It was this starting-point that condemned the Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception to playing out that unhappy dialectic which had 
been the fate of Western philosophy since Descartes: 
Philosophy elects certain beings- 'sensations', 'representations', 
'thought', 'consciousness', or even a deceiving being- in order to 
separate itself from all being. Precisely in order to accomplish its 
will for radicalism, it would have to take as its theme the umbilical 
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bond that binds it always to Being, the inalienable horizon with 
which it is already and henceforth circumvented, the primary 
initiation which it tries in vain to go back on.23 
The vacillations in the Phenomenology of Perception testified to the 
inability of a philosophy which had broken the bond of 'perceptual 
faith' with the overly abstract categories of the philosophy of 
consciousness, ever to return to that 'umbilical bond' with being 
which Merleau-Ponty came to see as the authentic concern of 
onto)ogy. No less than the 'reflective' philosophies criticised in the 
first chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, the analyses of the 
Phenomenology of Perception were marked by the 'original stain' of 
trying to 'coincide with a constitutive principle already at work in 
the spectacle of the world', but- as 'reflection, re-turn, re-conquest, 
or re-covery'- always arriving post festum. 24 
The Phenomenology of Perception, seeking to reconcile subject 
and world, wound up weaving them both into a chiasmus. It began 
from a divergence between subject and object which it could never 
overcome, however strenuously Merleau-Ponty might seek to 
uncover a 'pre-reflective' world where all of the entities fathered by 
reflection were alleged to be at one with each other. With an 
uncompromising radicalism The Visible and the Invisible dispensed 
with all the positive entities of the Phenomenology of Perception 
and tried to begin thinking again from the starting-point of the 
chiasm and the ecart. It attempts to dispense with the inherited 
notions of 'selves', 'others', and 'things' and instead tries to focus on 
the reversibility which ties together as obverse and reverse the self 
and things and the self and others. If the insecure arguments of the 
Phenomenology of Perception remind us of the famous Gestalt 
drawing which can be seen either as a rabbit or a duck - from one 
perspective the book seems to be a concerted attempt to dismantle 
the categories of transcendental philosophy; from another, it is an 
attempt at reconstructing transcendental philosophy on the basis of 
the incarnate consciousness - The Visible and the Invisible has a 
focus of a most peculiar and challenging sort. It enjoins us to look 
neither at the duck, nor the rabbit, nor the oscillating series 
duck-rabbit-duck-rabbit-duck-rabbit ... Rather, we must learn to 
look at the pattern of lines which cleave space in such a way as to 
make a hinge around which ducks and rabbits may pivot. 
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Some equivocations on the threshold of structuralism 
If, by 1959, phenomenology had become problematic for 
Merleau-Ponty, what can be said about his stance towards structur-
alism? If he was no longer unequivocally a 'phenomenologist' could 
he be said, in some sense of the term, to have been a 'structuralist' 
before the fact? 
The question admits of no simple answer. To begin to give an 
adequate response it would be necessary to find some way of 
characterising the minimal commitments which define that remark-
ably heteroclite movement which has been known, for better or 
worse, as structuralism.25 But, as Eugenio Donato has noted, 
'structuralism', like 'existentialism' before it, possessed such coher-
ence only at the outset: 
Initially the term is used against the established ideologies of the 
day to mark the presence of something new or different in the 
works of a certain number of thinkers; the new element being 
attributed to a new method of analysis ... Then as the opposition 
diminishes or disappears and the new term becomes the new 
ideology, the need to insist on the methodological pretexts which 
at first seemed so important diminishes and as individual thinkers 
continue with their distinctive concerns and preoccupations, the 
differences between them became more and more marked. In the 
same way that by, say, 1960 it was impossible to speak of Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty in the same breath, it has nowadays become, 
except in the most trivial and superficial way, impossible to put 
under the same heading, say, Foucault, Lacan, and LCvi-
Strauss.26 
To the extent that 'structuralism' can be talked about as a coherent 
movement at all, the only way to proceed may be to try to 
understand what it was that various alleged 'structuralists' were at 
one in rejecting. What Levi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Jacques 
Lacan, and Michel Foucault (to name only the usual suspects who 
arc rounded up whenever it is necessary to talk about 'structural-
ism') share is less a common commitment to a set of methodological 
principles than a common set of antipathies. They all, in one way or 
another, have rejected the cogito as the starting-point for their 
inquiries, they all view the quest for an ultimate foundation or origin 
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which can 'ground' inquiries with considerable suspicion, and they 
have all rebelled against the priority given to 'History' in the 
Hegelianised Marxism articulated by Merleau-Ponty in the late 
1940s and taken up again by Jean-Paul Sartre in his Critique of 
Dialectical Reason (1960). Thus, instead of asking 'Was Merleau-
Ponty a structuralist?', we might do better to see to what degree he 
shared the same antipathies as those thinkers who have typically 
been associated with 'structuralism' .27 
As we have seen, there is much in Merleau-Ponty's critique of 
Marx and Husser! that bears a resemblance to what came to pass in 
French thought in the decade after his death. His 'defenestration of 
the cogito' culminated in an attempt to elaborate an ontology which 
dispensed with the conventional categories of the 'philosophy of 
consciousness' and instead sought to develop a new conceptual 
apparatus which rested on concepts such as 'flesh', 'chiasm', 'ecart' 
and 'reversibility'. Further, the foundation on which this ontology 
rested was less a primordial'ground' than a 'spread' or 'divergence'; 
what was fundamental for Merleau-Ponty was not a common origin 
but rather a network of divergences and differences. Finally, his 
critique of Marx's vision of a universal history moving towards one 
goal gave rise to an alternative vision of history as a series of 
multiple, local histories, each defined by their own peculiar 
symbolic matrix. 
We would, however, be doing Merleau-Ponty a considerable 
disservice if we were to present him merely as anticipating certain 
positions which were subsequently elaborated, with fewer hesita-
tions, by Levi-Strauss, Lacan, Barthes, or Foucault. As we have 
seen, there were dimensions of his work which, even in the last years 
of his life, continued to draw upon his earlier concerns and thus set 
him in opposition to many of the positions that came to the fore 
after his death. However much he embraced Saussure's linguistics, 
his Saus:;ure remained a very different creature from the thinker to 
whom Levi-Strauss, Lacan, Barthes, and- to a much lesser extent-
Foucault turned for inspiration. 
Saussure's definition of the linguistic sign, as Emile Benveniste 
pointed out in his classic 1939 article, tended to confuse the 
'signified' and the 'object signified'. Saussure could claim that the 
relation between signifier and signified was arbitrary, Benveniste 
argued, only 'by an unconscious and surreptitious recourse to a 
third term which was not included in the initial definition ... the 
I, 
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thing itself, reality' .28 The ox 'in its concrete and "substantial" 
particularity' is indeed connected in an arbitrary and unmotivated 
fashion with the signifiers 'bof' and 'oks', but Saussure claimed, at 
the outset, to have banished the living and breathing ox from 
consideration and to be dealing only with the relationship between 
the 'sound-images' 'Bof' and 'oks' and the 'concept' 'ox'. This 
relation between sound-image and concept is 'arbitrary', in Ben-
veniste's words, 'only under the impassive regard of Sirius or for the 
person who limits himself to observing from the outside the bond 
established between an objective reality and human behaviour and 
condemns himself thus to seeing nothing in it but contingency' .29 
It is indeed true that there is little of interest to be said about the 
relation between signifier and signified. But this is not because the 
relation is an arbitrary one. Rather it is because the relationship 
between sound and meaning is so necessary and unavoidable for 
speakers of a language that there is simply nothing that can be said 
about the language which does not begin by accepting this coupling 
of sound-image and concept, a coupling which- as Saussure put it in 
one of his happier analogies- is as in dissociable as that between the 
recto and verso of a piece of paper.30 Saussure was also right in 
maintaining that the relation between the act of signification and 
the object which it signifies is mutable, contingent, and relative to 
differing temporal or geographical circumstances. But to explore 
what was involved in the act of signification he would have had to 
take up those problems of reference which the doctrine of the 
'arbitrary nature of the sign' prematurely foreclosed.31 
Such inquiries, as we have seen, stood at the centre of Merleau-
Ponty's account of expression, even in the period when he was most 
inspired by Saussure. The conceptual mayhem which he wreaked on 
Saussure's distinctions has its logic. The 'synchronic linguistics of 
parole' made little sense in terms of Sal!ssure's categories, but that 
may be more a criticism of Saussure than of Merleau-Ponty. What 
Merleau-Ponty was looking for in Saussure was a way of under-
standing how subjects polarise a set of instituted signs in ways that 
enable them to say something new. What he wanted to understand 
was the way in which a finite number of signs could be put to an 
infinite number of uses. What he wanted to show was how 
conventions could produce something unconventional. These are 
not unreasonable requests to make of an account of language and 
Merleau-Ponty's obsession with the practical dimension of speech is 
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ample testimony to his ability to sense what was lacking in 
Saussure 's account, even if he tried to convince himself that what he 
was inventing was in fact already there in Saussure himself. 
It is this concern with the problem of parole which makes 
Merleau-Ponty's work of such relevance to contemporary social 
theory. He was one of the few thinkers of his time to have tried to 
think seriously about both agency and structure. His account of the 
subject was never as oblivious of the degree to which institutions 
place limits on individual freedom as Sartre's was. From his very 
first writings he was articulating a more convincing account of the 
nature of human action than that unlimited Cartesian freedom that 
stood at the centre of Sartre's account. He was drawn to Saussure in 
hopes of finding a way of better understanding the opacity and 
thickness of the world of intersubjective meaning. He was well 
aware that the problem of agency could not be resolved simply by 
assuming that the Cartesian cogito, with suitable modifications, 
could be resurrected as that 'body-subject' which grounds our grasp 
of language and supports our interactions with others. A proper 
consideration of the implications of social action, of expression, and 
of history requires, he argued, a new ontology which breaks with the 
prejudices of the Cartesian account of subjectivity. 
The question of the unwritten chapter of The Prose of the World 
was only partially answered by The Visible and the Invisible. In the 
latter as in the former he was still trying to determine 'what, across 
the successive and simultaneous community of speaking subjects, 
wishes, speaks, and finally thinks' .32 His response that what is 
needed is an account of the 'savage spirit' or the 'subject of praxis' is 
less an answer than a rubric under which possible answers might be 
pursued. But the fact that he was asking the question is perhaps 
enough. He recognised that Saussure's linguistics, Lacan's 
psychoanalysis, and Levi-Strauss's ethnology spelled the end of the 
hoped-for rapprochement between the human sciences and a 
phenomenology which still conceived of itself as a philosophy of the 
cogito. But he did not conclude that it was possible for these 
approaches to neglect completely the problem of agency. What was 
needed, and what philosophy could conceivably contribute, was an 
understanding of the peculiar sort of subject which these disciplines 
seemed to presume -a subject which both shapes and is shaped by 
the structures it employs. 
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The party at Durkheim's breaks up 
The doctrine of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign inspires 
many of the arguments of those who sought to extend Saussure's 
approach to the human sciences in the decade after Merleau-
Ponty's death. If the relation of signifier to signified is indeed 
'arbitrary' and 'unmotivated', then it clearly escapes the intentions 
of the speaking subject. To understand the way signs are related to 
one another, it is necessary to turn away from the subject and 
consider instead the system which is alleged to govern their 
deployment. As Vincent Descombes has argued: 
Semiology displaces all issues towards the analysis of discourse 
and gives pride of place to the relationship of emitter to code ... 
The result is that the origin of meaning can no longer be located 
where the phenomenologists had thought to find it, in the author 
of discourse, the individual who believes he is expressing himself, 
but rather it lies in language itself ... Not man, but structures are 
decisive! Man is nothing! Such was the lesson that public opinion 
drew from the research of structural anthropology; or so we 
might think, to read the scandalised commentaries of the 
now-obsolete 'humanists' .33 
That 'philosophy without a subject' which had presumably been put 
to rest during the heyday of existentialism and phenomenology 
reappeared, draped now with the terminology of structurallinguis-
tics.34 
Hence Levi-Strauss could express a lack of interest in the 
meaning that the myths he analysed had for those who in fact told 
them, a lack of interest which was as complete as Durkheim's 
disdain for the non-social facts of individual psychology. As he 
stressed in the 'Overture' to The Raw and the Cooked: 
I ... claim to show not how men think in myths, but how myths 
operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact. And 
... it would perhaps be better to go further and, disregarding the 
thinking subject completely, proceeded as if the thinking process 
were taking place in the myths, in their reflection upon them-
selves, and their interrelation.35 
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In much the same way, Louis Althusser's reading of Marx argued 
that the true subject of historical materialism was not 'man' but 
rather 'relations of production'. 'Man' enters the theoretical 
universe of Capital only under a mask and only in the role of a 
'support' (Triiger) of relations of production.36 The very notion of 
'subject' is itself the product of an ideological discourse which, like 
Lacan's mirror, 'interpellates' the subject as a subject.37 And, 
mustering that sort of apocalyptic prose of which he was a master, 
Michel Foucault could conclude an 'archaeology' of the 'funda-
mental arrangements of knowledge' with the observation that, far 
from being an 'age-old concern', the category of 'man' is 'an 
invention of recent date' fated to be erased in time 'like a face drawn 
in the sand at the edge of the sea' .38 
Such stances may seem a bit excessive, but then patricide is not an 
affair for the faint-hearted. What mattered was to be rid of a 
philosophy which appeared to be only a continuation of Cartesian-
ism by other means. As Michel Foucault, the 'structuralist' who was 
most effective in dodging the label, observed: 
Everything that took place in the sixties arose from a dissatisfac-
tion with the phenomenological theory of the subject, and 
involved different escapades, subterfuges, breakthroughs, 
according to whether we use a negative or a positive term, in the 
direction of linguistics, psychoanalysis or Nietzsche.39 
By the mid-1960s the deed had been done, using whatever lay 
closest to hand. Against Sartre, against Husser!, and- at the bottom 
of it all - against pere Descartes, structure was privileged over the 
subject, the unconscious over the conscious, constraint over action. 
Effective as a way of throwing off a philosophical tradition which 
everywhere saw only consciousness, freedom, and creativity, it is 
less clear that such strategies have served to liberate social theory 
from its patriarchs. As Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron 
commented in 1967: 
All the social sciences now live in the house of Durkheimism, 
unbeknownst to them, as it were, because they walked into it 
backwards.40 
But once inside, they have had a chance to look around, realise 
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where they have wound up, and begin to inch towards the door 
again. 
French social thought since 1968 has been, among other things, 
the story of repeated attempts at mitigating the abstract formalism 
and rigid constraint which were the hallmarks of structuralism in its 
salad days.41 A kindred movement can be seen in Roland Barthes's 
shift from a 'semiotics of the message' to a 'semiotics of the 
interlocuter' .42 Neither tendency marks a return to a Cartesian or 
even a Sartrian subject, but both do address one of the more 
problematic aspects of the early structuralist project. Devoid of any 
reference to the subject which shapes and is shaped by the 
structures which the theorist analyses, accounts such as Levi-
Strauss's 'science of myths' run the risk of becoming, at worst, 
rather pointless exercises in pattern-picking and, at best, quite 
bizarre attempts to learn the rules of languages which appear to 
have no native speakers.43 Saussure's structural linguistics was able 
to elaborate a coherent and suggestive research programme 
because the object it studied - unlike the 'languages' of myth, 
ideology, fashion, or what have you- had a coherence independent 
of the constructs of the theorist. Languages are spoken by a 
linguistic community. Their parts belong together, and have been 
brought together as a result of the actions of subjects who have a 
practical understanding of what it means to make sense to one 
another and the requisite competencies to go on and speak the 
language in ways that, more often than not, do make sense to 
others.44 The reconstruction of these competencies and the analysis 
of this knowledge need not and cannot take the form of an effort at 
coinciding with the 'lived experience' of any particular subject. But 
neither can such inquiries be undertaken by an approach which 
assumes that language can somehow manage to speak itself. 
What has come to be called 'post-structuralism' (but not, 
perhaps, with sufficient embarrassment over how empty the term is) 
thus faces a problem which is the mirror image of the one which 
confronted Merleau-Ponty. He was faced with the task of taming an 
excessively subjectivist theory with a knowledge of the opacity and 
density of the world of structures. Contemporary social theorists are 
faced with the task of overcoming an excessively objectivist 
understanding of structures with the knowledge that structures do 
not simply constrain agents, they also allow agents to act in ways 
which frequently lead to the transformation of the structures 
•m-= 
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themselves. It would not be surprising if, sneaking out of Dur-
kheim's house in the dead of night, they should run into a familiar 
figure, slipping out of Descartes's house. Meeting in that no-man's 
land where, for better or worse, the human sciences seem con-
demned to camp out for the foreseeable future, they might well 
greet one another with a smile of recognition. 
., 
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212. VI, p.262. 
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p.146). 
232. VI, p.210. 
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3. PrP,p.11. 
4. SNS, p.94, ft.13. 
5. PrP, pp.7-9, 
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Saussure in a discussion of the work of M. K. Buhler (see p.402). 
Watson further suggests that Merleau-Ponty 'probably' was making 
reference to Saussure's distinction between langue and parole in his 
discussion of expression in the Phenomenology of Perception (p.196), 
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44. Roland Barthes, 'The Imagination of the Sign', in Barthes, Critical 
Essays, trans. R. Howard (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1972) p.205. 
45. Ibid., p.207. 
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